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Integrated information theory (IIT) proposes a measure of integrated information, termed Phi (Φ), to capture the level of consciousness of a physical system in a given state. Unfortunately, calculating Φ itself is currently possible only for very small model systems and far from computable for the kinds of system typically associated with consciousness (brains). Here, we considered several proposed heuristic measures and computational approximations, some of which can be applied to larger systems, and tested if they correlate well with Φ. While these measures and approximations capture intuitions underlying IIT and some have had success in practical applications, it has not been shown that they actually quantify the type of integrated information specified by the latest version of IIT and, thus, whether they can be used to test the theory. In this study, we evaluated these approximations and heuristic measures considering how well they estimated the Φ values of model systems and not on the basis of practical or clinical considerations. To do this, we simulated networks consisting of 3–6 binary linear threshold nodes randomly connected with excitatory and inhibitory connections. For each system, we then constructed the system’s state transition probability matrix (TPM) and generated observed data over time from all possible initial conditions. We then calculated Φ, approximations to Φ, and measures based on state differentiation, coalition entropy, state uniqueness, and integrated information. Our findings suggest that Φ can be approximated closely in small binary systems by using one or more of the readily available approximations (r > 0.95) but without major reductions in computational demands. Furthermore, the maximum value of Φ across states (a state-independent quantity) correlated strongly with measures of signal complexity (LZ, rs = 0.722), decoder-based integrated information (Φ*, rs = 0.816), and state differentiation (D1, rs = 0.827). These measures could allow for the efficient estimation of a system’s capacity for high Φ or function as accurate predictors of low- (but not high-)Φ systems. While it is uncertain whether the results extend to larger systems or systems with other dynamics, we stress the importance that measures aimed at being practical alternatives to Φ be, at a minimum, rigorously tested in an environment where the ground truth can be established.

In a recent electroencephalography (EEG) sleep study inspired by complexity theories of consciousness, we found that multi-channel signal diversity progressively decreased from wakefulness to slow wave sleep, but failed to find any significant difference between dreaming and non-dreaming awakenings within the same sleep stage (NREM2). However, we did find that multi-channel Lempel-Ziv complexity (LZC) measured over the posterior cortex increased with more perceptual ratings of NREM2 dream experience along a thought-perceptual axis. In this follow-up study, we re-tested our previous findings, using a slightly different approach. Partial sleep-deprivation was followed by evening sleep experiments, with repeated awakenings and immediate dream reports. Participants reported whether they had been dreaming, and were asked to rate how diverse, vivid, perceptual, and thought-like the contents of their dreams were. High density (64 channel) EEG was recorded throughout the experiment, and mean single-channel LZC was calculated for each 30 s sleep epoch. LZC progressively decreased with depth of non-REM sleep. Surprisingly, estimated marginal mean LZC was slightly higher for NREM1 than for wakefulness, but the difference did not remain significant after adjusting for multiple comparisons. We found no significant difference in LZC between dream and non-dream awakenings, nor any significant relationship between LZC and subjective ratings of dream experience, within the same sleep stage (NREM2). The failure to reproduce our own previous finding of a positive correlation between posterior LZC and more perceptual dream experiences, or to find any other correlation between brain signal complexity and subjective experience within NREM2 sleep, raises the question of whether EEG LZC is really a reliable correlate of richness of experience as such, within the same sleep stage.

Background: Developing and testing methods for reliably measuring the state of consciousness of individuals is important for both basic research and clinical purposes. In recent years, several promising measures of consciousness, grounded in theoretical developments, have been proposed. However, the degrees to which these measures are affected by changes in brain activity that are not related to changes in the degree of consciousness has not been well tested. In this study, we examined whether several of these measures are modulated by the loading of cognitive resources. Methods: We recorded electroencephalography (EEG) from 12 participants in two conditions: (1) while passively attending to sensory stimuli related to the measures and (2) during increased cognitive load consisting of a demanding working memory task. We investigated whether a set of proposed objective EEG-based measures of consciousness differed between the passive and the cognitively demanding conditions. Results: The P300b event-related potential (sensitive to conscious awareness of deviance from an expected pattern in auditory stimuli) was significantly affected by concurrent performance on a working memory task, whereas various measures based on signal diversity of spontaneous and perturbed EEG were not. Conclusion: Because signal diversity-based measures of spontaneous or perturbed EEG are not sensitive to the degree of cognitive load, we suggest that these measures may be used in clinical situations where attention, sensory processing, or command following might be impaired.

