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The U.S. military spends more than 14 countries combined and possesses state-of-the art weapons and equipment, yet after 13 years of effort, $1.4 trillion, and some 6,000 casualties, it still has been unable to defeat its enemies in Afghanistan and Iraq. The book explains why and how it can be remedied. It first demonstrates the negative effects of four factors that are prerequisites for military success and that have undermined U.S. military performance since the end of the Cold War. These include uneven civil-military relations; an inability to formulate and execute sound campaign plans; a mistaken approach to counter-insurgency, irregular warfare, and stability operations; and inattention to military options other than regime change. It also acknowledges that other factors often also intervene, and that the enemy plays a decisive role in military outcomes. Still, if the United States is to preserve the use of military force as a reasonable (albeit last resort) policy option, it must develop the means to maintain healthy, reliable civil-military relations, design and execute sound campaign plans appropriate to the adversary in question and the threat it poses to U.S. interests, conduct effective counter-insurgency and irregular warfare campaigns suitable given the size and capabilities of today's all volunteer armed forces, and develop a menu of military options beyond regime change. The intent is to bring attention to the under-performance of the U.S. armed forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere and prescribe remedies. These solutions cannot be left solely in the hands of the Department of Defense and congressional action and oversight will be essential to favorable outcomes. This is a timely survey as the military is facing downsizing in response to budget pressure that will constrain defense and counter-terrorism spending.

The U.S. military spends more than 14 countries combined and possesses state-of-the art weapons and equipment, yet after 13 years of effort, $1.4 trillion, and some 6,000 casualties, it still has been unable to defeat its enemies in Afghanistan and Iraq. The book explains why and how it can be remedied. It first demonstrates the negative effects of four factors that are prerequisites for military success and that have undermined U.S. military performance since the end of the Cold War. These include uneven civil-military relations; an inability to formulate and execute sound campaign plans; a mistaken approach to counter-insurgency, irregular warfare, and stability operations; and inattention to military options other than regime change. It also acknowledges that other factors often also intervene, and that the enemy plays a decisive role in military outcomes. Still, if the United States is to preserve the use of military force as a reasonable (albeit last resort) policy option, it must develop the means to maintain healthy, reliable civil-military relations, design and execute sound campaign plans appropriate to the adversary in question and the threat it poses to U.S. interests, conduct effective counter-insurgency and irregular warfare campaigns suitable given the size and capabilities of today's all volunteer armed forces, and develop a menu of military options beyond regime change. The intent is to bring attention to the under-performance of the U.S. armed forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere and prescribe remedies. These solutions cannot be left solely in the hands of the Department of Defense and congressional action and oversight will be essential to favorable outcomes. This is a timely survey as the military is facing downsizing in response to budget pressure that will constrain defense and counter-terrorism spending.

Illustrates that Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) cannot merely exist in stasis but must interact with other arms control activities and other European security instruments. Some observers have wondered whether the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty was becoming an instrument whose purpose had become obsolete, or whose function had been taken over by other, more effective institutions. The author concludes that it no longer functions as its designers originally intended, but it nevertheless continues to contribute to the region's stability. This report illustrates that CFE cannot merely exist in stasis but must interact with other arms control activities and other European security instruments. Along the line of other security instruments, the author proposes safety and security measures to improve peoples' confidence that civil authority will function fairly to protect them — measures providing international monitors to evaluate the objectivity and legal basis of the police process, and providing people with recourse to an international court in the event due process is not observed. The protracted need for NATO forces in Bosnia is testimony to the fact that the arms control aspects of the Dayton Accords, although successful at separating the belligerents and corralling the major weapons, do not go far enough in addressing the fundamental problems of Bosnia and many parts of Europe in general.

Homeland security encompasses five distinct missions: domestic preparednessand civil support in case of attacks on civilians, continuity of government, continuity ofmilitary operations, border and coastal defense, and national missile defense. This reportextensively details four of those mission areas (national missile defense having beencovered in great detail elsewhere). The authors define homeland security and its missionareas, provide a methodology for assessing homeland security response options, and reviewrelevant trend data for each mission area. They also assess the adequacy of the doctrine,organizations, training, leadership, materiel, and soldier systems and provide illustrativescenarios to help clarify Army planning priorities. The report concludes with options andrecommendations for developing more cost-effective programs and recommends a planningframework that can facilitate planning to meet homeland security needs.

Contemporary molecular genetic analysis methods have not been used to study large samples of carriage isolates of group A Streptococcus. To determine the emm types causing asymptomatic carriage and pharyngitis in a closed population, we analyzed 675 isolates recovered from a population-based surveillance study of 10,634 recruits at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, during 4 months in 1993–1994. Strains with emm1 and emm6 alleles accounted for only 22% of the isolates recovered from asymptomatic recruits at entrance to training. However, these 2 emm types caused 69% of the pharyngitis cases identified during training and represented 51% of the isolates recovered from the throat on exit from training. Sequence analysis of the hypervariable sic gene documented that distinct emm1 subclones disseminated in specific training groups called flights. The preferential increase in the prevalence of emm1 and emm6 isolates during the 6-week training period indicates an enhanced ability of these strains to disseminate and cause disease in this population

This monograph highlights key factors in South Asia imperiling U.S. interests, and suggests how and where the U.S. military might play an expanded, influential role. It suggests seven steps the military might take to better advance and defend U.S. interests in South Asia, the Middle East, and Asia at large. Washington should intensify involvement in South Asia and become more influential with the governments there. Given the area's potential for violence, it should also shape part of the U.S. military to meet potential crises.

Using a two-tiered framework areas applied to eight case studies from around the globe, the authors of this ground-breaking work seek to understand the conditions that give rise to ungoverned territories and make them conducive to a terrorist or insurgent presence. They also develop strategies to improve the U.S. ability to mitigate their effects on U.S. security interests.

The United States can significantly reduce the likelihood of a nuclear terrorist attack if it pursues a vigorous, multilayered approach. Such an approach involves controlling nuclear technology and materials, manipulating the black market, and monitoring the behavior of aspiring nuclear actors. After analyzing each of these components, this article outlines the broad contours of a national preventative strategy that should give the nonproliferation community some cause for optimism.

The prevalence of Streptococcus pyogenes in Air Force recruits (n = 10,634) completing basic training at Lackland Air Force Base between November 1, 1993, and March 1, 1994, was determined. Throat cultures were obtained on the second day and the last day of training, approximately 6 weeks later. Although the prevalence on the second day was nearly identical between males (1.99%) and females (1.98%), males with positive cultures increased to 4.30%, whereas females with positive cultures increased to 2.92% at the end of training. Within flights, an increase was noted in male flights when members sought care and subsequently were positive for S. pyogenes. Within these flights, S. pyogenes prevalence significantly increased from 2.79 to 7.20% (p < 0.001) despite antibiotic therapy and prophylaxis treatment measures. Within female flights, the increase was from 2.68 to 3.35%, which was not statistically significant (p < 0.19). A total of 161 trainees were treated for S. pyogenes as a result of positive cultures; remarkably, 27.3% of these were still culture-positive on the last day of training.

In this paper, we analyze power in five modes of social organization, as can be found in Adam Smith's An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Specifically, we analyze Smith's presentations of pre-capital accumulation and private appropriation of land; feudalism; a system of perfect liberty; late eighteenth century England; and the American colonies, and examine how wealth power, monopoly power, employer power, and political power is manifested within each. We conclude, as does Smith, that modes of social organization can neither be found nor analyzed separately from power.