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What explains the social reintegration of ex-combatants from armed conflicts? Community-level programs to reintegrate ex-combatants into society are based on the theory that the participation of ex-combatants in their communities can promote reconciliation and minimize recidivism to illegal activities. We evaluate community and security-related opportunities for and constraints on social reintegration using a survey of ex-combatants from Colombia. We find that ex-combatants in more participatory communities tend to have an easier time with social reintegration and feel less of a need to organize among themselves. These findings suggest that to help ex-combatants, reintegration processes should also work to improve the social vibrancy of receptor communities.

Studies about Islamist‐inspired terror attacks in the Western world have identified a recently declining impact on public opinion. What explains this development? I argue that the wider audience of terrorist attacks has become desensitized. Cognitive desensitization occurs when citizens increasingly expect an attack, reducing the likelihood of attitudinal change. Emotional desensitization occurs when audiences lose sensitivity to attacks, tempering emotional arousal. To assess the implications of desensitization, I analyze a survey conducted around the Berlin Christmas market attack in 2016 and account for baseline information of the surveyed individuals, an approach not used before due to data limitations. I find that attitudes like trust in government, national identification, and views of Islam remain unchanged. Sadness and anger are heightened in the immediate aftermath of the attack. The wider German audience may thus have expected an attack but still be emotionally sensitive to it in the short term. These findings are relevant as political leaders have justified important policy changes in fields like migration and even war making with reference to supposed shifts in public opinion after attacks.

In this article, we test whether an isolated information campaign can deter criminals by appealing to their apprehension risk perception. A randomized trial was conducted around 154 high crime housing blocks in Bogotá. With support of the Colombian Police, half of the blocks were exposed to a three month poster campaign reporting the number of \"arrests around this street block\" and half to a no-treatment control condition. The main outcome measure (total registered crime) and secondary outcome measures (calls to the emergency line for thefts and attacks, and minor wrongdoings) were provided by the Police. Additionally, trust in police, security perception, and police performance perception were measured among residents and workers in the treatment and control areas (N = 616) using a post-treatment survey. Measures were analyzed with linear regression analysis and two-sample t-tests. Over the course of the treatment period, premeditated crime was reduced, while spontaneous crime remained unchanged. Overall levels of crime were not significantly altered. Also, a moderate crime reduction is detectable during the first month of the treatment period. The posters were highly visible (93% of respondents in the treated areas recalled them) and positively received (67% \"liked\" them). Perceptions of security and police among locals improved, though not significantly. Inherent among residents of Bogotá is a pervasive feeling of impunity and low trust in authorities, making the city a hard test case for an offender-targeted advertising campaign. Initial reductions of crime and overall reductions of premeditated crime are thus noteworthy. These results align with key principles of apprehension risk updating theory.

What determines the recidivism of ex-combatants from armed conflicts? In postconflict settings around the world, there has been growing interest in reintegration programs to prevent ex-combatants from returning to illegal activities or to armed groups, yet little is known about who decides to “go bad.” We evaluate explanations for recidivism related to combatant experiences and common criminal motives by combining data from a representative survey of ex-combatants of various armed groups in Colombia with police records of observed behaviors that indicate which among the respondents returned to belligerent or illegal activities. Consistent with a theory of recidivism being shaped by driving and restraining factors, the results suggest that factors such as antisocial personality traits, weak family ties, lack of educational attainment, and the presence of criminal groups are most highly correlated with various kinds of recidivism and hold implications for programs and policies to successfully reintegrate ex-combatants into society.

Objective. Recent literature indicates that exposure to conflict can foster participation. Scholars often point to the social dynamics related to conflict to explain this finding. This article examines individual coping as alternative explanation. It should influence victims of violence independently of the origin of victimization. Methods. Using data from four survey waves in Colombia conducted between 2013 and 2015 (N = 5,536), victims of conflict actors are compared to victims of common delinquency with fixed effects regression analysis. Results. Both conflict and crime victims show elevated levels of participation in social organizations across a series of model specifications. Conclusion. Theories related to the social dynamics of conflict cannot explain why crime victims show similarly elevated levels of participation as conflict victims. Individual coping theory provides an alternative. According to this theory, victims of violence seek support and participation to deal with emotional stress independent of the source of victimization.

