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Amidst declarations of planetary emergency and reports that the window for limiting climate change to 1.5 °C is rapidly closing, global average temperatures and fossil fuel emissions continue to rise. Global fossil CO2 emissions have grown three years consecutively: +1.5% in 2017, +2.1% in 2018, and our slower central projection of +0.6% in 2019 (range of -0.32% to 1.5%) to 37 2 Gt CO2 (Friedlingstein et al 2019 Earth Syst. Sci. Data accepted), after a temporary growth hiatus from 2014 to 2016. Economic indicators and trends in global natural gas and oil use suggest a further rise in emissions in 2020 is likely. CO2 emissions are decreasing slowly in many industrialized regions, including the European Union (preliminary estimate of −1.7% [-3.4% to +0.1%] for 2019, −0.8%/yr for 2003-2018) and United States (−1.7% [-3.7% to +0.3%] in 2019, −0.8%/yr for 2003-2018), while emissions continue growing in India (+1.8% [+0.7% to 3.7%] in 2019, +5.1%/yr for 2003-2018), China (+2.6% [+0.7% to 4.4%] in 2019, +0.4%/yr for 2003-2018), and rest of the world ((+0.5% [−0.8% to 1.8%] in 2019, +1.4%/yr for 2003-2018). Two under-appreciated trends suggest continued long-term growth in both oil and natural gas use is likely. Because per capita oil consumption in the US and Europe remains 5- to 20-fold higher than in China and India, increasing vehicle ownership and air travel in Asia are poised to increase global CO2 emissions from oil over the next decade or more. Liquified natural gas exports from Australia and the United States are surging, lowering natural gas prices in Asia and increasing global access to this fossil resource. To counterbalance increasing emissions, we need accelerated energy efficiency improvements and reduced consumption, rapid deployment of electric vehicles, carbon capture and storage technologies, and a decarbonized electricity grid, with new renewable capacities replacing fossil fuels, not supplementing them. Stronger global commitments and carbon pricing would help implement such policies at scale and in time.

The responses of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other climate variables to an emission pulse of CO2 into the atmosphere are often used to compute the Global Warming Potential (GWP) and Global Temperature change Potential (GTP), to characterize the response timescales of Earth System models, and to build reduced-form models. In this carbon cycle-climate model intercomparison project, which spans the full model hierarchy, we quantify responses to emission pulses of different magnitudes injected under different conditions. The CO2 response shows the known rapid decline in the first few decades followed by a millennium-scale tail. For a 100 Gt-C emission pulse added to a constant CO2 concentration of 389 ppm, 25 ± 9% is still found in the atmosphere after 1000 yr; the ocean has absorbed 59 ± 12% and the land the remainder (16 ± 14%). The response in global mean surface air temperature is an increase by 0.20 ± 0.12 °C within the first twenty years; thereafter and until year 1000, temperature decreases only slightly, whereas ocean heat content and sea level continue to rise. Our best estimate for the Absolute Global Warming Potential, given by the time-integrated response in CO2 at year 100 multiplied by its radiative efficiency, is 92.5 × 10−15 yr W m−2 per kg-CO2. This value very likely (5 to 95% confidence) lies within the range of (68 to 117) × 10−15 yr W m−2 per kg-CO2. Estimates for time-integrated response in CO2 published in the IPCC First, Second, and Fourth Assessment and our multi-model best estimate all agree within 15% during the first 100 yr. The integrated CO2 response, normalized by the pulse size, is lower for pre-industrial conditions, compared to present day, and lower for smaller pulses than larger pulses. In contrast, the response in temperature, sea level and ocean heat content is less sensitive to these choices. Although, choices in pulse size, background concentration, and model lead to uncertainties, the most important and subjective choice to determine AGWP of CO2 and GWP is the time horizon.

