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We extend the canonical epidemiology model to study the interaction between economic decisions and epidemics. Our model implies that people cut back on consumption and work to reduce the chances of being infected. These decisions reduce the severity of the epidemic but exacerbate the size of the associated recession. The competitive equilibrium is not socially optimal because infected people do not fully internalize the effect of their economic decisions on the spread of the virus. In our benchmark model, the best simple containment policy increases the severity of the recession but saves roughly half a million lives in the United States.

Aggregate and sectoral comovement are central features of business cycles, so the ability to generate comovement is a natural litmus test for macroeconomic models. But it is a test that most models fail. We propose a unified model that generates aggregate and sectoral comovement in response to contemporaneous and news shocks about fundamentals. The fundamentals that we consider are aggregate and sectoral total factor productivity shocks as well as investment-specific technical change. The model has three key elements: variable capital utilization, adjustment costs to investment, and preferences that allow us to parameterize the strength of short-run wealth effects on the labor supply.

Using a quantitative model that features technical progress in automation and endogenous skill choice, we show that, given the current U.S. tax system, a sustained fall in automation costs can lead to a massive rise in income inequality. We characterize the optimal tax system in this model. We find that it is optimal to tax robots while the current generations of routine workers, who can no longer move to non-routine occupations, are active in the labour force. Once these workers retire, optimal robot taxes are zero.

Some booms in housing prices are followed by busts. Others are not. It is generally difficult to find observable fundamentals that are useful for predicting whether a boom will turn into a bust or not. We develop a model consistent with these observations. Agents have heterogeneous expectations about long-run fundamentals but change their views because of “social dynamics.” Agents with tighter priors are more likely to convert others to their beliefs. Boom-bust episodes typically occur when skeptical agents happen to be correct. The booms that are not followed by busts typically occur when optimistic agents happen to be correct.

We argue that the government-spending multiplier can be much larger than one when the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate binds. The larger the fraction of government spending that occurs while the nominal interest rate is zero, the larger the value of the multiplier. After providing intuition for these results, we investigate the size of the multiplier in a dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium model. In this model the multiplier effect is substantially larger than one when the zero bound binds. Our model is consistent with the behavior of key macro aggregates during the recent financial crisis.

Standard representative-agent models fail to account for the weak correlation between stock returns and measurable fundamentals, such as consumption and output growth. This failing, which underlies virtually all modern asset pricing puzzles, arises because these models load all uncertainty onto the supply side of the economy. We propose a simple theory of asset pricing in which demand shocks play a central role. These shocks give rise to valuation risk that allows the model to account for key asset pricing moments, such as the equity premium, the bond term premium, and the weak correlation between stock returns and fundamentals.

We study the properties of the carry trade, a currency speculation strategy in which an investor borrows low-interest-rate currencies and lends high-interest-rate currencies. This strategy generates payoffs that are on average large and uncorrelated with traditional risk factors. We argue that these payoffs reflect a peso problem. The underlying peso event features high values of the stochastic discount factor rather than very large negative payoffs.

We assess the importance of nominal rigidities using a new weekly scanner dataset. We find that nominal rigidities take the form of inertia in reference prices and costs, defined as the most common prices and costs within a given quarter. Reference prices are particularly inertial and have an average duration of roughly one year, even though weekly prices change roughly once every two weeks. We document the relation between prices and costs and find sharp evidence of state dependence in prices. We use a simple model to argue that reference prices and costs are useful statistics for macroeconomic analysis.

We propose a model consistent with two observations. First, the tax rates adopted by different countries are generally uncorrelated with their growth performance. Second, countries that drastically reduce private incentives to invest severely hurt their growth performance. In our model, the effects of taxation on growth are highly nonlinear. Low tax rates have a very small impact on long-run growth rates. But as tax rates rise, their negative impact on growth rises dramatically. The median voter chooses tax rates that have a small impact on growth prospects, making the relation between tax rates and economic growth difficult to measure empirically.

In this paper we argue that the primary force behind the large drop in real exchange rates that occurs after large devaluations is the slow adjustment in the prices of nontradable goods and services. Our empirical analysis uses data from five large devaluation episodes: Argentina (2002), Brazil (1999), Korea (1997), Mexico (1994), and Thailand (1997). We conduct a detailed analysis of the Argentinian case using disaggregated consumer price index data, data from our own survey of prices in Buenos Aires, and scanner data from supermarkets. We assess the robustness of our findings by studying large real exchange rate appreciations, medium devaluations, and small exchange rate movements.