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"Needham, Duncan"
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Expansionary fiscal contraction : the Thatcher government's 1981 budget in perspective
\"In its 1981 Budget, the Thatcher government discarded Keynesian counter-cyclical policies and cut Britain's public sector deficit in the depths of the worst UK recession since the 1930s. Controversially, the government argued that fiscal contraction would produce economic growth. In this specially commissioned volume, contributors examine recently released archives alongside firsthand accounts from key players within No. 10 Downing Street, HM Treasury and the Bank of England, to provide the first comprehensive treatment of this critical event in British economic history. They assess the empirical and theoretical basis for expansionary fiscal contraction, drawing clear parallels with contemporary debates on austerity in Europe, USA and Japan in the wake of the recent global financial crisis. This timely and thoughtful book will have broad appeal among economists, political scientists, historians and policy makers\"-- Provided by publisher.
Book
Historical reasons for the focus on broad monetary aggregates in post-World War II Britain and the ‘Seven Years War’ with the IMF
The British monetary authorities have traditionally focused on broader monetary aggregates than their counterparts elsewhere. The reasons include: the willingness of UK banks to allow customers to make payments by drawing on time deposits, the particularities of the UK approach to managing the national debt and the foreign exchange reserves, and the flow-of-funds system of national accounts developed after World War II. This article outlines these reasons, and explores the implications for the UK's often fractious relationship with the International Monetary Fund during the 1950s and 1960s. It explains why IMF conditionality on loans to the UK focused on broad aggregates.
Journal Article
Britain's Money Supply Experiment, 1971—73
This article challenges the claim that neglect of monetary policy was responsible for the unprecedented UK inflation of the 1970s. It departs from the historiography by showing that the Bank of England and UK Treasury were following unpublished money supply objectives from 1971, two years earlier than is currently acknowledged and five years before Denis Healey first published a money supply target. This early experiment in monetary targeting was not a success. Despite having unpublished monetary targets in place, 1972-73 saw unprecedented growth in the UK money supply. Two years later, inflation hit record levels, apparently vindicating Milton Friedman's claim that excess monetary growth leads inexorably to higher prices after a long and variable lag. The experience convinced senior Bank and Treasury officials that it was impossible to exercise tight control over the UK money supply. Paradoxically, it also persuaded influential politicians, academics, and commentators, less aware of the technical difficulties and realities of monetary policy implementation, that only tighter control of the money supply would cure Britain of her inflationary ills. The result was the Medium-Term Financial Strategy (MTFS), launched by the Thatcher government in March 1980. This produced a recession of unnecessary severity that has had profound long-term consequences for the shape of the British economy.
Journal Article
Britain's money supply experiment, 1971-73
This article challenges the claim that monetary policy neglect was responsible for the unprecedented UK inflation of the 1970s. It departs from the historiography by showing the Bank of England following money supply objectives from 1971, two years earlier than is currently acknowledged and five years before Denis Healey first published a money supply target. After missing its monetary objectives in 1972-73, the Bank concluded that tight control of the money supply was impracticable in the UK. Conservative policymakers drew the opposite conclusion, that only tighter control of the money supply would cure Britain of its economic ills. This failure to heed the lessons of 1970s monetary policy would have profound consequences for the British economy in the early 1980s and beyond.
Paper
Historical reasons for the focus on broad monetary aggregates in post-World War II Britain and the ‘Seven Years War’ with the IMF
The British monetary authorities have traditionally focused on broader monetary aggregates than their counterparts elsewhere. The reasons include: the willingness of UK banks to allow customers to make payments by drawing on time deposits, the particularities of the UK approach to managing the national debt and the foreign exchange reserves, and the flow-of-funds system of national accounts developed after World War II. This article outlines these reasons, and explores the implications for the UK's often fractious relationship with the International Monetary Fund during the 1950s and 1960s. It explains why IMF conditionality on loans to the UK focused on broad aggregates.
Paper