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"Poole, Keith T"
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Why Hasn't Democracy Slowed Rising Inequality?
During the past two generations, democratic forms have coexisted with massive increases in economic inequality in the United States and many other advanced democracies. Moreover, these new inequalities have primarily benefited the top 1 percent and even the top .01 percent. These groups seem sufficiently small that economic inequality could be held in check by political equality in the form of “one person, one vote.” In this paper, we explore five possible reasons why the US political system has failed to counterbalance rising inequality. First, both Republicans and many Democrats have experienced an ideological shift toward acceptance of a form of free market capitalism that offers less support for government provision of transfers, lower marginal tax rates for those with high incomes, and deregulation of a number of industries. Second, immigration and low turnout of the poor have combined to make the distribution of voters more weighted to high incomes than is the distribution of households. Third, rising real income and wealth has made a larger fraction of the population less attracted to turning to government for social insurance. Fourth, the rich have been able to use their resources to influence electoral, legislative, and regulatory processes through campaign contributions, lobbying, and revolving door employment of politicians and bureaucrats. Fifth, the political process is distorted by institutions that reduce the accountability of elected officials to the majority and hampered by institutions that combine with political polarization to create policy gridlock.
Journal Article
Using Bayesian Aldrich-McKelvey Scaling to Study Citizens' Ideological Preferences and Perceptions
Aldrich-McKelvey scaling is a powerful method that corrects for differential-item functioning (DIF) in estimating the positions of political stimuli (e.g., parties and candidates) and survey respondents along a latent policy dimension from issue scale data. DIF arises when respondents interpret issue scales (e.g., the standard liberal-conservative scale) differently and distort their placements of the stimuli and themselves. We develop a Bayesian implementation of the classical maximum likelihood Aldrich-McKelvey scaling method that overcomes some important shortcomings in the classical procedure. We then apply this method to study citizens' ideological preferences and perceptions using data from the 2004–2012 American National Election Studies and the 2010 Cooperative Congressional Election Study. Our findings indicate that DIF biases self-placements on the liberal-conservative scale in a way that understates the extent of polarization in the contemporary American electorate and that citizens have remarkably accurate perceptions of the ideological positions of senators and Senate candidates.
Journal Article
Does Gerrymandering Cause Polarization?
Both pundits and scholars have blamed increasing levels of partisan conflict and polarization in Congress on the effects of partisan gerrymandering. We assess whether there is a strong causal relationship between congressional districting and polarization. We find very little evidence for such a link. First, we show that congressional polarization is primarily a function of the differences in how Democrats and Republicans represent the same districts rather than a function of which districts each party represents or the distribution of constituency preferences. Second, we conduct simulations to gauge the level of polarization under various \"neutral\" districting procedures. We find that the actual levels of polarization are not much higher than those produced by the simulations. We do find that gerrymandering has increased the Republican seat share in the House; however, this increase is not an important source of polarization.
Journal Article
Political bubbles
Behind every financial crisis lurks a \"political bubble\"--policy biases that foster market behaviors leading to financial instability. Rather than tilting against risky behavior, political bubbles--arising from a potent combination of beliefs, institutions, and interests--aid, abet, and amplify risk. Demonstrating how political bubbles helped create the real estate-generated financial bubble and the 2008 financial crisis, this book argues that similar government oversights in the aftermath of the crisis undermined Washington's response to the \"popped\" financial bubble, and shows how such patterns have occurred repeatedly throughout US history.
The authors show that just as financial bubbles are an unfortunate mix of mistaken beliefs, market imperfections, and greed, political bubbles are the product of rigid ideologies, unresponsive and ineffective government institutions, and special interests. Financial market innovations--including adjustable-rate mortgages, mortgage-backed securities, and credit default swaps--become subject to legislated leniency and regulatory failure, increasing hazardous practices. The authors shed important light on the politics that blinds regulators to the economic weaknesses that create the conditions for economic bubbles and recommend simple, focused rules that should help avoid such crises in the future.
The first full accounting of how politics produces financial ruptures,Political Bubblesoffers timely lessons that all sectors would do well to heed.
eBook
Bayesian Metric Multidimensional Scaling
In this article, we show how to apply Bayesian methods to noisy ratio scale distances for both the classical similarities problem as well as the unfolding problem. Bayesian methods produce essentially the same point estimates as the classical methods, but are superior in that they provide more accurate measures of uncertainty in the data. Identification is nontrivial for this class of problems because a configuration of points that reproduces the distances is identified only up to a choice of origin, angles of rotation, and sign flips on the dimensions. We prove that fixing the origin and rotation is sufficient to identify a configuration in the sense that the corresponding maxima/minima are inflection points with full-rank Hessians. However, an unavoidable result is multiple posterior distributions that are mirror images of one another. This poses a problem for Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods. The approach we take is to find the optimal solution using standard optimizers. The configuration of points from the optimizers is then used to isolate a single Bayesian posterior that can then be easily analyzed with standard MCMC methods.
Journal Article
Recovering a Basic Space From a Set of Issue Scales
This paper develops a scaling procedure for estimating the latent/unobservable dimensions underlying a set of manifest/observable variables. The scaling procedure performs, in effect, a singular value decomposition of a rectangular matrix of real elements with missing entries. In contrast to existing techniques such as factor analysis which work with a correlation or covariance matrix computed from the data matrix, the scaling procedure shown here analyzes the data matrix directly. The scaling procedure is a general-purpose tool that can be used not only to estimate latent/unobservable dimensions but also to estimate an Eckart-Young lower-rank approximation matrix of a matrix with missing entries. Monte Carlo tests show that the procedure reliably estimates the latent dimensions and reproduces the missing elements of a matrix even at high levels of error and missing data. A number of applications to political data are shown and discussed.
Journal Article
The Polarization of Contemporary American Politics
Political elites of the United States are deeply polarized. Polarization of the Democratic and Republican Parties is higher than at any time since the end of the Civil War. This essay describes how the modern polarization trend emerged and its implications for mass political behavior and public policy outcomes. We contend that contemporary political polarization must be understood in terms of both the ideological divergence of the parties and the expansion of the liberal–conservative dimension of conflict to a wider set of social and cultural conflicts in American society. We close with the speculation that the Republican Party has become the more fractured of the parties along the liberal–conservative dimension at both the elite and mass level.
Journal Article
The Hunt for Party Discipline in Congress
We analyze party discipline in the House of Representatives between 1947 and 1998. The effects of party pressures can be represented in a spatial model by allowing each party to have its own cutting line on roll call votes. Adding a second cutting line makes, at best, a marginal improvement over the standard single-line model. Analysis of legislators who switch parties shows, however, that party discipline is manifest in the location of the legislator's ideal point. In contrast to our approach, we find that the Snyder-Groseclose method of estimating the influence of party discipline is biased toward exaggerating party effects.
Journal Article