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121 result(s) for "Pearlman, Wendy"
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The home I worked to make : voices from the new Syrian diaspora
\"War forced millions of Syrians from their homes. It also forced them to rethink the meaning of home itself. In 2011, Syrians took to the streets demanding freedom. Brutal government repression transformed peaceful protests into one of the most devastating conflicts of our times, killing hundreds of thousands and displacing millions. The Home I Worked to Make takes Syria's refugee outflow as its point of departure. Based on hundreds of interviews conducted across more than a decade, it probes a question as intimate as it is universal: What is home? With gripping immediacy, Syrians now on five continents share stories of leaving, losing, searching, and finding (or not finding) home. Across this tapestry of voices, a new understanding emerges: home, for those without the privilege of taking it for granted, is both struggle and achievement. Recasting \"refugee crises\" as acts of diaspora-making, The Home I Worked to Make challenges readers to grapple with the hard-won wisdom of those who survive war and to see, with fresh eyes, what home means in their own lives.\"-- Provided by publisher.
Emotions and the Microfoundations of the Arab Uprisings
In any political setting, a few people will defy political authority. The main challenge for theories of rebellion is to explain when and why others join en masse. Scholarship on social movements typically develops answers to this puzzle on the basis of either of two microfoundations. Explanations that conceptualize individuals as utility-maximizers contend that they protest as a means to other ends. Explanations that see individuals as driven by values and beliefs suggest that people protest for the inherent benefit of voicing dissent. Both perspectives generate compelling explanations. Yet how do purposeful individuals act when utilitarian calculations and cherished values recommend contrary courses of action? Why might an actor prioritize one or the other at different points in time? Taking on these questions, I argue for an approach to microfoundations that focuses on emotions. Emotions such as fear, sadness, and shame promote pessimistic assessments, risk aversion, and a low sense of control. Such dispiriting emotions encourage individuals to prioritize security and resign to political circumstances, even when they contradict values of dignity. By contrast, anger, joy, and pride promote optimistic assessments, risk acceptance, and feelings of personal efficacy. Such emboldening emotions encourage prioritization of dignity and increase willingness to engage in resistance, even when it jeopardizes security. When instrumentality and values offer different answers to the question of whether to resign or rebel, therefore, emotions can shift individuals toward one or the other. I ground this argument in findings from the neurosciences and illustrate it with evidence from the 2011 uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt and the absence of an uprising in Algeria.
Muzoon : a Syrian refugee speaks out
Muzoon was fourteen years old when her family made the wrenching decision to leave their home in Syria. War had begun. Peaceful protests were met with shootings. Next, bombs were flying overhead. Even still, Muzoon wanted to stay. What would become of her in a refugee camp? Would there be a school there? Would she ever be able to go home again? In this inspiring memoir, Muzoon shares how she grew up as a refugee. And how she spoke up for what she needed: A chance to learn. A chance to make a difference. Muzoon wasn't just fighting for herself - she wanted to help other refugee kids, too. And she shows how one stubborn, determined girl can change the world.
Violence, Nonviolence, and the Palestinian National Movement
Why do some national movements use violent protest and others nonviolent protest? Wendy Pearlman shows that much of the answer lies inside movements themselves. Nonviolent protest requires coordination and restraint, which only a cohesive movement can provide. When, by contrast, a movement is fragmented, factional competition generates new incentives for violence and authority structures are too weak to constrain escalation. Pearlman reveals these patterns across one hundred years in the Palestinian national movement, with comparisons to South Africa and Northern Ireland. To those who ask why there is no Palestinian Gandhi, Pearlman demonstrates that nonviolence is not simply a matter of leadership. Nor is violence attributable only to religion, emotions or stark instrumentality. Instead, a movement's organizational structure mediates the strategies that it employs. By taking readers on a journey from civil disobedience to suicide bombings, this book offers fresh insight into the dynamics of conflict and mobilization.
Triadic coercion : Israel's targeting of states that host nonstate actors
In the post-Cold War era, an increasing number of conflicts involve states and non-state actors. Yet states often have difficulty fighting such groups due to their small size, secretive structures, lack of visible assets, and extremist ideologies. Given these circumstances, some analysts conclude that states cannot deter non-state actors directly, and instead recommend that states aim to deter other states that aid, abet, or host these non-state actors--a strategy Atzili and Pearlman term \"triadic coercion.\" In this book, Pearlman and Atzili explain the strategic function of triadic coercion, outlining how 'coercer' states employ this strategy; under what circumstances it is successful; and why states pursue triadic coercion even when it is the non-rational option (i.e., when the 'host' state is too politically or militarily weak to take effective action against the non-state actor). They trace triadic coercion through Israel's over 65 years of conflict with non-state actors like Hezbollah that attack Israel from neighboring Arab states. Employing qualitative empirical analysis of a range of primary and secondary sources--including interviews with political and military leaders, journalists, and analysts--Atzili and Pearlman map out the ideas, relationships, and mechanisms that led Israel to take the course of action it did; the consequences; and why Israel continues to utilize this strategy despite past failures. The final chapter broadens in scope to analyze how Turkey and India utilize (and do not utilize) triadic coercion in different ways, partly due to their country-specific security cultures, and why triadic coercion will continue to be a key, evolving force in the international security landscape.
