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177 result(s) for "Orphanides, Athanasios"
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Monetary Policy Rules Based on Real-Time Data
This paper examines the magnitude of informational problems associated with the implementation and interpretation of simple monetary policy rules. Using Taylor's rule as an example, I demonstrate that real-time policy recommendations differ considerably from those obtained with ex post revised data. Further, estimated policy reaction functions based on ex post revised data provide misleading descriptions of historical policy and obscure the behavior suggested by information available to the Federal Reserve in real time. These results indicate that reliance on the information actually available to policy makers in real time is essential for the analysis of monetary policy rules.
The Unreliability of Output-Gap Estimates in Real Time
We examine the reliability of alternative output detrending methods, with special attention to the accuracy of real-time estimates of the output gap. We show that ex post revisions of the estimated gap are of the same order of magnitude as the estimated gap itself and that these revisions are highly persistent. Although important, the revision of published data is not the primary source of revisions in measured output gaps; the bulk of the problem is due to the pervasive unreliability of end-of-sample estimates of the trend in output. Multivariate methods that incorporate information from inflation to estimate the output gap are not more reliable than their univariate counterparts.
The Reliability of Inflation Forecasts Based on Output Gap Estimates in Real Time
A stable predictive relationship between inflation and the output gap, often referred to as a Phillips curve, provides the basis for countercyclical monetary policy in many models. In this paper, we evaluate the usefulness of alternative univariate and multivariate estimates of the output gap for predicting inflation. Many of the ex post output gap measures we examine appear to be quite useful for predicting inflation. However, forecasts using real-time estimates of the same measures do not perform nearly as well. The relative usefulness of real-time output gap estimates diminishes further when compared to simple bivariate forecasting models which use past inflation and output growth. Forecast performance also appears to be unstable over time, with models often performing differently over periods of high and low inflation. These results call into question the practical usefulness of the output gap concept for forecasting inflation.
The fiscal dimension of monetary policy and central bank autonomy: lessons from two crises
Comparing and contrasting the Fed’s and ECB’s policy responses to the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC) and the Covid-19 pandemic highlights the importance of the fiscal dimension of monetary policy and the potential pitfalls when the synergy of fiscal and monetary policy is neglected by an independent central bank. For the ECB, two critical changes in its policy response led to notably better outcomes in the aftermath of the pandemic. In contrast to the hesitation it exhibited in 2008, the ECB expanded its balance sheet more appropriately in 2020 with decisive purchases of long-term government debt. Furthermore, the ECB suspended elements of its policy framework that had impaired the functioning of government debt markets, such as the reliance on credit rating agencies for determining the eligibility of government debt for monetary operations. By protecting government bond markets from the self-fulfilling adverse equilibria that the ECB had tolerated in the aftermath of the GFC, the ECB supported refinancing government debt at low cost in the entire euro area, instead of only in selected Member States. This facilitated more expansionary fiscal policy that supported a more robust recovery, and protected against the further fragmentation of the euro area.
The Euro Area Crisis: Politics over Economics
This paper explores the dominant role of politics in decisions made by euro area governments during the crisis. Decisions that appear to have been driven by local political considerations to the detriment of the euro area as a whole are discussed. The domination of politics over economics has led to crisis mismanagement. The underlying cause of tension is identified as a misalignment of political incentives. Member state governments tend to defend their own interests in a noncooperative manner. This has magnified the costs of the crisis and has resulted in an unbalanced and divisive incidence of the costs across the euro area. The example of Cyprus is discussed, where political decisions resulted in a transfer of about half of 2013 GDP from the island to cover losses elsewhere. In the absence of a federal government, no institution can adequately defend the interests of the euro area as a whole. European institutions appear weak and incapable of defending European principles and the proper functioning of the euro. Political reform is needed to sustain the euro but this is unlikely to pass the political feasibility test with the current governments of Europe.
IMPROVING MONETARY POLICY BY ADOPTING A SIMPLE RULE
With the adoption of an inflation target-2 percent, measured by the PCE index-in its Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy (Federal Reserve Board 2012), the Fed can facilitate well-anchored inflation expectations in line with price stability and can be held accountable over time more easily. [...]it is argued, it is best for policy to remain discretionary. If policy is set in accordance with this version of the Taylor rule and the wrong assessment of the natural rate of interest, policy would be systematically too easy or too tight, leading to inferior economic outcomes. [...]it is argued, discretion is better. Replacing the meeting-by-meeting discretion with a transparent process of selecting and periodically adapting a simple and robust policy rule would ensure that monetary policy is systematic and contributes to social welfare over time while also retaining the flexibility to account for the evolution of the economic environment and of our knowledge.
Monetary Policy Rules, Macroeconomic Stability, and Inflation: A View from the Trenches
I estimate a forward-looking monetary policy reaction function for the Federal Reserve for the periods before and after Paul Volcker's appointment as Chairman in 1979, using information that was available to the FOMC in real time from 1966 to 1995. The results suggest broad similarities in policy and point to a forward-looking approach to policy consistent with a strong reaction to inflation forecasts during both periods. This contradicts the hypothesis, based on analysis with ex post constructed data, that the instability of the Great Inflation was the result of weak FOMC policy responses to expected inflation. A difference is that prior to Volcker's appointment, policy was too activist in reacting to perceived output gaps that retrospectively proved overambitious. Drawing on contemporaneous accounts of FOMC policy, I discuss the implications of the findings for alternative explanations of the Great Inflation and the improvement in macroeconomic stability since then.
Term Structure Estimation with Survey Data on Interest Rate Forecasts
The estimation of dynamic no-arbitrage term structure models with a flexible specification of the market price of risk is beset by severe small-sample problems arising from the highly persistent nature of interest rates. We propose using survey forecasts of a short-term interest rate as an additional input to the estimation to overcome the problem. To illustrate the methodology, we estimate the 3-factor affine-Gaussian model with U.S. Treasury yields data and demonstrate that incorporating information from survey forecasts mitigates the small-sample problem. The model thus estimated for the 1990–2003 sample generates a stable and sensible estimate of the expected path of the short rate, reproduces the well-known stylized patterns in the expectations hypothesis tests, and captures some of the short-run variations in the survey forecast of the changes in longer-term interest rates.