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\"Since the publication of the Stern Review, economists have started to ask more normative questions about climate change. Should we act now or tomorrow? What is the best theoretical carbon price to reach long-term abatement targets? How do we discount the long-term costs and benefits of climate change? This provocative book argues that these are the wrong sorts of questions to ask because they don't take into account the policies that have already been implemented. Instead, it urges us to concentrate on existing policies and tools by showing how the development of carbon markets could dramatically reduce world greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, triggering policies to build a new low-carbon energy system while restructuring the way agriculture interacts with forests. This provides an innovative new perspective on how a post-Kyoto international climate regime could emerge from agreements between the main GHG emitters capping their emissions and building an international carbon market\"-- Provided by publisher.

Linkages between Emissions Trading Systems are deemed an important element of the future climate policy landscape. They are, however, difficult to agree and remain few and far between. Temporary restrictions on permit trading have potential to facilitate and gradually approach unrestricted, full linkage. We compare the relative merits of several link restrictions in this respect, namely quantitative transfer limits, border taxes on transfers, exchange and discount rates, and unilateral linkage. To this end, we develop a simple model to have a unifying framework which, in conjunction with lessons we draw from real-world experiences, serves as a basis for a broader, policy-oriented discussion. While quantitative restrictions seem to be the natural route to full linkage, they can lead to uncertain distributional effects and weaken price signals. These aspects are mitigated under a border permit tax, but this policy seems harder to implement. Exchange rates have potential to adjust for programmes’ stringencies and raise ambition over time, but can be challenging to select. As experience corroborates, unilateral linkage can be a convenient approach.

À la COP26, l'objectif de maintenir le réchauffement en-deçà de 1,5 °C s'est imposé comme cible de long terme. Cette visée n'est pas en cohérence avec les contributions que les États ont déposées pour réduire leurs émissions de gaz à effet de serre d'ici 2030. Pour accélérer la transition, ils devront s'accorder sur des transferts financiers d'une autre ampleur, introduire une réelle tarification carbone redistributive au niveau international et organiser la sortie des énergies fossiles. At COP26, a long-term target to keep global warming below 1.5°C was set. This goal is inconsistent with the commitments that the signatory countries have made in terms of reducing their greenhouse gas emissions by 2030. To speed up the transition, they must agree to financial transfers of a greater magnitude, introduce real and redistributive international carbon pricing, and take steps to phase out fossil fuels.

China faces significant challenges in reconciling food security goals with the objective of becoming a low-carbon economy. Agriculture accounts for approximately 11 % of China’s national greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions with cereal production representing a large proportion (about 32 %) of agricultural emissions. Minimizing emissions per unit of product is a policy objective and we estimated the GHG intensities (GHGI) of rice, wheat and maize production in China from 1985 to 2010. Results show significant variations of GHGIs among Chinese provinces and regions. Relative to wheat and maize, GHGI of rice production is much higher owing to CH 4 emissions, and is more closely related to yield levels. In general, the south and central has been the most carbon intensive region in rice production while the GHGI of wheat production is highest in north and northwest provinces. The southwest has been characterized by the highest maize GHGI but the lowest rice GHGI. Compared to the baseline scenario, a 2 % annual reduction in N inputs, combined with improved water management in rice paddies, would mitigate 17 % of total GHG emissions from cereal production in 2020 while sustaining the required yield increase to ensure food security. Better management practices will entail additional gains in soil organic carbon further decreasing GHGI. To realize the full mitigation potential while maximizing agriculture development, the design of appropriate policies should accommodate local conditions.

L'ère où adaptation et atténuation du changement climatique étaient considérées comme concurrentes est révolue. Dans un monde où le thermomètre est en passe de régulièrement dépasser le + 1,5°C observé en 2024, la résilience des économies exige de combiner adaptation et atténuation. L'industrie est concernée au premier chef. Pour renforcer sa résilience, elle doit coupler ses efforts de décarbonation à des stratégies d'adaptation pour protéger le fonctionnement des réseaux, assurer la résilience des chaÎnes d'approvisionnement et faire face aux perturbations du cycle de l'eau. Durant les prochaines décennies, l'adaptation sera une exigence forte, mais aussi un nouveau gisement pour l'innovation.

Le rendez-vous Paris Climat 2015 constitue la date butoir pour poser les bases d'un accord universel. Un accord climatique ambitieux repose sur trois piliers : un engagement des gouvernements, un système indépendant de monitoring , de reporting et de vérification (MRV) et l'instauration d'une tarification internationale du carbone.Dans cet article, nous proposons une méthode mixant taxation et marchés de permis. Il s'agit dans un premier temps d'introduire un bonus-malus carbone international, avec une taxe de l'ordre de 7 $ par tonne de CO2, calculé à partir de l'écart pour un pays entre son niveau moyen d'émission par habitant et la moyenne mondiale. Cette tarification aurait le double objectif d'inciter les pays à faible émission par habitant à rejoindre le système commun de MRV et de faciliter le respect de la promesse d'opérer un transfert annuel de 100 Md$ à destination des pays les moins avancés. Dans un second temps, il faut constituer un marché transcontinental du carbone, à partir des systèmes d'échange de quotas de CO2 en Europe, en Chine et aux États-Unis. Interconnecter ces différents marchés exige de mettre en place une gouvernance commune pour s'assurer que les grands émetteurs s'engagent bien sur des trajectoires compatibles avec l'objectif de limitation du réchauffement climatique à 2 °C.Classification JEL : F53, F59, H23, Q54. The Paris climate summer represents the last chance to lay the foundations for a universal agreement. An ambitious climate agreement is based on: (1) a commitment by governments, (2) an independent monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) system and (3) the introduction of international carbon pricing. In this paper we propose a method combining taxation and allowances markets. First, the introduction of an international carbon bonus-malus system, with a tax of around $7 per tonne of CO2, calculated for each country on the basis of the difference between its average emissions per capita and the world average. This pricing system would have the dual objective of encouraging countries with low emissions per capita to join the common MRV system and of facilitating compliance with the pledge to make an annual transfer of $100 billion to the least developed countries. Second, the creation of a transcontinental carbon market, based on the emissions trading systems being developed in Europe, China and the United States. Interconnecting these markets requires setting up a common system of governance to ensure that major emitters fully commit themselves to trajectories consistent with the objective of limiting global warming to 2°C.Classification JEL: F53, F59, H23, Q54.