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This paper examines the role of capital market conditions and target leverage on the marginal financing decisions of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), which include both capital raising and capital reduction activities. We investigate the relevance of a hybrid hypothesis whereby REITs have target leverage, but they also choose and time their marginal financing decisions according to the capital market conditions. The empirical results suggest that target leverage behavior plays a secondary role to market timing behavior in the financing decisions of REITs. In particular, we find strong and consistent evidence that REITs exhibit market timing behavior in terms of when and what type of capital to issue or reduce. Such market timing practices, motivated by attempts to take advantage of capital market conditions, may shift the firms away from their target leverage. However, we observe that in the long run, most REITs do move their capital structure towards the target debt level.

This paper employs a new scoring framework designed by the Asia Pacific Real Estate Association (APREA) to examine the link between corporate performance and quality of corporate governance among externally managed REITs listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange (S-REITs). The empirical tests provide evidence supporting a positive correlation between corporate governance practices and stock performances. However, we find no positive correlation with operating performance proxied by accounting measures. In other words, S-REITs with higher corporate governance tend to register better risk-adjusted returns but do not outperform operationally. To test for market efficiency, the study shows that S-REITs with the best corporate governance practices also have less information asymmetry.

Using a natural experiment in Singapore, we examine the economic impact of temporarily restricting owners’ rights to transfer their property. Executive condominiums (ECs), introduced to provide affordable housing for middle-class citizens, are subject to restrictions on transferability in the first 10 years, unlike private condominiums (PCs). As per the option theory, EC buyers have the forward-start American put option with the right to sell their properties only after the contract date. Among transacted units matched by location, completion and transaction dates, and complex- and unit-level characteristics, we find that prices of new ECs are about 21 percent lower than those of PCs. After the 10th year, when property rights restrictions are completely removed, the price gap between ECs and PCs narrows to about 3 percent. These results suggest that property rights restrictions and illiquidity generated by the forward-start American put option for 10 years results in an 18 percent discount.

This paper tests the significance of sponsors in REIT IPOs viz-a-viz quality certification, signal of firm value, and commitment to alleviate moral hazard concerns. We model the REIT pricing and sponsor share retention decisions within a simultaneous decision framework as motivated by Grinblatt and Hwang (Journal of Finance 44:393–420, 1989 ). We find positive and significant bidirectional relationship between the fraction of shares held by the sponsor in IPO and underpricing which is consistent with Grinblatt and Hwang’s (Journal of Finance 44:393–420, 1989 ) signaling model. Our results also support the commitment hypothesis that developers that spin off REITs tend to hold more shares at IPO, possibly to compensate investors for the potential moral hazard problems in the aftermarket.

The volatility of a stock returns can be decomposed into market and firm-specific volatility, with the former commonly known as systematic risk and the later as idiosyncratic risk. This study examines the relevance of idiosyncratic risk in explaining the monthly cross-sectional returns of REIT stocks. Contrary to the CAPM theory, a significant positive relationship is found between idiosyncratic volatility and the cross-sectional returns. This suggests that firm-specific risk matters in REIT pricing. The regression results further show that once idiosyncratic risk is controlled for in the asset-pricing model, the size and book-to-market equity ratio factors ceased to be significant. The explanatory power of the momentum effect remains robust in the presence of idiosyncratic risk.

This paper examines the information content of debt raising and refinancing activities of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) in normal and tight credit markets. Based on a sample of 340 debt announcements made by REITs in Japan (J-REITs) between 2002 and 2011, we observe that they are associated with a positive stock price reaction, averaging 1.05 % over a 4-day window. Stratifying the sample into debt raising and debt refinancing, we find strong evidence that the positive economic gains associated with debt announcements flowed from the pool of debt refinancing announcements. They registered a significant mean return of 1.20 % over the 4-day window, as opposed to 0.07 % for the pool of debt raising activities. Further investigation shows that the positive market reaction to debt refinancing is more pronounced during the credit crunch of 2007 to 2009. Although debt refinancing does not lead to any change in the firm’s capital structure, it still contains valuable information about the firm’s prospect, especially in tight credit markets.

This paper examines the effects of market conditions and asset acquisitions on announcement returns and the probability of equity offerings by REITs in Japan and Singapore. The Asian experience is interesting given the prevalence of yield accretive strategies, but more so, we establish that past acquisitions have a significant effect on the probability of equity offering, over and beyond the effect of debt and market conditions. A contemporaneous acquisition announcement mitigates the negative price effect of the SEO announcement. We also find that equity clustering affects market reaction and SEO issuance.

Comparing agent-owner with agent-represented home sales illustrates that commission contracts lead to external agent moral hazard. Real estate developers are sophisticated sellers who can either use external agents or hire internal agents. The theory shows that neither scheme eliminates agent moral hazard. The empirical study of how the seller-agent relationship affects both price and liquidity in a simultaneous system concludes that external agents enjoy superior selling ability that offset moral hazard effects.

The rapid growth of REITs over the last two decades raises an old debate on the existence of scale economies. Out of the 874 growth incidents recorded by individual REITs between 1992 and 2012, we observe that 44.5% of them are sub-optimal, that is they resulted in the acquiring REITs operating at decreasing returns to scale. Large REITs with more free cash flows have a higher propensity to engage in bad growth activities. We find evidence that institutional investors play an effective role in discouraging managerial opportunism and empire building. Independent directors and external creditors, however, do not appear to be effective in discouraging REIT managers from making bad growth decisions.