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البناء المنطقي للعالم والمسائل الزائفة في الفلسفة
يعتبر كتاب البناء المنطقي للعالم من المحاولات القليلة لإنشاء نسق منطقي مطابق للمعرفة الإنسانية، علما أن هذه الأخيرة ليست سوى تصورات للعالم باعتباره مجموعة من المواضيع أو المفاهيم. وفي هذا الصدد نشير إلى أن كارناب لا يفرق بين \"الموضوع\" و\"الكفهوم\" أو \"الشيء\" إذ يشير دائما إلى أنه يتحدث عن الموضوع بمعناه الواسع، أي، كل ما تصاغ في صدده القضية أو العبارة سواء تعلق الأمر بالأشياء أو الخصائص أو العلاقات المفهومية أو العلاقات الماصدقية أو الأوصاف أو العمليات، بالإضافة إلى ما هو واقعي وغير واقعي، وهو ما يدفعنا إلى القول بأن الموضوع، في نظر كارناب هو العالم ذاته.
Book
Two Essays on Entropy
This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press's mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1977.
eBook
Two Essays on Entropy
Two Essays on Entropy by Rudolf Carnap (edited with an introduction by Abner Shimony) brings a major twentieth-century philosopher of science to the front lines of thermodynamics, probability, and inductive logic. Written during Carnap's 1952-54 fellowship at the Institute for Advanced Study, these essays pursue an \"abstract concept of entropy\" usable for scientific inference while testing, with unusual clarity, the coherence of the physicists' own statistical notion. Carnap's guiding claim is bold and bracing: entropy belongs with temperature and pressure as an objective physical magnitude, not a merely logical or informational index. From this stance he scrutinizes the classical formulations of Boltzmann and Gibbs, rejects fashionable identifications of entropy with \"negative information,\" and articulates a principle of physical magnitudes to require that finer descriptions of a system accord with coarser, thermodynamic attributions. Shimony's editorial introduction situates Carnap's project within postwar debates on probability (frequency, propensity, and epistemic readings), ergodicity, and coarse- versus fine-grained ensembles, clarifying both the reach and the limits of Carnap's proposal. Presented together for the first time as Carnap had originally envisioned, the essays are lightly but thoughtfully edited: overlapping prefatory sections are removed, a concise \"Brief Formulation\" is foregrounded, and cross-references rationalized to reveal the architecture of the program as a whole. Readers see Carnap extend Boltzmann's entropy beyond cell partitions, probe the logical pitfalls of description-dependent definitions, and sketch a continuous, geometry-based alternative aimed at eliminating arbitrary coarse-graining. The result is a rare conversation across philosophy and physics-historically grounded, methodologically incisive, and still sharply relevant to contemporary work in statistical mechanics, information theory, and the foundations of data-driven inference. A vital resource for scholars in philosophy of science, physics, and the history of analytic philosophy, Two Essays on Entropy restores a rigorous, physicalist account of order, randomness, and explanation to center stage. This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press's mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1977.
eBook
Value concepts (1958)
Carnap wrote a continuation of his reply to Kaplan (§32 of Carnap's replies in the 1963 Schilpp volume), which would, however, have made that reply, already by far the longest in the book, too long. So he set aside his projected notes for a continuation to serve as the basis for a separate paper, which he never got around to writing. It is transcribed here from his shorthand and translated into English, with some introductory notes to provide a little context.
Journal Article
PROBABILITY AS A GUIDE IN LIFE
Many philosophers are of the opinion -- and Carnap agrees with them -- that the concept of probability is of importance not only from a theoretical point of view but also in practice: it serves as a guide in life. People can never obtain certainty in predictions of future events but at best some measure of probability. They form their expectations of future events in accordance with their probabilities on the basis of the observations made so far, and these expectations influence their decisions. It seems to him that there are two concepts of probability, two different meanings in which the word 'probability' is commonly us.
Journal Article
Application to a schema with one magnitude
We shall now apply the concept of degree of confirmation c** defined in the preceding section to a schema with n = 1, i.e., with only one magnitude ϕi. Let the interval of admitted values of ϕ₁ be the open interval (A, B).
Throughout our further discussion (§§14,15), we presuppose a fixed evidence e which specifies fixed values of ϕ₁ for all elements except the last one, a
N
:
(14-1) ϕ₁(a₁) = c₁; ϕ₁(a₂) = c₂; . . .; ϕ₁(a
N-1) = c
N-1.
The ϕ₁-values for distinct elements are distinct from one another (11-1) and from A and B. But we assume
Book Chapter
An Alternative Definition of Entropy for an Ensemble
We shall now construct an alternative concept which, in distinction to Gibbs’s ${\\text{S}}_{\\text{G}}^{{\\text{II}}}$, fulfills the following conditions: (1) it satisfies the principles (6-1) and (6-2) and is therefore a purely physical concept; (2) it is in agreement with S
th or with the mean of S
th in an ensemble (under the same conditions as S
B, §5); (3) it leads to a theorem which is an analogue to Boltzmann’s H-theorem and a statistical counterpart to the second law. The property (1) is assured by the use of Method I (§6); we therefore denote the concept by ‘${\\text{S}}_{\\text{G}}^{\\text{I}}$’. Although it is not Gibbs’s
Book Chapter