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Between 1850 and 2000 Spain's real output and labor productivity grew at average rates of 2.5 and 2.1 percent. The sources of this long-run growth are investigated here for the first time. Broad capital accumulation and efficiency gains appear as complementary in Spain's long-term growth. Factor accumulation dominated long-run growth up to 1950, while total factor productivity (TFP) led thereafter and, especially, during periods of growth acceleration. The main spurts in TFP and capital coincide with the impact of the railroads (1850s-1880), the electrification (the 1920s and 1950s), and to the adoption of new vintage technology during the Golden Age.

Two distinctive regimes are distinguished in Spain over half a millennium. The first one (1270s-1590s) corresponds to a high land-labour ratio frontier economy, which is pastoral, trade-oriented, and led by towns. Wages and food consumption were relatively high. Sustained per capita growth occurred from the end of the Reconquest (1264) to the Black Death (1340s) and resumed from the 1390s only broken by late fifteenth-century turmoil. A second regime (1600s-1810s) corresponds to a more agricultural and densely populated low-wage economy which, although it grew at a pace similar to that of 1270-1600, remained at a lower level. Contrary to preindustrial western Europe, Spain achieved its highest living standards in the 1340s, not by mid-fifteenth century. Although its death toll was lower, the plague had a more damaging impact on Spain and, far from releasing non-existent demographic pressure, destroyed the equilibrium between scarce population and abundant resources. Pre-1350 per capita income was reached by the late sixteenth century but only exceeded after 1820.

En España, durante los dos últimos siglos, el ingreso real por habitante ha mejorado sustancialmente impulsado por el aumento de la productividad del trabajo, derivado de un uso más intenso y eficiente del capital físico y humano por trabajador. La exposición a la competencia internacional ha representado un estímulo para ello. Aunque la relación entre crecimiento y desigualdad no ha sido lineal, las fases de mayor dinamismo económico del último siglo se corresponden con una mejoría de la distribución de la renta. Así, el moderno crecimiento económico está asociado al aumento del bienestar material de sus habitantes.

The rising trend in the capital-output ratio and the productivity slowdown have put capital back in the economist’s agenda. This paper contributes to the debate by providing new estimates of net capital stock and services for Spain over the last 170 years. The net capital (wealth) stock-GDP ratio rose over time and doubled in the last half a century. Capital services grew fast over the long run accelerating in the 1920s and from the mid-1950s to 2007. Until 1975, its acceleration was helped by an increase in the “quality” of capital. Capital deepening proceeded steadily, accelerating during 1955–1985 and slowing down thereafter for expanding sectors attracted less investment-specific technological progress. Although capital consumption rose over time, the rate of depreciation fell from 1970 to 2007 as new capital goods’ relative prices declined due to embodied technological change.

[...]O’Brien strongly rejects what he labels the Whiggish view, which claims that modern economic growth took place in Britain due to its specific institutions and the set of incentives they provided. The rise of agricultural labour productivity, resulting from the landed aristocracy’s accumulation of land (often through expropriation of common land) and the urban pull from rural labour, facilitated rapid urbanization and the creation of an urban labour force. [...]O’Brien stresses the combination of ruthless predation by the landed aristocracy with the exogenous natural reserves of coal. [...]O’Brien rejects the entrepreneurial attitude of the British industrial business community who, he claims, lacked ‘templates’ and ‘systemic and scientific knowledge’ which resulted in ‘one of the slowest … transitions to an industrial economy in global history’. [...]Britain did not suffer growth reversals (i.e., phases of negative trend growth), since at least the Black Death, even though zero trend growth is found between 1527 and 1628.

Research in economic history has challenged a strict Malthusian depiction of preindustrial European economies, highlighting ‘efflorescences’, ‘Smithian’ and ‘growth recurring’ episodes. Do these defining concepts apply to preindustrial Spain? In this paper, we carry out new yearly estimates of output and population for over half-a millennium. We find that our estimates of agricultural output on the basis of tithes largely confirm those obtained using a demand function approach supporting its use in the absence of direct information. We show that, although levels of output per head in the early nineteenth century were not much different from those in the eve of the Black Death, preindustrial Spain was far from stagnant. Phases of simultaneous per capita output and population expansion and shrinkage alternated, lending support to the recurring growth and frontier economy hypotheses. A long phase of sustained growth and lower inequality collapsed in the 1570s and gave way to another one of sluggish growth and higher inequality. As an alternative to a Malthusian interpretation, we hypothesise that, in preindustrial Spain, growth and decline are largely explained by individual and collective economic decisions.

