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How does losing one’s right to vote again after having been eligible to vote before affect political fundamentals such as political efficacy? We draw attention to the hitherto neglected phenomenon “temporary disenfranchisement,” which, for instance, occurs regularly in states that extended the franchise to underage citizens in some but not all elections. If an election with voting age 16 is closely followed by an election with voting age 18, underage voters who are eligible for the former will have no right to vote in the latter. Using original panel data on young citizens in Germany and a differences-in-differences design, we find that temporary disenfranchisement results in a decrease in external efficacy, which remains even after regaining eligibility. Our findings highlight an important side effect of selective voting rights extensions and bear insights that are relevant to other cases of temporary disenfranchisement due to residential mobility, citizenship, or felony disenfranchisement.

Students from a high socioeconomic background show relatively homogeneous, high levels of educational attainment, whereas students with a low socioeconomic origin display a large variability in their educational careers. In this paper, we examine whether the varying degrees of students' academic self-efficacy can contribute to an explanation of this variation. Focusing on Germany's highly stratified educational system, we utilized the CILS4EU dataset to analyse the association between the academic self-efficacy of students from low and high socioeconomic backgrounds in 9th grade and their later educational aspirations and transitions. Our results show that students from non-academic families are much more likely to (a) aspire to an Abitur, (b) transition to upper secondary school, and (c) enter tertiary education if they exhibit a high level of academic self-efficacy. In contrast, academic self-efficacy shows no link to the educational aspirations and decisions of students who have at least one parent with an academic certificate. Our research is guided by the question 'to what extent do adolescents' educational and political efficacy beliefs influence their later educational and political behaviour?' Thus, the project seeks to examine what happens when adolescents of a disadvantaged (vs. advantaged) group (operationalized by socio-economic status and immigrant origin) experience success (vs. failure) in the education system: How are their personal, group, and system efficacy beliefs shaped by those experiences? As part of this, we utilize the CILS4EU data to follow students' educational pathways from age 14 to age 22 and analyse socioeconomic differences in the link between students' academic self-efficacy and their educational aspirations and decisions.

Unequal political participation increasingly challenges democracies. The turnout gap is particularly large among younger voters, with severe implications for future developments of democratic representation, legitimacy, and quality. This article focuses on the role of political efficacy beliefs in explaining unequal turnout among newly enfranchised citizens. We argue that internal political efficacy beliefs are particularly important for turnout among the newly enfranchised from lower-class backgrounds, as they lack alternative mobilizing factors such as politically aware and active parents, political knowledge, and mobilizing networks. Furthermore, we argue that once these voters successfully turn out in their first election, they are as likely as those from higher-class backgrounds to turn out in their second election. We empirically test these arguments using original longitudinal data on newly enfranchised citizens from three German federal states (Bundesländer). Overall, our results support the argument: Political efficacy beliefs are a stronger predictor of first turnout among young adults from disadvantaged backgrounds compared to those from more advantaged backgrounds, and those who do turn out are as likely as those with higher-class backgrounds to turn out in their second election. This highlights the relevance of political efficacy beliefs in the (re)production of persisting political inequality.

Previous sociological studies have paid little attention to religion as a central determinant of individual preferences for redistribution. In this article we argue that religious individuals, living in increasingly secular societies, differ in political preferences from their secular counterparts. Based on the theory of religious cleavages, we expect that religious individuals will oppose income redistribution by the state. Furthermore, in contexts where the polarization between religious and secular individuals is large, preferences for redistribution will be lower. In the empirical analysis we test our predictions in a multilevel framework, using data from the European Social Survey 2002—2006 for 16 Western European countries. After controlling for a wide range of individual socio-economic factors and for welfare-state policies, religion plays and important explanatory role. We find that both Catholics and Protestants strongly oppose income redistribution by the state. The cleavage between religious and secular individuals is far more important than the difference between denominations. Using a refined measure of religious polarization, we also find that in more polarized context the overall level of support for redistribution is lower.

