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Superconducting quantum interference devices (SQUIDs) can be used to detect weak magnetic fields and have traditionally been the most sensitive magnetometers available. However, because of their relatively large effective size (on the order of 1 µm) 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , the devices have so far been unable to achieve the level of sensitivity required to detect the field generated by the spin magnetic moment ( μ B ) of a single electron 5 , 6 . Here we show that nanoscale SQUIDs with diameters as small as 46 nm can be fabricated on the apex of a sharp tip. The nano-SQUIDs have an extremely low flux noise of 50 n Φ 0  Hz −1/2 and a spin sensitivity of down to 0.38  μ B  Hz −1/2 , which is almost two orders of magnitude better than previous devices 2 , 3 , 7 , 8 . They can also operate over a wide range of magnetic fields, providing a sensitivity of 0.6  μ B  Hz −1/2 at 1 T. The unique geometry of our nano-SQUIDs makes them well suited to scanning probe microscopy, and we use the devices to image vortices in a type II superconductor, spaced 120 nm apart, and to record magnetic fields due to alternating currents down to 50 nT. Nanoscale superconducting quantum interference devices (SQUIDs) fabricated on the apex of a sharp tip can provide spin sensitivities that are nearly two orders of magnitude better than previous SQUID sensors.

Original intent and original public meaning are generally thought to be opposing camps within originalism. Both theories assert that that the meaning of a constitutional provision was fixed at the time it was enacted. But they disagree fundamentally on the nature of interpretation. Original intent asserts that the meaning sought is that intended by the Constitution's enactors. Original public meaning asserts that the meaning sought is that revealed by the text as reasonably understood by a well-informed reader at the time of the provision's enactment. In this Essay, we unite these two conflicting principles of originalism under the original methods approach to constitutional interpretation, thereby providing a single coherent foundation for originalism. Under original methods, the Constitution is interpreted using the conventional legal interpretive rules deemed applicable to a document of its type at the time it was enacted. As properly understood, both the original intent and original public meaning approaches mandate that the Constitution be interpreted using the same conventional interpretive rules. Under original public meaning, a reasonable and knowledgeable person at the time would interpret the constitutional text by using the rules that were then thought to apply to it. Under original intent, the enactors would have intended the Constitution to be interpreted based on the conventional interpretive rules applied to it at that time. We further argue that these interpretive rules should be identified using the methods that people at the time would have employed for determining the interpretive rules. Just as constitutional provisions should be interpreted using the interpretive rules employed at the time of the relevant provision's enactment, so too should the interpretive rules be identified based on the methods employed to identify those interpretive rules. We illustrate our approach by exploring the controversy of the Bank of the United States, showing, for instance, that there was a consensus against use of the substantive intent of the Philadelphia Convention as an interpretive rule.

Under this approach, the Constitution should be interpreted using the interpretive methods that the constitutional enactors would have deemed applicable to it. [...] many of the key questions that arise about constitutional interpretation - such as whether intent or text should be its focus, whether legislative history should be considered, and whether words should be understood statically or dynamically - are answered based on the content of the interpretive mies in place when the Constitution was enacted. [...] to find what an informed speaker of the language would have understood the Constitution's meaning to be, one must look to the interpretive mies that were customarily applied to such a document. [...] under both original intent and original public meaning, the meaning of the Constitution should be interpreted based on the applicable interpretive mies of the time.

In this Article, the author has tried to show that the broad interpretation of the Recess Appointments Clause cannot be justified by nonoriginalist arguments. Given the strong originalist support for the arrow interpretation, the only arguments for the broad interpretation would be based on non-originalism. But these arguments fail as well. A living constitutionalist approach that interprets the Clause to take account of modern values and circumstances does not support the broad interpretation, but a narrow one. And a focus on practice does not suggest that the broad interpretation has been acquiesced in or consented to by the legislature. The Congress as a whole, far from accepting the broad interpretation, generally has rejected that view whenever it has passed legislation. Congress did fail to strongly object to the broad interpretation for a limited period, but that occurred when the executive asserted its authority in a restrained manner, and once the executive more aggressively asserted authority, congressional objections soon ensued.

Originalism holds that the U.S. Constitution should be interpreted according to its meaning at the time it was enacted. In their innovative defense of originalism, John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport maintain that the text of the Constitution should be adhered to by the Supreme Court because it was enacted by supermajorities--both its original enactment under Article VII and subsequent Amendments under Article V. A text approved by supermajorities has special value in a democracy because it has unusually wide support and thus tends to maximize the welfare of the greatest number. The authors recognize and respond to many possible objections. Does originalism perpetuate the dead hand of the past? How can originalism be justified, given the exclusion of African Americans and women from the Constitution and many of its subsequent Amendments? What is originalism's place in interpretation, after two hundred years of non-originalist precedent? A fascinating counterfactual they pose is this: had the Supreme Court not interpreted the Constitution so freely, perhaps the nation would have resorted to the Article V amendment process more often and with greater effect. Their book will be an important contribution to the literature on originalism, now the most prominent theory of constitutional interpretation.

[...] precedent should be followed when it is entrenched - when the precedent enjoys strong support that is comparable to that enjoyed by a constitutional amendment. Together these justifications provide a sound basis to follow cases like Brown v. Board of Education and Frontiero v. Richardson, even if one does not believe these cases were decided correctly as an original matter. [...] our theory deprives originalism's opponents of their familiar complaint that to embrace originalism is to abandon cases that have become fundamental to our constitutional order.

General arguments 1 suggest that first-order phase transitions become less sharp in the presence of weak disorder, while extensive disorder can transform them into second-order transitions; but the atomic level details of this process are not clear. The vortex lattice in superconductors provides a unique system in which to study the first-order transition 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 on an inter-particle scale, as well as over a wide range of particle densities. Here we use a differential magneto-optical technique to obtain direct experimental visualization of the melting process in a disordered superconductor. The images reveal complex behaviour in nucleation, pattern formation, and solid–liquid interface coarsening and pinning. Although the local melting is found to be first-order, a global rounding of the transition is observed; this results from a disorder-induced broad distribution of local melting temperatures, at scales down to the mesoscopic level. We also resolve local hysteretic supercooling of microscopic liquid domains, a non-equilibrium process that occurs only at selected sites where the disorder-modified melting temperature has a local maximum. By revealing the nucleation process, we are able to experimentally evaluate the solid–liquid surface tension, which we find to be extremely small.

The amendment provisions of the United States Constitution have a serious defect. Although some commentators claim that the supermajority rules in these provisions are too strict, that is by no means clear. Rather, the clear defect in the amendment provisions is that the only effective way they provide of amending the Constitution requires Congress’s approval and therefore Congress enjoys a veto over all amendments. While the Constitution does formally allow the state legislatures to seek to amend the Constitution through a national convention, that amendment method is broken. Not only has the national convention method never been used to pass an amendment or even to call a convention, the state legislatures are unlikely to ever use this method, because of the state legislatures’ fear of a runaway convention that might seek to enact constitutional amendments that they strongly dislike.