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"ROY A. PRETE"
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Strategy and Command
Falling between the \"War of Movement\" in 1914 and the major
attrition battles of 1916, 1915 was a critical year in the First
World War. As France failed in ever-larger offensives to break
through the German trenches, Britain shifted its strategy from
defence of empire to total commitment to the continental war. In
the second of three planned volumes, Roy Prete analyzes the
political and military policies and strategies of Britain and
France and their joint command relationship on the Western Front in
1915. The opposing strategies of the two governments proved to be
the main determinant in the sometimes ragged relations between the
French commander-in-chief, Joseph Joffre, and his British
counterpart, Sir John French, as they sought to drive the German
army out of France and to aid their hard-pressed Russian ally. With
an impressive marshalling of evidence, Strategy and
Command demonstrates that the increased British commitment to
the continental war, manifested in sending Kitchener's New Armies
to France in 1915, was largely due to the disastrous situation of
the Russian army on the Eastern Front and the perceived weakness of
the French government. Based on extensive research in French and
British political and military archives, this new in-depth study of
Anglo-French military relations on the Western Front in 1915 fills
a major gap in the unfolding drama of the First World War.
eBook
Strategy and Command
In the first of three projected volumes, Prete crafts a behind-the-scenes look at Anglo-French command relations during World War I, from the start of the conflict until 1915, when trench warfare drastically altered the situation. Drawing on extensive archival research, Prete argues that the British government's primary interest lay in the defence of the empire; the small expeditionary force sent to France was progressively enlarged because the French, especially Commander-in-Chief Joseph Joffre, dragged their British ally into a progressively greater involvement. Several crises in Anglo-French command relations derived from these competing strategic objectives. New information gleaned from French public and private archives - including private diaries - enlarge our understanding of key players in the allied relationship.
eBook
Strategy and Command
Histories of the First World War are often written from a British perspective, ignoring the coalition element of the conflict and the French point of view. In Strategy and Command, Roy Prete offers a major new interpretation supported by in-depth research in French archival sources. In the first of three projected volumes, Prete crafts a behind-the-scenes look at Anglo-French command relations during World War I, from the start of the conflict until 1915, when trench warfare drastically altered the situation. Drawing on extensive archival research, Prete argues that the British government's primary interest lay in the defence of the empire; the small expeditionary force sent to France was progressively enlarged because the French, especially Commander-in-Chief Joseph Joffre, dragged their British ally into a progressively greater involvement. Several crises in Anglo-French command relations derived from these competing strategic objectives. New information gleaned from French public and private archives - including private diaries - enlarge our understanding of key players in the allied relationship. Prete shows that suspicion and distrust on the part of both sides of the alliance continued to inform relations well after the circumstances creating them had changed. Strategy and Command clearly establishes the fundamental strategic differences between the allies at the start of the war, setting the stage for the next two volumes.
eBook
Joffre and the Origins of the Somme: A Study in Allied Military Planning
This paper examines the origins of the Battle of the Somme within the context of French Commander-in-Chief Joseph Joffre's effort to coordinate Allied military operations in 1916 and to mount a combined Anglo-French offensive on the Western Front. The French chose a joint operation on the Somme, in which they would play the major role, as a means of leading the British into battle. But a major British attritional operation preceding the offensive was dropped, and ironically, the French Army bore the brunt of Allied wastage in the German attack at Verdun until the Somme offensive began on 1 July 1916.
Journal Article
The Move North, Defence of Antwerp,and Competition over Belgium
THE HARMONY ENGENDERED BETWEEN the French and British commands during the march to the Marne was short-lived, as the British found themselves uncomfortably wedged between superior French forces on the Aisne. The British request, made for political and strategic reasons, to relocate the BEF on the Allied left during the critical “Race the Sea,” put additional stresses on the relationship. But the joint plan gradual British transfer north was overtaken by events at the end of September 1914, with the German bombardment of Antwerp, which hastened the move north and pitted British strategic policy against French operational strategy in an
Book Chapter
The March on Lille, the Battle of Ypres, and the Second Command Crisis
ACCORDING TO JOFFRE’S INTERPRETATION, which he set forth in his memoirs, the victory of the Marne sealed his friendship with Sir John French. Thereafter their collaboration was cordial and effective, both on the field and against scheming politicians, who wished to retain or withdraw forces from their front for ill-founded peripheral operations in the Mediterranean.¹ Standard British accounts from British sources maintain further that the long-standing conflict between Kitchener and Sir John, which was exacerbated by the events of 1 September, finally led to Kitchener’s plan, which he proposed to the French government and command at Dunkirk on 1 November,
Book Chapter
Collapse and Renewal
AS THE ARMIES OF FRANCE and the British Expeditionary Force took the field in August 1914, the military commanders and staffs of the two forces were brought into immediate contact with each other. The tenor of relationships was thus set as the British fell in with French strategy to take the offensive against the German onslaught. But defeat in the lost frontier battles led to collapse in Allied cooperation in the field. Compelled to retreat, Joffre redeployed major forces to strengthen his left wing and attempted repeatedly to mount a concerted effort to strike back. Only a highly fortuitous series
Book Chapter