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"Reiman, Jeffrey H"
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As free and as just as possible : the theory of Marxian liberalism
Grafting the Marxian idea that private property is coercive onto the liberal imperative of individual liberty, this new thesis from one of America's foremost intellectuals conceives a revised definition of justice that recognizes the harm inflicted by capitalism's hidden coercive structures. Maps a new frontier in moral philosophy and political theory Distills a new concept of justice that recognizes the iniquities of capitalism Synthesis of elements of Marxism and Liberalism will interest readers in both camps Direct and ...
Book
As Free and As Just As Possible
Grafting the Marxian idea that private property is coercive onto the liberal imperative of individual liberty, this new thesis from one of America's foremost intellectuals conceives a revised definition of justice that recognizes the harm inflicted by capitalism's hidden coercive structures. Maps a new frontier in moral philosophy and political theory Distills a new concept of justice that recognizes the iniquities of capitalism Synthesis of elements of Marxism and Liberalism will interest readers in both camps Direct and jargon-free style opens these complex ideas to a wide readership
eBook
Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood
In response to J. Thomson's argument (see SA0312/I1790) that we need not seek what is common to all rights in right to privacy claims, it is noted that there is a common & unique feature to claims of privacy rights, & this feature is of great value in moral reasoning. Linked with privacy rights are the notions of intimacy & personhood. It is necessary to recognize that privacy is a social practice that involves behaviors of restraint & exists for good reasons. The point of this very complicated social ritual is that it provides a means by which an individual's moral title to his existence is conferred. As such, privacy is a social process recognizing the value of intimacy in regard to the existence of the individual, which is a precondition of personhood. To be a person, an individual must recognize not just his actual capacity to shape his destiny by his choices; he must also recognize that he has an exclusive moral right to shape his destiny. The right to privacy is the right to the existence of a social practice which makes it possible for one to think of this existence as his. It protects an individual's interest in becoming, being, & remaining a person. Modified Author's Summary.
Journal Article
The Possibility of a Marxian Theory of justice
I have argued elsewhere1 that Rawl's
method
(i.e., the original position and so forth, as distinct from the
principles
that Rawls derives by using the method) provides us with the proper way to determine whether the structure of any society is exploitative. The argument trimmed to the bare bones is this. Since exploitation is the suppression of some peoples’ interests for the benefit of others, an argument that a set of social relations would be unanimously agreed to by rational individuals concerned to secure maximum opportunity to control their lives and possessed of correct knowledge of the nature of social reality and free of interests or attitudes deriving from the society they occupy or the position they occupy in it, is an argument that those social relations are not exploitative. If we take ideology to be false beliefs or interests or attitudes arising from society which lead people to think that their society is rational for all to accept when it would not be rational in the absence of such beliefs or interests or attitudes, then we can see that Rawls has constructed a method for arguing around ideology.
Journal Article
Anarchism and Nominalism: Wolff's Latest Obituary for Political Philosophy
R. P. Wolff (In Defense of Anarchism, with a Reply to Jeffrey H. Reiman's 'Defense of Political Philosophy,' New York: Harper and Row, 1976) has offered a response to criticisms of his arguments for anarchism. However, Wolff has shifted his ground from arguing that the legitimate state is a fiction to arguing that the state as such is a fiction. The original argument for the conceptual immiscibility of authority & autonomy has been replaced by the argument that states as such are disguises for the domination of some persons by others, which is directly contrary to the classical concept of the state as the whole people. Wolff's argument for this position in fact assumes what it sets out to prove. Further, Wolff's argument against the legitimacy of this classically conceived state rests on the claim that prima facie legitimacy has no significance for justifying the state, a position that does not touch many positions in support of the legitimate state. Wolff's position, assuming extreme political nominalism, Kantianism, & rejection of extrinsic moral considerations, in fact prejudges the issue by making a defense of the state impossible, without affecting such a defense on other grounds. W. H. Stoddard.
Journal Article
Justice, Civilization, and the Death Penalty: Answering van den Haag
ON THE ISSUE OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, THERE IS A CLEAR A CLASH OF MORAL INTUITIONS AS WE ARE LIKELY TO SEE. SOME (NOW A MAJORITY OF AMERICANS) FEEL DEEPLY THAT JUSTICE REQUIRES PAYMENT IN KIND AND THUS THAT MURDERS SHOULD DIE; AND OTHERS (ONCE, BUT NO LONGER, NEARLY A MAJORITY OF AMERCANS) FEEL DEEPLY THAT THE STATE OUGHT NOT BE IN THE BUSINESS OF PUTTING PEOPLE TO DEATH.
Journal Article