In a globalised world, the transfer of carbon between regions, either physically or embodied in production, represents a substantial fraction of global carbon emissions. The resulting emission transfers are important for balancing regional carbon budgets and for understanding the drivers of emissions. In this paper we synthesise current understanding in two parts: (1) CO2 emissions embodied in goods and services that are produced in one country but consumed in others, and (2) carbon physically present in fossil fuels, petroleum-derived products, harvested wood products, crops, and livestock products. We describe the key differences between studies and provide a consistent set of estimates using the same definitions, modelling framework, and consistent data. We find the largest trade flows of carbon in international trade in 2004 were fossil fuels (2673 MtC, 37 % of global emissions), CO2 embodied in traded goods and services (1661 MtC, 22 % of global emissions), crops (522 MtC, 31 % of total harvested crop carbon), petroleum-based products (183 MtC, 50 % of their total production), harvested wood products (149 MtC, 40 % of total roundwood extraction), and livestock products (28 MtC, 22 % of total livestock carbon). We find that for embodied CO2 emissions, estimates from independent studies are robust, and that differences between individual studies are not a reflection of the uncertainty in consumption-based estimates, but rather these differences result from the use of different production-based emissions input data and different definitions for allocating emissions to international trade. After adjusting for these issues, results across independent studies converge to give less uncertainty than previously assumed. For physical carbon flows there are relatively few studies to be synthesised, but differences between existing studies are due to the method of allocating to international trade, with some studies using \"apparent consumption\" as opposed to \"final consumption\". While results across studies are sufficiently robust to be used in further applications, more research is needed to understand differences and to harmonise definitions for particular applications.

In order to limit climate warming, CO 2 emissions must remain below fixed quota. An evaluation of past emissions suggests that at 2014 emissions rates, the total quota will probably be exhausted within the next 30 years. Efforts to limit climate change below a given temperature level require that global emissions of CO 2 cumulated over time remain below a limited quota. This quota varies depending on the temperature level, the desired probability of staying below this level and the contributions of other gases. In spite of this restriction, global emissions of CO 2 from fossil fuel combustion and cement production have continued to grow by 2.5% per year on average over the past decade. Two thirds of the CO 2 emission quota consistent with a 2 °C temperature limit has already been used, and the total quota will likely be exhausted in a further 30 years at the 2014 emissions rates. We show that CO 2 emissions track the high end of the latest generation of emissions scenarios, due to lower than anticipated carbon intensity improvements of emerging economies and higher global gross domestic product growth. In the absence of more stringent mitigation, these trends are set to continue and further reduce the remaining quota until the onset of a potential new climate agreement in 2020. Breaking current emission trends in the short term is key to retaining credible climate targets within a rapidly diminishing emission quota.

Recent reports have highlighted the challenge of keeping global average temperatures below 2 °C and-even more so-1.5 °C (IPCC 2018). Fossil-fuel burning and cement production release ∼90% of all CO2 emissions from human activities. After a three-year hiatus with stable global emissions (Jackson et al 2016; Le Quéré C et al 2018a ; IEA 2018), CO2 emissions grew by 1.6% in 2017 to 36.2 Gt (billion tonnes), and are expected to grow a further 2.7% in 2018 (range: 1.8%-3.7%) to a record 37.1 2 Gt CO2 (Le Quéré et al 2018b). Additional increases in 2019 remain uncertain but appear likely because of persistent growth in oil and natural gas use and strong growth projected for the global economy. Coal use has slowed markedly in the last few years, potentially peaking, but its future trajectory remains uncertain. Despite positive progress in ∼19 countries whose economies have grown over the last decade and their emissions have declined, growth in energy use from fossil-fuel sources is still outpacing the rise of low-carbon sources and activities. A robust global economy, insufficient emission reductions in developed countries, and a need for increased energy use in developing countries where per capita emissions remain far below those of wealthier nations will continue to put upward pressure on CO2 emissions. Peak emissions will occur only when total fossil CO2 emissions finally start to decline despite growth in global energy consumption, with fossil energy production replaced by rapidly growing low- or no-carbon technologies.

Carbon dioxide removal from the atmosphere (CDR)—also known as 'negative emissions'—features prominently in most 2 °C scenarios and has been under increased scrutiny by scientists, citizens, and policymakers. Critics argue that 'negative emission technologies' (NETs) are insufficiently mature to rely on them for climate stabilization. Some even argue that 2 °C is no longer feasible or might have unacceptable social and environmental costs. Nonetheless, the Paris Agreement endorsed an aspirational goal of limiting global warming to even lower levels, arguing that climate impacts—especially for vulnerable nations such as small island states—will be unacceptably severe in a 2 °C world. While there are few pathways to 2 °C that do not rely on negative emissions, 1.5 °C scenarios are barely conceivable without them. Building on previous assessments of NETs, we identify some urgent research needs to provide a more complete picture for reaching ambitious climate targets, and the role that NETs can play in reaching them.

Carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from fossil fuels and industry comprise ~90% of all CO2 emissions from human activities. For the last three years, such emissions were stable, despite continuing growth in the global economy. Many positive trends contributed to this unique hiatus, including reduced coal use in China and elsewhere, continuing gains in energy efficiency, and a boom in low-carbon renewables such as wind and solar. However, the temporary hiatus appears to have ended in 2017. For 2017, we project emissions growth of 2.0% (range: 0.8%−3.0%) from 2016 levels (leap-year adjusted), reaching a record 36.8 ± 2 Gt CO2. Economic projections suggest further emissions growth in 2018 is likely. Time is running out on our ability to keep global average temperature increases below 2 °C and, even more immediately, anything close to 1.5 °C.

Fossil CO2 emissions in 2021 grew an estimated 4.2% (3.5%–4.8%) to 36.2 billion metric tons compared with 2020, pushing global emissions back close to 2019 levels (36.7 Gt CO2).

Natural carbon sinks currently absorb approximately half of the anthropogenic CO2 emitted by fossil fuel burning, cement production and land-use change. However, this airborne fraction may change in the future depending on the emissions scenario. An important issue in developing carbon budgets to achieve climate stabilisation targets is the behaviour of natural carbon sinks, particularly under low emissions mitigation scenarios as required to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement. A key requirement for low carbon pathways is to quantify the effectiveness of negative emissions technologies which will be strongly affected by carbon cycle feedbacks. Here we find that Earth system models suggest significant weakening, even potential reversal, of the ocean and land sinks under future low emission scenarios. For the RCP2.6 concentration pathway, models project land and ocean sinks to weaken to 0.8 0.9 and 1.1 0.3 GtC yr−1 respectively for the second half of the 21st century and to −0.4 0.4 and 0.1 0.2 GtC yr−1 respectively for the second half of the 23rd century. Weakening of natural carbon sinks will hinder the effectiveness of negative emissions technologies and therefore increase their required deployment to achieve a given climate stabilisation target. We introduce a new metric, the perturbation airborne fraction, to measure and assess the effectiveness of negative emissions.

This paper reports a study of the full carbon (C-CO2) budget of the Australian continent, focussing on 1990–2011 in the context of estimates over two centuries. The work is a contribution to the RECCAP (REgional Carbon Cycle Assessment and Processes) project, as one of numerous regional studies. In constructing the budget, we estimate the following component carbon fluxes: net primary production (NPP); net ecosystem production (NEP); fire; land use change (LUC); riverine export; dust export; harvest (wood, crop and livestock) and fossil fuel emissions (both territorial and non-territorial). Major biospheric fluxes were derived using BIOS2 (Haverd et al., 2012), a fine-spatial-resolution (0.05°) offline modelling environment in which predictions of CABLE (Wang et al., 2011), a sophisticated land surface model with carbon cycle, are constrained by multiple observation types. The mean NEP reveals that climate variability and rising CO2 contributed 12 ± 24 (1σ error on mean) and 68 ± 15 TgC yr−1, respectively. However these gains were partially offset by fire and LUC (along with other minor fluxes), which caused net losses of 26 ± 4 TgC yr−1 and 18 ± 7 TgC yr−1, respectively. The resultant net biome production (NBP) is 36 ± 29 TgC yr−1, in which the largest contributions to uncertainty are NEP, fire and LUC. This NBP offset fossil fuel emissions (95 ± 6 TgC yr−1) by 38 ± 30%. The interannual variability (IAV) in the Australian carbon budget exceeds Australia's total carbon emissions by fossil fuel combustion and is dominated by IAV in NEP. Territorial fossil fuel emissions are significantly smaller than the rapidly growing fossil fuel exports: in 2009–2010, Australia exported 2.5 times more carbon in fossil fuels than it emitted by burning fossil fuels.