Lynching is a surprisingly prevalent form of collective violence. We argue that two conditions can cause lynching: a shared morality based on salient collective threats, providing justification, and weak authority, creating opportunity. We examine this argument with the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. In Aceh, the province most impacted, the tsunami was a shock to morality (producing a religious revival) and authority (creating a situation of institutional flux). Using World Bank data, we find that Aceh saw an increase of lynchings, while lynchings stayed on average the same in other parts of Indonesia. Within Aceh, the increase was most pronounced where authority was most undermined and where locals had high levels of shared morality. These findings have implications for research on collective violence and the prevention of lynching.

Mistrust between conflict parties after civil war is a major hurdle to sustainable peace. However, existing research focuses on elite interactions and has not examined the trust relationship between government and rank-and-file members of armed groups, despite their importance for postconflict stability. We use the unexpected decision of the Colombian government to extradite top-level former paramilitary leaders to the United States in 2008 to identify how a peace deal reversal influences ex-combatants’ trust in government. In theory, they may lose trust for instrumental reasons, if they suffer personal costs, or for normative reasons, if they think the government is failing its commitments. Using quasi-experimental survey evidence, we find that extradition decreases trust substantially among ex-paramilitaries, but not in a comparison group of ex-guerrillas not part of the same peace deal. Even though paramilitaries are seen as particularly opportunistic, our evidence suggests that normative rather than instrumentalist considerations led to trust erosion.

This article demonstrates that public opinion on migration \"at home\" is systematically driven by terrorism in other countries. Although there is little substantive evidence linking refugees or migrants to most recent terror attacks in Europe, news about terrorist attach can trigger more negative views of immigrants. However, the spatial dynamics of this process are neglected in existing research. We argue that feelings of imminent danger and a more salient perception of migration threats do not stop at national borders. The empirical results based on spatial econometrics and data on all terrorist attach in Europe for the post-9/11 period support these claims. The effect of terrorism on migration concern is strongly present within a country but also diffuses across states in Europe. This finding improves our understanding of public opinion on migration, as well as the spillover effects of terrorism, and it highlights crucial lessons for scholars interested in the security implications of population movements.

Scholars have pointed to the importance of resentment (Petersen 2002), hatred (Kaufman 2001), fear (McDoom 2012), and moral outrage (Wood 2003) to explain the emergence of civil war and the participation of individuals in violent groups. These qualitative analyses have been complemented by aggregate-level studies about grievances and indignation (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; Costalli and Ruggeri 2015). Broadly speaking, emotions act as mechanisms in a causal chain, according to this literature. They are the result of a shock or changed structural condition and can then contribute to certain action tendencies associated with behavioral manifestations, including armed mobilization. In this article, I synthesize and develop existing literature by using a dialectical approach. Initially, I adopt the thesis that emotions, understood as individually held mental states, contribute to armed mobilization. According to this individual-level perspective, we should observe that the connection between shocks and emotions, and between emotions and action tendencies, have a certain regularity across individuals. However, in reality both connections are indeterminate and volatile. This brings me to a second thesis: group-based emotions contribute to armed mobilization. On a group level, ideology as a specific kind of collective frame can act as the connecting piece that channels meandering emotions into a given direction and prescribes a corresponding behavioral response. However, individuals within groups can still have a multitude of mixed emotions even while this group process is taking place. Synthesizing these two theses, I argue that group-based emotions contribute to armed mobilization, but that their effect across individuals remains indeterminate. As a result of this reasoning, one could empirically observe whether a \"net effect\" of shocks on emotions and ensuing action tendencies are associated with armed mobilization. This conceptual innovation encompasses both the notion of indeterminacy, based on an individual level understanding of emotion, and the concept of collective frames, necessary for group-based emotions.

Lynching is a surprisingly prevalent form of collective violence. We argue that two conditions can cause lynching: a shared morality based on salient collective threats, providing justification, and weak authority, creating opportunity. We examine this argument with the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. In Aceh, the province most impacted, the tsunami was a shock to morality (producing a religious revival) and authority (creating a situation of institutional flux). Using World Bank data, we find that Aceh saw an increase of lynchings, while lynchings stayed on average the same in other parts of Indonesia. Within Aceh, the increase was most pronounced where authority was most undermined and where locals had high levels of shared morality. These findings have implications for research on collective violence and the prevention of lynching.