Voluntary associations have been presented as a solution to political apathy and cynicism towards representative democracy. The authors collected in this volume, however, argue that these claims require more robust substantiation and seek to critically examine the crucial link between the associative sector and the health of democracy. Focusing on the role of context and using diverse approaches and empirical material, they explore whether these associations in differing socio-political contexts actually undermine rather than reinvigorate democracy. Part 1. Politics and Institutions Part 2. Features of Associations Part 3. The Social Fabric of Daily Life Conclusion

In this article, we argue that party-system polarization and subjective perceptions of ideological party differences are conceptually and empirically distinct phenomena that affect electoral participation differently. Looking at 84 elections worldwide, we show that party-system polarization, and the sharp conflicts associated with it, depresses turnout because many citizens are put off by extreme party positions and unrewarding polemics. By contrast, the individual perception of differences between parties increases turnout because more citizens can find a party that is close to their own position and identify others as being further away. These opposite effects are possible because party-system polarization leads only some individuals to perceive differences between parties but leads others to avoid the emotionalized political arena. Moreover, individuals' ability to recognize differences between parties is not necessarily a consequence of party-system polarization. The contradictory findings in previous research are due to a conceptual and empirical blurring of these two essentially different aspects.

Innerhalb kurzer Zeit konnte sich die Partei „Alternative für Deutschland“ (AfD) als Vertreterin vernachlässigter Gruppen und tabuisierter Themen im politischen Diskurs positionieren und ist schließlich mit einem zweistelligen Ergebnis bei der Wahl 2017 in den Bundestag eingezogen. Dennoch bleibt weiter unklar, ob sie das Potenzial besitzt, sich in der deutschen Parteienlandschaft langfristig zu etablieren. Ihre Entwicklung ist bis heute von einem anhaltenden Streit um politische Positionen und Führungspersonen gekennzeichnet. Es ist davon auszugehen, dass diese Konflikte und die damit einhergehenden Veränderungen einen zentralen Einfluss auf ihre Etablierungschancen ausüben. Dabei interessiert vor allem, inwiefern die AfD bereits über eine loyale Wählerschaft verfügt oder eher von flüchtigen Wählersegmenten mit Protestwahlmotiven oder Anti-Parteien-Sentiments gewählt wird. Über den kompletten Betrachtungszeitraum hinweg zeigt sich, dass Protestwahlverhalten und Ressentiments gegenüber Parteien zentrale Motive für eine Stimmabgabe zugunsten der AfD darstellen. Allerdings ist im Zeitverlauf auch ein Anwachsen der Gruppe loyaler AnhängerInnen unter der Wählerschaft der AfD zu beobachten – wenn auch auf niedrigem Niveau. Within a very short time the German party “Alternative für Deutschland” (AfD) was able to position itself as a representative of neglected groups and taboo issues. At the occasion of the federal election 2017, the party received more than ten percent of the votes and is now represented in the German Bundestag. However, it still remains unclear if the AfD will establish itself in the German party landscape in the long-run. Until today, the development of the AfD is marked by continuous quarrels about political positions and leaders. These conflicts and the associated changes may have an important impact on the party’s prospect of establishment. Of particular interest is whether the AfD already has a loyal electorate or the party is primarily elected by volatile voter segments motivated by protest and anti-partysentiments. Applying a longitudinal perspective the article outlines that the party’s success depends heavily on volatile voter segments. However, a certain increase of loyal voters has also been observed – albeit on a low level.

Issue Title: Religion und Gesellschaft In Germany as in other European countries the share of religious and churched persons is shrinking. The process of secularization is progressing gradually but inexorably and affects both Christian churches alike. In this contribution we examine if and how the numerical shrinkage of religious core segments affects the relation between religiosity and political attitudes. From secularization theory one can derive three partly opposing expectations. The radicalization thesis--particularly popular in the USA--assumes religious groups feel threatened by an increasingly secular society and this ties them together, radicalizes and mobilizes them. A second expectation rests on the assumption that in particular younger, economically well-off and highly educated people leave the churches. Through this process the social composition of the remaining church members changes leading not to radicalization but to traditionalization and withdrawal from politics. Finally, according to a third view it can be expected that the secularization process affects the entire society leading to a disintegration of tight religious milieus which in turn leads to a dissolution of social control and a decoupling of religiosity and political orientations. The central finding of our analyses is that--in support of our third hypothesis--religion loses its function for political attitudes and behaviors. In the German context the effect of religiosity on politics has been nearly exclusively studied with respect to voting behavior. By extending the focus to a wide range of other attitudes and behaviors and by taking a dynamic perspective this contribution thus closes an important research gap.[PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]