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This study explores the tension between the standard economic theory of preference and nonstandard theories of preference that are motivated by an underlying theory of framing. A simple experiment fails to measure a known preference. The divergence of the measured preference from the known preference reflects a mistake, arising from some subjects’ misconception of the game form. We conclude that choice data should not be granted an unqualified interpretation of preference revelation. Mistakes in choices obscured by a possible error at the foundation of the theory of framing can masquerade as having been produced by nonstandard preferences.

Systematic asymmetries in exchange behavior have been widely interpreted as support for “endowment effect theory,” an application of prospect theory positing that loss aversion and utility function kinks set by entitlements explain observed asymmetries. We experimentally test an alternative explanation, namely, that asymmetries are explained by classical preference theories finding influence through the experimental procedures typically used. Contrary to the predictions of endowment effect theory, we observe no asymmetries when we modify procedures to remove the influence of classical preference theories. When we return to traditional-type procedures, however, the asymmetries reappear. The results support explanations based in classical preference theories and reject endowment effect theory. (JEL D01)

We conduct experiments to explore the possibility that subject misconceptions, as opposed to a particular theory of preferences referred to as the \"endowment effect,\" account for reported gaps between willingness to pay (\"WTP\") and willingness to accept (\"WTA\"). The literature reveals two important facts. First, there is no consensus regarding the nature or robustness of WTP-WTA gaps. Second, while experimenters are careful to control for subject misconceptions, there is no consensus about the fundamental properties of misconceptions or how to avoid them. Instead, by implementing different types of experimental controls, experimenters have revealed notions of how misconceptions arise. Experimenters have applied these controls separately or in different combinations. Such controls include ensuring subject anonymity, using incentive-compatible elicitation mechanisms, and providing subjects with practice and training on the elicitation mechanism before employing it to measure valuations. The pattern of results reported in the literature suggests that the widely differing reports of WTP-WTA gaps could be due to an incomplete science regarding subject misconceptions. We implement a \"revealed theory\" methodology to compensate for the lack of a theory of misconceptions. Theories implicit in experimental procedures found in the literature are at the heart of our experimental design. Thus, our approach to addressing subject misconceptions reflects an attempt to control simultaneously for all dimensions of concern over possible subject misconceptions found in the literature. To this end, our procedures modify the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism used in previous studies to elicit values. In addition, our procedures supplement commonly used procedures by providing extensive training on the elicitation mechanism before subjects provide WTP and WTA responses. Experiments were conducted using both lotteries and mugs, goods frequently used in endowment effect experiments. Using the modified procedures, we observe no gap between WTA and WTP. Therefore, our results call into question the interpretation of observed gaps as evidence of loss aversion or prospect theory. Further evidence is required before convincing interpretations of observed gaps can be advanced.

Revealed preference theory provides axiomatic tools for assessing whether individuals make observable choices “as if” they are maximizing an underlying utility function. The theory evokes a tradeoff between goods whereby individuals improve themselves by trading one good for another good to obtain the best combination. Preferences revealed in these choices are modeled as curves of equal choice (indifference curves) and reflect an underlying process of optimization. These notions have far-reaching applications in consumer choice theory and impact the welfare of human and animal populations. However, they lack the empirical implementation in animals that would be required to establish a common biological basis. In a design using basic features of revealed preference theory, we measured in rhesus monkeys the frequency of repeated choices between bundles of two liquids. For various liquids, the animals’ choices were compatible with the notion of giving up a quantity of one good to gain one unit of another good while maintaining choice indifference, thereby implementing the concept of marginal rate of substitution. The indifference maps consisted of nonoverlapping, linear, convex, and occasionally concave curves with typically negative, but also sometimes positive, slopes depending on bundle composition. Out-of-sample predictions using homothetic polynomials validated the indifference curves. The animals’ preferences were internally consistent in satisfying transitivity. Change of option set size demonstrated choice optimality and satisfied the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP). These data are consistent with a version of revealed preference theory in which preferences are stochastic; the monkeys behaved “as if” they had well-structured preferences and maximized utility.

The paper reports on the methodology, experiments, design and outcome of a large auction with multiple, interdependent markets constructed from principles of general equilibrium as opposed to game theoretic auction theory. The auction distributed 18,788 entitlements to operate electronic gaming machines in 176 interconnected markets to 363 potential buyers representing gaming establishments subject to multiple policy constraints on the allocation. The multi-round auction, conducted in one day, produced over $600M in revenue. All policy constraints were satisfied. Revealed dynamics of interim allocations and new statistical tests provide evidence of multiple market convergence hypothesized by classical principles and theories of general equilibrium. Results support the use of computer supported, “tâtonnement–like” market adjustments as a reliable empirical processes and not as purely theoretical constructs.

Isoni, Loomes, and Sugden (2011) assert that Plott and Zeiler (2005) reported inaccurate results. Placing ILS's selective quotes into context demonstrates otherwise. Additionally, examining the data closely yields three conclusions. First, all mug data reject endowment effect theory. Second, lottery gaps are associated with unstable attitudes toward uncertainty, a finding consistent with PZ's (2005) lottery data description, explicit warnings about procedure limitations and the data supplement, which reports the lottery data and cautions. Third, lottery outcome beliefs are influenced by whether WTP or WTA is reported, suggesting that changing beliefs, as opposed to the shape of preferences, produce lottery gaps. (JEL C91)

A new information aggregation mechanism (IAM), developed via laboratory experimental methods, is implemented inside Intel Corporation in a long-running field test. The IAM, incorporating features of pari-mutuel betting, is uniquely designed to collect and quantize as probability distributions dispersed, subjectively held information. IAM participants’ incentives support timely information revelation and the emergence of consensus beliefs over future outcomes. Empirical tests demonstrate the robustness of experimental results and the IAM’s practical usefulness in addressing real-world problems. The IAM’s predictive distributions forecasting sales are very accurate, especially for short horizons and direct sales channels, often proving more accurate than Intel’s internal forecast.

Biodiversity offset credits in New South Wales are transacted within a regulatory environment defined by detailed trading rules and many different types of biodiversity credits that can lead to thin markets and high transaction costs. This paper describes a market designed to facilitate efficient and effective transactions. The market includes a search algorithm to identify who can exchange with whom, according to the regulatory constraints, and an online exchange tool to facilitate efficient price discovery and allocation of offset contracts.

We study multiple-unit, laboratory experimental call markets in which orders are cleared by a single price at a scheduled \"call.\" The markets are independent trading \"days\" with two calls each day preceded by a continuous and public order flow. Markets approach the competitive equilibrium over time. The price formation dynamics operate through the flow of bids and asks configured as the \"jaws\" of the order book with contract execution featuring elements of an underlying mathematical principle, the Newton-Raphson method for solving systems of equations. Both excess demand and its slope play a systematic role in call market price discovery.

We report the results of an experiment designed to study the role of speculation in the formation of bubbles and crashes in laboratory asset markets. In a setting in which speculation is not possible, bubbles and crashes are observed. The results suggest that the departures from fundamental values are not caused by the lack of common knowledge of rationality leading to speculation, but rather by behavior that itself exhibits elements of irrationality. Much of the trading activity that accompanies bubble formation, in markets where speculation is possible, is due to the fact that there is no other activity available for participants in the experiment.