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Since its inception in 1947, Pakistan has perceived serious threats to its national sovereignty and territorial integrity from neighboring India. As a result, Pakistan adopted a state-centric national security approach to counter local and regional threats to its security during the Cold War period. By plugging into Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, Pakistan secured American support to help develop and consolidate a national security state that was focused, above all else, on a perceived local threat from India. Over time, the country was able devote substantial amounts of domestic and international resources to the imperative of national security. Meanwhile, the Pakistani military became a prominent institution in the formulation and execution of the country's foreign and security policies. The article seeks to chart the distinctive evolution of the national security state in Pakistan from 1947 to 1988 and to demonstrate that the Pakistani model has gone much further than its American counterpart in institutionalizing the leading role of the military in the making of security and foreign policy.

This article explores the relationship between domestic concerns about regime survival in Russia and Vladimir Putin’s muscular policy toward the Ukraine since 2013. After critically examining claims that the Ukraine crisis was caused by NATO enlargement, American diplomatic weakness or strategic folly, the authors consider the operational code construct as an alternative explanation to better explain Putin’s decision-making. They attempt to show that Putin’s intervention in the Ukraine was shaped, above all, by the political ‘rules’ of an authoritarian regime, which viewed growing links between a significant ‘near abroad’ state and the EU as a potentially destabilizing at home. Putin’s political system assigns a prominent regime maintenance role to Russia’s intelligence services and is one characterized by widespread corruption, stark inequality, the suppression of independent media organizations, and the systematic harassment and intimidation of political opponents.

This seminal work argues that the disastrous raid in Mogadishu in 1993, and America's resulting aversion to intervening in failed states, led to the Rwanda and Bosnia genocides and to the 9/11 attacks. Contrary to conventional wisdom, this book argues, it was not the 9/11 attacks that transformed the international security environment. Instead, it was \"Somali Syndrome, \" an aversion to intervening in failed states that began in the wake of the1993 U.S./UN action in Somalia. The botched raid precipitated America's strategic retreat from its post-Cold War experiment at partnership with the UN in nation-building and peace enforcement and engendered U.S. paralysis in the face of genocide in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Darfur. The ensuing international security vacuum emboldened al-Qaeda to emerge and attack America and inaugurated our present era of intrastate conflict, mass killings, forced relocations, and international terrorism. As this even-handed treatment shows, the Somali crisis can be connected to seven key features of the emerging post-Cold War world security order. These include the fact that failed states are now the main source of world instability and that new wars are driven by racial, ethnic, and religious identity issues.

This article locates the origins of 9/11 in the increasingly globalized security context of the early post-Cold War period. In particular, it seeks to illuminate the causal connection between the disastrous US-UN humanitarian intervention in Somalia in 1992–1993 and the emergence of a permissive security environment that ultimately made the events of 11 September possible. It is argued here that the Somali crisis was a defining moment for US foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. It generated the ‘Somalia Syndrome’ in Washington – a risk-averse approach to intervention in civil conflicts which, as the terrorist attack on the United States in September 2011 subsequently revealed, had unintended but far-reaching international consequences.

This ground-breaking volume considers the ethical aspects of foreign policy change through five interrelated dimensions: conceptual, security, economic, normative and diplomatic. Defining ethics and what an ethical foreign policy should be is highly contested. The book includes many very different viewpoints to reflect the strong divergence of opinion on such issues as humanitarian intervention, free trade, the doctrine of preemption, political corruption and human rights. The thematic approach provides this volume with a clear organizational structure, giving readers a balanced overview of a number of important conceptual and practical issues central to the ethical analysis of states' conduct and foreign policy making. An impressive group of international scholars and practitioners, including a New Zealand Foreign Minister, a US National Security Advisor, and an ICJ Justice, makes this volume ideally suited to courses on international relations, security studies, ethics and human rights, philosophy, media studies and international law.

