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Populist parties have been shown to attract many voters disillusioned with representative democracies. And some of these parties do indeed propose models of government that challenge contemporary democratic systems. However, we do not know exactly what the democratic preferences of populist party supporters are. We propose to fill this gap by investigating the types of actors that citizens who are more sympathetic to populist parties would like to see play a greater role in their national political system. First, we find that populists believe that citizens should be more involved, highlighting the people-centred nature of populism. Second, they advocate a greater role for business leaders, military generals, and religious leaders, a preference found among both right-wing and left-wing populists. Third, left-wing populists show a unique preference for scientific experts in government, suggesting a technocratic inclination. Conversely, right-wing populists are particularly critical of elected politicians, underlining their deep anti-elitist attitudes. Our findings suggest that, among citizens who are more sympathetic to populist parties, there is support for models of government that challenge representative democracy. The question is whether populist parties would be influenced by these citizens to push for institutional reforms.

Voters of governing parties are more satisfied with democracy than opposition voters, but the consequences of this winner-loser gap remain underexplored. We argue that electoral losers should be more supportive of referendums than electoral winners as representative democracy has failed electoral losers, whereas electoral winners aim to protect their party’s ability to govern without constraint. In addition, we theorize that affective polarization should strengthen this gap. Using cross-national survey data from thirteen European democracies, we find that electoral losers consistently show greater support for referendums than winners, and affective polarization amplifies this effect. Yet, the effect of affective polarization is solely attributed to a decrease in support for referendums among polarized election winners. These findings raise questions about the role of affective polarization in undermining the accountability mechanism between electoral winners and their parties. Concerns about electoral losers might be overstated and potentially overlook the democratic implications of electoral victory.

Fitting with a common scheme across European democracies, the last election in Belgium led radical (left and right) parties to increase their vote share. One of the key drivers of the radical vote is political dissatisfaction (Droste 2011). Yet, the latter does not always translate into radical or protest voting behaviors. Using the 2019s RepResent Belgian Elections Study, we show the moderating effect of close social contacts in this relationship. For dissatisfied voters who believe that most contacts are similarly discontent, the probability to vote for radical parties (or, if not, to adopt other protest behaviors) is reinforced. However, the odds decrease the more they perceive their contacts different from themselves, i.e., as politically satisfied voters. Then, they become more likely to avoid protest/radical choices and to vote for institutionalized parties. Overall, our study yields findings showing that voting behaviors should be studied by considering also the voters’ social networks, which seem to exert a role in defining the acceptability of voting choices. What matters is not only how one perceives politics but also how one believes his close contacts perceive politics too.

This article explores the development of my PhD dissertation’s methodological approach, based on Social Network Analysis (SNA), or the collection and analysis of network data, in order to deal with political parties and their members (party membership). I extensively relied on this alternative, growing methodological background in three extents. First (1), SNA was used to analyze bibliographic references related to my dissertation topic, i.e. party membership studies, and identify the most central authors, thereby illustrating the literature review while describing their key contributions. Second (2), SNA was employed to collect and analyze network data likely to better grasp how interpersonal networks affect the probability for a random citizen to turn into party member, assuming that social influence matters in the process of joining a political party. Third (3), I further capitalized on SNA to deal with the question of party activism and why some members become active whereas others remain passive, arguing theoretically and showing empirically that part of the answer lies in members’ position within their local party branch’s social network. Each of these three applications is discussed in the light of the main methodological developments, the empirical findings and their interpretation, while shortcomings and research opportunities are more systematically highlighted at the end.

This note introduces the POLITICIZE dataset which contains information on the characteristics of 105 Deliberative Mini-Publics (DMPs) that took place in Europe between 2000 and 2020. Based on coding of experts regarding cases of real-life deliberative experiments in 18 different European countries, the dataset describes the core features of DMPs in Europe. It comprises information on three crucial dimensions: their composition (who deliberates?), their format (how do they deliberate?) and their role (what do they deliberate about and what are their prerogatives?). Hence, the note presents the different variables included in the dataset and reports empirical variations across them, thereby presenting the main contribution of the POLITICIZE dataset: delivering the most systematic and comprehensive efforts of data collection on mini-publics in Europe.

The aim of this research is to gauge public support for ministers who did not follow a typical “career politician” pathway prior to their nomination (i.e., those who never held an elected office and are not affiliated to a political party) and to understand what drives this support. We use a web-based conjoint experiment fielded in six European countries, in which respondents are presented with pairs of vignettes describing the profile of hypothetical ministers and must state which of the two candidates they would personally prefer. The task is repeated five times, once for the Prime Minister office and once for four specialized minister positions. We find that attributes associated with technocratic government almost always increase popular support for ministers. These preferences are stable across policy domains and are as prevalent in the case of the PM as in the case of specialized ministries. However, we identify substantial cross-country variations: pro-technocratic attitudes are more prevalent in Italy, Poland and Spain than in the UK and Germany.

Previous research suggests that Europeans want more experts in government, but which experts do they want and why? Using survey data collected in 15 European countries, this study compared citizens’ preferences for high-ranking civil servants, university professors, and business executives over traditional political actors (MPs and former ministers) as ministers in government. Overall, university professors were rated more positively than MPs or former ministers in almost all countries, whereas civil servants and business executives were only rated more positively than politicians in Poland, Italy, Spain, Greece, Ireland, and Belgium. While political distrust is a key predictor of preferring political outsiders, we also found that civil servants are not as appealing to politically distrusting individuals, depending on the country. Furthermore, while the demand for more expertise in government mainly influences preferences for university professors, the demand for more government by the people is connected to preferences for business executives and (to a lesser extent) civil servants. The latter finding challenges the common distinction between citizen and expert-oriented visions of democracy and the alleged ‘elitist’ underpinnings of empowering non-elected outsiders.

Assessments of party decline and decline of traditional forms of political participation often rely on the argument of party membership decline. Most studies analysing trends in party membership over time focus on aggregate country-level data at a few points in time. While they allow grasping general membership trends, they are not without shortcomings. This article presents the Members and Activists of Political Parties (MAPP) dataset related to the MAPP project. The dataset makes a large amount of data on party membership available to the larger public. The dataset provides 6,307 party membership data observations (M) covering 397 parties in 31 countries, mostly between 1945 and 2014. The article discusses the existing literature and data on party membership trends, how membership trends have been assessed so far, and the potential added value of the MAPP dataset.