In studies employing physiological measures such as magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), it is often hard to distinguish what constitutes risk-resilience factors to posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) following trauma exposure and what the effects of trauma exposure and PTSD are. We aimed to investigate whether there were observable morphological differences in cortical and sub-cortical regions of the brain, 7-8 years after a single potentially traumatic event. Twenty-four participants, who all directly experienced the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, and 25 controls, underwent structural MRI using a 3T scanner. We generated cortical thickness maps and parcellated sub-cortical volumes for analysis. We observed greater cortical thickness for the trauma-exposed participants relative to controls, in a right lateralized temporal lobe region including anterior fusiform gyrus, and superior, middle, and inferior temporal gyrus. We observed greater thickness in the right temporal lobe which might indicate that the region could be implicated in resilience to the long-term effects of a traumatic event. We hypothesize this is due to altered emotional semantic memory processing. However, several methodological and confounding issues warrant caution in interpretation of the results. Following a traumatic event, most people do not develop long-lasting trauma-related symptoms. In a group who experienced a traumatic event 8 years prior, but showed low levels of trauma-related symptoms, we observed increased cortical thickness in the right temporal lobe. The right temporal lobe is implicated in emotional semantic memory processing, and thus might be associated with resilience to the long-term effects of a traumatic event.

In the field of consciousness science, there is a tradition to categorize certain states such as slow-wave non-REM sleep and deep general anesthesia as “unconscious”. While this categorization seems reasonable at first glance, careful investigations have revealed that it is not so simple. Given that 1) behavioral signs of (un-)consciousness can be unreliable, 2) subjective reports of (un-)consciousness can be unreliable, and, 3) states presumed to be unconscious are not always devoid of reported experience, there are reasons to reexamine our traditional assumptions about “states of unconsciousness”. While these issues are not novel, and may be partly semantic, they have implications both for scientific progress and clinical practice. We suggest that focusing on approaches that provide a more pragmatic and nuanced characterization of different experimental conditions may promote clarity in the field going forward, and help us build stronger foundations for future studies.

Abstract To investigate mechanisms underlying loss of consciousness, it is important to extend methods established in humans to rodents as well. Perturbational complexity index (PCI) is a promising metric of “capacity for consciousness” and is based on a perturbational approach that allows inferring a system’s capacity for causal integration and differentiation of information. These properties have been proposed as necessary for conscious systems. Measures based on spontaneous electroencephalography recordings, however, may be more practical for certain clinical purposes and may better reflect ongoing dynamics. Here, we compare PCI (using electrical stimulation for perturbing cortical activity) to several spontaneous electroencephalography-based measures of signal diversity and integrated information in rats undergoing propofol, sevoflurane, and ketamine anesthesia. We find that, along with PCI, the spontaneous electroencephalography-based measures, Lempel–Ziv complexity (LZ) and geometric integrated information (ΦG), were best able to distinguish between awake and propofol and sevoflurane anesthesia. However, PCI was anti-correlated with spontaneous measures of integrated information, which generally increased during propofol and sevoflurane anesthesia, contrary to expectations. Together with an observed divergence in network properties estimated from directed functional connectivity (current results) and effective connectivity (earlier results), the perturbation-based results seem to suggest that anesthesia disrupts global cortico-cortical information transfer, whereas spontaneous activity suggests the opposite. We speculate that these seemingly diverging results may be because of suppressed encoding specificity of information or driving subcortical projections from, e.g., the thalamus. We conclude that certain perturbation-based measures (PCI) and spontaneous measures (LZ and ΦG) may be complementary and mutually informative when studying altered states of consciousness.