The Obama leadership has seemingly gone further than previous administrations in recognizing that globalization has fundamentally reshaped the structure of world politics, and made the idea of US unilateralism deeply problematic. In the words of Susan Rice, while US leadership in the world ‘is necessary it’s rarely sufficient’. But the Obama team’s fresh emphasis on diplomacy, its tilt towards multilateralism and its desire to lighten the US global military footprint has not led to the abandonment of US exceptionalism. Rather, US exceptionalism has been reframed in terms of the resilience and power of the American democratic and economic example in an interconnected world. History, the Obama administration contends, is on the side of the American democratic political system. In contrast to authoritarian rival states, the US democratic model is not only more prosperous and stable, but is also able to more successfully adapt to the pressures and opportunities of globalization.

This book considers the evolving relationship between China and the international system, and the interaction between a China of profound change in its identity, capability, and influence, and an international system that is itself experiencing a process of far-reaching transformation. It develops an analytical framework that allows us to capture, understand and explain a more dynamic pattern of agent-structure interaction in China's relationship with the international system. By demonstrating a more dynamic and mutually constitutive relationship between China and the international system, the book explores the extent to which both transform themselves in the process, and provides a fuller and more effective assessment of the evolving nature of the relationship. In doing so, it addresses key issues in the current literature on the relationship of China and the international system, and helps close the gap in our knowledge of the conditions and consequences of change and stability in the international system as a result of the change in distributions of power, capability and influence among nation-states.

For over half a century, the internationally recognised University of Otago Foreign Policy School has annually drawn together a mix of government officials, diplomats, academics, students and members of the general public to discuss issues of international significance. This article considers the establishment of the Foreign Policy School, and analyses its impact on the formulation and implementation of foreign policy between 1966 and 1976. Michelle Hale Williams' conceptual model is employed to assess the School's influence on public and political debate. It is argued the School's influence was directly and most clearly evident at what Williams defines as the agendas and institutional levels. There was a gradual but definite shift in New Zealand's foreign policy outlook between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s, which is reflected in questions raised and discussed by the School. Public engagement with foreign policy questions, in which the School played an enabling role, was also transformed in the course of this period. The School rapidly became an important forum for foreign policy discussions between groups that had previously had little interaction. This article shows that, while it generated few concrete results at the level of policy, the School certainly played a part in helping to foster a national world-view that was increasingly based on New Zealand values and interests, paving the way for the emergence of a more independent foreign policy.

This article focuses on the tensions between a new exclusive US exceptionalism after 9/11 and a globalised security environment. The terrorist attacks in Washington and New York revealed that even the world's only superpower is vulnerable to the type of transnational violence that had blighted other countries during the post-cold war era. Yet these events, at least in the short term, have served to intensify the 'distinctive American internationalism' of the Bush administration. This trend culminated in the USA bypassing the authority of the UN Security Council and leading an invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Nevertheless, there are growing signs that this new American exceptionalism has become a serious impediment to effectively prosecuting the war on terror. In the era of globalisation it is the support of other nations and multilateral institutions that offers the best hope of ensuring that the USA lives in a more secure world. Without moving to a more inclusive form of exceptionalism, Washington will struggle to sustain the level of international support that it needs to prevail in the current struggle against terrorism.

The US national security state was fashioned at the beginning of the Cold War to contain the global threat of the rival superpower, the Soviet Union. However, this security framework did not wither away with the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the USSR. The events of September 11 starkly exposed the limitations of a state-centric approach to international security in a globalizing world. But the Bush administration falsely assumed that the traumatic events of 9/11 came out of a clear blue sky, and that a rejuvenated national security state would eventually overwhelm the ‘new’ threat of terrorism. The dangers of persisting in this direction were shown by the US-led invasion of Iraq. Far from closing the gap between the US approach to security and the operation environment of a post-Cold War world, Bush's war on terror undermined the international reputation of the US and presented the American taxpayer with a huge and probably unsustainable burden. All this highlighted the need for a more multilateral direction in US security policy in the post-Bush era. Such an approach would not only correspond better to the realities of today's interconnected world, but also serve as a buffer against the extension of the power of government that had been witnessed in America during the Bush years.