In this paper the economic performance of post-independence Latin America is assessed in comparative perspective. The release from the colonial fiscal burden was partly offset by higher costs of self-government, while the opening of independent Latin American countries to the international economy represented a handmaiden of growth. Regional disparities increased after independence, so generalisations about the region's long-run behaviour are not straightforward. However, on average, per capita income grew in Latin America, and although the region fell behind compared with the United States and Western Europe, it improved or maintained its position relative to the rest of the world. Thus the term ‘lost decades’ appears an unwarranted depiction of the period between 1820 and 1870. En este artículo es evaluado desde una perspectiva comparativa el desempeño económico de América Latina post-independencia. La liberación de la carga fiscal colonial fue en parte igualado por el alto costo de mantener gobiernos propios, mientras que la apertura de los países latinoamericanos independientes a la economía internacional representó un eje de crecimiento. Las desigualdades regionales se incrementaron después de la independencia, así que las generalizaciones acerca del comportamiento de largo plazo de la región no son fáciles de hacer. Sin embargo, como promedio, el ingreso por cabeza creció en Latinoamérica y aunque la región quedó atrás en comparación con los Estados Unidos y Europa Occidental, ésta mejoró o mantuvo su posición relativa con respecto al resto del mundo. Así que el término “décadas perdidas” parece ser más bien una descripción injustificada del periodo entre 1820 y 1870. Neste artigo o desempenho econômico da América Latina pós-independência é avaliado em uma perspectiva comparativa. A libertação do encargo tributário colonial foi parcialmente compensada por custos maiores decorrentes da nova condição de governo autônomo, enquanto a abertura de países latino-americanos independentes à economia internacional representou um auxílio secundário ao crescimento. Disparidades regionais aumentaram após as independências, consequentemente generalizações a respeito do comportamento da região a longo prazo não são simples. Entretanto a renda per capita aumentou, em média, na América Latina e, embora a região tenha ficado para trás em comparação com os Estados Unidos e a Europa ocidental, ela melhorou ou preservou sua posição em relação ao resto do mundo. Portanto a expressão “décadas perdidas” seria uma retratação injusta do período entre 1820 e 1870.

This article presents historical indices for the main dimensions of economic freedom and an aggregate index for the developed countries of today., specifically pre-1994 OECD members. Economic liberty expanded over the last century-and-a-half, reaching more than two-thirds of its possible maximum. However, its evolution has been far from linear. After a substantial improvement from the mid-nineteenth century, the First World War brought a major setback. The postwar recovery up to 1929 was followed by a dramatic decline in the 1930s. Significant progress took place during the 1950s but fell short of the pre-First World War peak. After a period of stagnation, steady expansion since the early 1980s has resulted in the highest levels of economic liberty of the last two centuries. Each of the main dimensions of economic freedom exhibited a distinctive trend and its contribution to the aggregate index varied over time. Overall, improved property rights provided the main contribution to the long-run advancement of economic liberty.

This paper is an attempt at assessing the economic impact of market-oriented reforms undertaken during General Franco's dictatorship, in particular the 1959 Stabilisation and Liberalisation Plan. Using an index of macroeconomic distortions, the relationship between economic policies and the growth record is examined. Although a gradual reduction in macroeconomic distortions was already in motion during the 1950s, the 1959 Plan opened the way to a new institutional design that favoured a free market allocation of resources and allowed Spain to accelerate growth and catch up with Western Europe. Without the 1950s reforms and, especially, the 1959 Plan, per capita GDP would have been significantly lower in 1975. Este ensayo es un intento de evaluar el impacto económico de las reformas orientadas hacia el mercado llevadas a cabo durante la dictadura del General Franco, en particular, el Plan de Estabilización y Liberalización de 1959. A partir de un índice de distorsiones macroeconómicas se examina la relación entre políticas económicas y crecimiento. Aunque una reducción gradual de estas distorsiones se había iniciado durante los años cincuenta, el Plan de 1959 dio lugar a un nuevo diseño institucional que favoreció la asignación de recursos con criterios de libre mercado y permitió a España acelerar su crecimiento y acortar distancias con Europa Occidental. Sin las reformas económicas de los años cincuenta y, en especial, del Plan de 1959, el PIB per capita habría sido significativamente inferior en 1975.