Spoiling Inside and out: Internal Political Contestation and the Middle East Peace Process
Actors turn to negotiating or spoiling as a means of contesting not only what a proposed peace settlement entails but also who has the power to decide the terms. Conflicts are more likely to witness negotiating and spoiling for purposes of internal contestation to the degree that one or both of the warring parties lack an institutionalized system of legitimate representation. Whether internal contestation leads a group to act as a peace maker or as a peace breaker is conditioned by its position in the internal balance of power. Two eras in the Palestinian national movement--the Palestine Liberation Organization's bid to join the Geneva peace conference in 1973-74 and its en gagement in the Oslo peace process from 1993 to 2000--illustrate these propositions. Leaders of national movements and rebel groups, no less than leaders of states, are systematically influenced by domestic politics. As such, sponsors of peace processes should expect spoiler problems unless a movement heals rifts within its ranks.
Moral Identity and Protest Cascades in Syria
Cascade models explain the roles of the intrepid few who initiate protest and the masses who join when the expected utility of dissent flips from negative to positive. Yet questions remain about what motivates participation between those points on the causal chain, or under any conditions of high risk. To explain these anomalies, this article employs theories of moral identity to explore the interdependence of a facet of decision making that rationalist models typically regard as fixed: individuals’ awareness of and need to express values central to their sense of self. Three mechanisms describe ways that individuals’ responses to early risers trigger moral identity-based motivations for protest. First, by conjuring normative ideals, first movers can activate bystanders’ urge to follow their example in order to earn their own self-respect. Secondly, by demonstrating the joy of agency, early risers can inspire bystanders’ desire to experience the same gratification. Thirdly, by absorbing punishments, early risers can activate onlookers’ sense of moral obligation to contribute to collective efforts. These mechanisms redouble bystanders’ sense of the inherent value of protest, apart from its instrumental utility, and intensify their acceptance of risks, independent of the actual risks anticipated. Original interviews with displaced Syrians about their participation in demonstrations illustrate these processes.
Narratives of Fear in Syria
Scholarship on Syria has traditionally been limited by researchers' difficulty in accessing the reflections of ordinary citizens due to their reluctance to speak about politics. The 2011 revolt opened exciting opportunities by producing an outpouring of new forms of self-expression, as well as encouraging millions to tell their stories for the first time. I explore what we can learn from greater attention to such data, based on thick descriptive analysis of original interviews with 200 Syrian refugees. I find that individuals' narratives coalesce into a collective narrative emphasizing shifts in political fear. Before the uprising, fear was a pillar of the state's coercive authority. Popular demonstrations generated a new experience of fear as a personal barrier to be surmounted. As rebellion militarized into war, fear became a semi-normalized way of life. Finally, protracted violence has produced nebulous fears of an uncertain future. Study of these testimonials aids understanding of Syria and other cases of destabilized authoritarianism by elucidating lived experiences obscured during a repressive past, providing a fresh window into the construction and evolution of national identity, and demonstrating how the act of narration is an exercise in meaning making within a revolution and itself a revolutionary practice.
Host State Engagement, Socioeconomic Class, and Syrian Refugees in Turkey and Germany
Refugees' preflight class interacts with host state policies to shape refugees' postdisplacement class trajectories. This interaction affects whether refugees of different backgrounds experience mobility over time and how refugees of various backgrounds disperse over space. \"Selective engagement\" hosts that leave refugees to self-settle accentuate stratification insofar as refugees with capital can attain entrepreneurial success, poor refugees lack protection from further impoverishment, and middle-class professionals have both the means and motivation to try to migrate elsewhere. \"Interventionist engagement\" hosts lessen the gap between rich and poor both by attracting middle-class refugees and by imposing integration programs that further compress all refugees toward the middle. Demonstrating these arguments, analysis of Syrian refugees in Turkey and Germany illustrates a diaspora's class-remaking in ways not attributable to displacement alone.