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Boilerplate--the fine-print terms and conditions that we become subject to when we click \"I agree\" online, rent an apartment, enter an employment contract, sign up for a cellphone carrier, or buy travel tickets--pervades all aspects of our modern lives. On a daily basis, most of us accept boilerplate provisions without realizing that should a dispute arise about a purchased good or service, the nonnegotiable boilerplate terms can deprive us of our right to jury trial and relieve providers of responsibility for harm.Boilerplateis the first comprehensive treatment of the problems posed by the increasing use of these terms, demonstrating how their use has degraded traditional notions of consent, agreement, and contract, and sacrificed core rights whose loss threatens the democratic order. Margaret Jane Radin examines attempts to justify the use of boilerplate provisions by claiming either that recipients freely consent to them or that economic efficiency demands them, and she finds these justifications wanting. She argues, moreover, that our courts, legislatures, and regulatory agencies have fallen short in their evaluation and oversight of the use of boilerplate clauses. To improve legal evaluation of boilerplate, Radin offers a new analytical framework, one that takes into account the nature of the rights affected, the quality of the recipient's consent, and the extent of the use of these terms. Radin goes on to offer possibilities for new methods of boilerplate evaluation and control, among them the bold suggestion that tort law rather than contract law provides a preferable analysis for some boilerplate schemes. She concludes by discussing positive steps that NGOs, legislators, regulators, courts, and scholars could take to bring about better practices.

Over the last several decades, courts and legal scholars have struggled with whether or when to consider boilerplate text as contract. Recent attempts to draw all boilerplate text into “contract” seek to end that struggle but have shifted contract law away from its traditional focus on enforcing parties’ actual agreements and common understandings. This has required a series of ad hoc “fixes” to contract law reminiscent of the medieval use of “epicycles” to try to square geocentric theories of planetary motion with recalcitrant observations of a nongeocentric universe. This shift has been transforming the meanings of contract law’s central concepts. We view the shift as an undiagnosed paradigm slip, resulting in a generalized theory of “contract” as a mere assumption of risk that allows private obligations to be created unilaterally without reaching the actual agreements required by core contract law principles. Some now call this new sort of obligation “contract.” But it is pseudo-contract, resembling contract without fulfilling its necessary conditions of validity. The recent paradigm slip into pseudo-contract raises a complex blend of linguistic, factual, conceptual, practical, normative, and doctrinal problems. Under the mantle of “contract,” the problems of pseudo-contract have remained largely hidden. In this Article we expose these problems and develop a more nuanced and coherent method of analysis — shared meaning analysis — that courts and other legal analysts can use to determine when any particular piece of boilerplate text does, or does not, contribute an actual term to a contract. Because facts about language have received insufficient attention in discussions of how boilerplate text may (or may not) contribute to contract meaning, we launch our analysis by developing several seminal insights into the dependence of meaning on social cooperation from the language philosopher Paul Grice. Drawing on his insights into language, we develop a contemporary definition of the shared meaning of a contract (or the “common meaning of the parties”) as that meaning that is most consistent with the presupposition that both parties were using language cooperatively to contract. We then offer a simple conceptual test that courts can use to discern this shared meaning, distinguish contractual from noncontractual uses of boilerplate text, and prevent contract from slipping into pseudo-contract. We pay particular attention to diagnosing deceptive or misleading uses of boilerplate text. Using examples ranging widely from clickwrap consumer contracts to high-end boilerplate contracts between sophisticated parties, we show how shared meaning analysis applies generally to many varieties of contract.

This collection of essays by one of the country's leading property theorists revitalizes the liberal personality theory of property. Departing from traditional libertarian and economic theories of property, Margaret Jane Radin argues that the law should take into account nonmonetary personal value attached to property—and that some things, such as bodily integrity, are so personal they should not be considered property at all. Gathered here are pieces ranging from Radin's classic early essay on property and personhood to her recent works on governmental \"taking\" of private property. Margaret Jane Radin is professor of law at Stanford University. She is the author of over twenty-five articles on legal and political theory.