Magneto/electroencephalography (M/EEG) studies of dreaming are an essential paradigm in the investigation of neurocognitive processes of human consciousness during sleep, but they are limited by the number of observations that can be collected per study. Dream research also involves substantial methodological and conceptual variability, which poses problems for the integration of results. To address these issues, here we present the DREAM database—an expanding collection of standardized datasets on human sleep M/EEG combined with dream report data—with an initial release comprising 20 datasets, 505 participants, and 2643 awakenings. Each awakening consists, at minimum, of sleep M/EEG ( ≥ 20 s, ≥100 Hz, ≥2 electrodes) up to the time of waking and a standardized dream report classification of the subject’s experience during sleep. We observed that reports of conscious experiences can be predicted with objective features extracted from EEG recordings in both Rapid Eye Movement (REM) and non-REM (NREM) sleep. We also provide several examples of analyses, showcasing the database’s high potential in paving the way for new research questions at a scale beyond the capacity of any single research group. The authors present a multicenter database to investigate the neural correlates of dreaming, including physiological, behavioral and experiential data. This database could boost the research on the mechanisms of dreaming in humans and the signatures of consciousness.

Objective: How and to what extent electrical brain activity is affected in pharmacologically altered states of consciousness, where it is mainly the phenomenological content rather than the level of consciousness that is altered, is not well understood. An example is the moderately psychedelic state caused by low doses of ketamine. Therefore, we investigated whether and how measures of evoked and spontaneous electroencephalographic (EEG) signal diversity are altered by sub-anaesthetic levels of ketamine compared to normal wakefulness, and how these measures relate to subjective assessments of consciousness. Methods: High-density electroencephalography (EEG, 62 channels) was used to record spontaneous brain activity and responses evoked by transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) in 10 healthy volunteers before and after administration of sub-anaesthetic doses of ketamine in an open-label within-subject design. Evoked signal diversity was assessed using the perturbational complexity index (PCI), calculated from the global EEG responses to local TMS perturbations. Signal diversity of spontaneous EEG, with eyes open and eyes closed, was assessed by Lempel Ziv complexity (LZc), amplitude coalition entropy (ACE), and synchrony coalition entropy (SCE). Results: Although no significant difference was found in the index of TMS-evoked complexity (PCI) between the sub-anaesthetic ketamine condition and normal wakefulness, all the three measures of spontaneous EEG signal diversity showed significantly increased values in the sub-anaesthetic ketamine condition. This increase in signal diversity also correlated with subjective assessment of altered states of consciousness. Moreover, spontaneous signal diversity was significantly higher when participants had eyes open compared to eyes closed, both during normal wakefulness and during influence of sub-anaesthetic ketamine doses. Conclusion: The results suggest that PCI and spontaneous signal diversity may be complementary and potentially measure different aspects of consciousness. Thus, our results seem compatible with PCI being indicative of the brain's ability to sustain consciousness, as indicated by previous research, while it is possible that spontaneous EEG signal diversity may be indicative of the complexity of conscious content. The observed sensitivity of the latter measures to visual input seems to support such an interpretation. Thus, sub-anaesthetic ketamine may increase the complexity of both the conscious content (experience) and the brain activity underlying it, while the level, degree, or general capacity of consciousness remains largely unaffected.

Background: Developing and testing methods for reliably assessing states of consciousness in humans is important for both basic research and clinical purposes. Several potential measures, partly grounded in theoretical developments, have been proposed, and some of them seem to reliably distinguish between conscious and unconscious brain states. However, the degrees to which these measures may also be affected by changes in brain activity or conditions that can occur within conscious brain states have rarely been tested. In this study we test whether several of these measures are modulated by attentional load and related use of cognitive resources. Methods: We recorded EEG from 12 participants while they passively received three types of stimuli: (1) transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) pulses (for measuring perturbational complexity), (2) auditory stimuli (for detection of auditory pattern deviants), or (3) audible clicks from a clock (spontaneous EEG, for measures of signal diversity and functional connectivity). We investigated whether the measures significantly differed between the passive condition and an attentional and cognitively demanding working memory task. Results: Our results showed that in the attention-based auditory P3b ERP measure (global auditory pattern deviant) was significantly affected by increased attentional and cognitive load, while the various measures based on spontaneous and perturbed EEG were not affected. Conclusion: Measures of conscious state based on complexity, diversity, and effective connectivity, are not affected by attentional and cognitive load, suggesting that these measures can be used to test both for the presence and absence of consciousness.