This collection of essays by one of the country's leading property theorists revitalizes the liberal personality theory of property. Departing from traditional libertarian and economic theories of property, Margaret Jane Radin argues that the law should take into account nonmonetary personal value attached to property—and that some things, such as bodily integrity, are so personal they should not be considered property at all. Gathered here are pieces ranging from Radin's classic early essay on property and personhood to her recent works on governmental \"taking\" of private property. Margaret Jane Radin is professor of law at Stanford University. She is the author of over twenty-five articles on legal and political theory.

The HLA Hart Memorial Lecture, delivered at Oxford on 24 May 2016. The Lecture considers how the advent and growth of the information society is posing challenges for the traditional theories of contract, and for the duties of the state with regard to contractual ordering. In particular, the Lecture considers the lack of ‘fit’ between certain prevalent uses of contract and the underlying justification for contract enforcement.

Thanks to the vision of Omri Ben-Shahar and the excellence of the scholars contributing to this symposium, students of the law of commercial exchange transactions will now understand how important and interesting, and indeed exciting, boilerplate really is. The various presentations are so rich that my assigned task of commentary cannot approach an adequate summation. Instead of attempting such a task, therefore, I will take up a slightly different one. My commentary will relate some of the ideas presented in the symposium to two themes that I think are significant for the groundwork of contract today: the growing modularity of contracts and the waning of consent as the normative basis of legal enforcement. (The latter is also a major theme of my fellow commentator, Todd Rakoff, whose contributions in this field have been preeminent.)

Over the last several decades, courts and legal scholars have struggled with whether or when to consider boilerplate text as contract. Recent attempts to draw all boilerplate text into “contract” seek to end that struggle but have shifted contract law away from its traditional focus on enforcing parties’ actual agreements and common understandings. This has required a series of ad hoc “fixes” to contract law reminiscent of the medieval use of “epicycles” to try to square geocentric theories of planetary motion with recalcitrant observations of a nongeocentric universe. This shift has been transforming the meanings of contract law’s central concepts. We view the shift as an undiagnosed paradigm slip, resulting in a generalized theory of “contract” as a mere assumption of risk that allows private obligations to be created unilaterally without reaching the actual agreements required by core contract law principles. Some now call this new sort of obligation “contract.” But it is pseudo-contract, resembling contract without fulfilling its necessary conditions of validity. The recent paradigm slip into pseudo-contract raises a complex blend of linguistic, factual, conceptual, practical, normative, and doctrinal problems. Under the mantle of “contract,” the problems of pseudo-contract have remained largely hidden. In this Article we expose these problems and develop a more nuanced and coherent method of analysis - shared meaning analysis - that courts and other legal analysts can use to determine when any particular piece of boilerplate text does, or does not, contribute an actual term to a contract. Because facts about language have received insufficient attention in discussions of how boilerplate text may (or may not) contribute to contract meaning, we launch our analysis by developing several seminal insights into the dependence of meaning on social cooperation from the language philosopher Paul Grice. Drawing on his insights into language, we develop a contemporary definition of the shared meaning of a contract (or the “common meaning of the parties”) as that meaning that is most consistent with the presupposition that both parties were using language cooperatively to contract. We then offer a simple conceptual test that courts can use to discern this shared meaning, distinguish contractual from noncontractual uses of boilerplate text, and prevent contract from slipping into pseudo-contract. We pay particular attention to diagnosing deceptive or misleading uses of boilerplate text. Using examples ranging widely from clickwrap consumer contracts to high-end boilerplate contracts between sophisticated parties, we show how shared meaning analysis applies generally to many varieties of contract.

Perhaps the lack of interlocutory appeal of the trial court's claim construction,12 or perhaps the conflicting standards between the United States Patent and Trademark Office's (\"PTO\") review and the United States Court of Appeals Federal Circuit's review, and in my view, certainly the lack of enough attention to the knowledge of PHOSITA. [...]perhaps the reforms of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (\"AIA\"),13 such as the various forms of post-grant review,14 have mitigated their critique. [...]I have argued that the idea that patent claim notice could be rendered precise enough to justify an analogy with physical fences is illusory.

Courts in the United States are finding that recipients can be bound by fine-print terms (boilerplate) if they had notice of them. Without directly confronting the overarching normative question whether notice can cause contractual obligation, this Article takes notice seriously by focusing on how psychological characteristics of “HUMANs” suggest rethinking of when effective notice is (or is not) likely to occur.