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Identifying groups at increased risk for political violence can support prevention efforts. We determine whether \"Make America Great Again\" (MAGA) Republicans, as defined, are potentially such a group. Nationwide survey conducted May 13-June 2, 2022 of adult members of the Ipsos KnowledgePanel. MAGA Republicans are defined as Republicans who voted for Donald Trump in the 2020 presidential election and deny the results of that election. Principal outcomes are weighted proportions of respondents who endorse political violence, are willing to engage in it, and consider it likely to occur. The analytic sample (n = 7,255) included 1,128 (15.0%) MAGA Republicans, 640 (8.3%) strong Republicans, 1,571 (21.3%) other Republicans, and 3,916 (55.3%) non-Republicans. MAGA Republicans were substantially more likely than others to agree strongly/very strongly that \"in the next few years, there will be civil war in the United States\" (MAGA Republicans, 30.3%, 95% CI 27.2%, 33.4%; strong Republicans, 7.5%, 95% CI 5.1%, 9.9%; other Republicans, 10.8%, 95% CI 9.0%, 12.6%; non-Republicans, 11.2%, 95% CI 10.0%, 12.3%; p < 0.001) and to consider violence usually/always justified to advance at least 1 of 17 specific political objectives (MAGA Republicans, 58.2%, 95% CI 55.0%, 61.4%; strong Republicans, 38.3%, 95% CI 34.2%, 42.4%; other Republicans, 31.5%, 95% CI 28.9%, 34.0%; non-Republicans, 25.1%, 95% CI 23.6%, 26.7%; p < 0.001). They were not more willing to engage personally in political violence. MAGA Republicans, as defined, are more likely than others to endorse political violence. They are not more willing to engage in such violence themselves; their endorsement may increase the risk that it will occur.

Evolutionary theory suggests that some animal species may experience shifts in their offspring sex ratio in response to maternal health and environmental conditions, and in some unfavorable conditions, females may be less likely to bear sons. Experimental data in both animals and humans indicate that maternal inflammation may disproportionately impact the viability of male conceptuses; however, it is unknown whether other factors associated with both pregnancy and inflammation, such as vitamin D status, are associated with the offspring sex ratio. Here, we show that among 1,228 women attempting pregnancy, preconception 25-hydroxyvitamin D concentrations are positively associated with the live birth of a male infant, with notably stronger associations among women with elevated high sensitivity C-reactive protein, a marker of systemic low-grade inflammation. Our findings suggest that vitamin D may mitigate maternal inflammation that would otherwise be detrimental to the implantation or survival of male conceptuses in utero. Higher vitamin D is associated with improved pregnancy and live birth rates, but its potential role in the human offspring sex ratio in unknown. Here, the authors show that the levels of vitamin D at preconception are positively associated with male live birth, particularly among women presenting inflammatory markers.

BackgroundFirearm violence is a major cause of death and injury in the United States. Tracking the movement of firearms from legal purchase to use in crimes can help inform prevention of firearm injuries and deaths. The last state-wide studies analyzing crime gun recoveries used data from over 20 years ago; thus, an update is needed.MethodsWe used data for 5,247,348 handgun and 2,868,713 long gun transactions and law enforcement recoveries from California crime gun recovery (2010–2021) and California’s Dealer Records of Sales records. Covariates included characteristics of dealership sales, firearms and their transactions, and purchaser’s demographic characteristics, purchasing history, criminal history (from firearm purchaser criminal history records), and neighborhood socioeconomic status. Analyses for handguns and long guns was conducted separately. In multivariable analysis, we included correlates into a Cox proportional hazard model accounting for left truncation and clustering between the same firearm, purchaser, dealerships, and geographic location. Covariates that remained significant (P < 0.05) were retained. For handguns, we evaluated associations of violent and weapons crimes separately. In supplementary analyses, we examined interactions by purchasers’ race and ethnicity.ResultsIn total, 38,441 handguns (0.80%) and 6,806 long guns (0.24%) were recovered in crimes. A firearm dealer’s sales volume, percent of transactions that were denials, pawns, pawn redemptions, and firearms that became crime guns were each positively associated with firearm recovery in crime. Handguns that were inexpensive, larger caliber, and that had been reported lost or stolen were positively associated with recovery in crimes. Purchaser characteristics associated with crime gun recovery included: being younger, female, Black, Hispanic, Native American or Pacific Islander, or other race/ethnicity (vs white), having previous arrests, living in close proximity to the firearm dealership, and living in a more socially vulnerable census tract. Associations with race and ethnicity were modified by previous infraction-only arrests.ConclusionsThis study confirms that many previously studied correlates of firearm recovery are still relevant today. We were able to expand on previous research by examining novel associations including purchasers’ criminal history and previous firearm transaction history. These results provide evidence that can be used to disrupt firearm use in crimes.

BackgroundIn recent years, the United States (US) has witnessed a rise in political violence. Prior research has found that an individual’s social network is associated with their likelihood of engaging in various forms of violence, but research on social networks and political violence in the US context is limited. This study examined associations between social network size and endorsement of political violence in a recent nationally representative survey and explored how the relationship varied by use of social media as a major news source, perceptions of the government as an enemy, and membership in a marginalized or privileged racial or ethnic group.MethodsThis was a nationally representative cross-sectional survey study of adults aged 18 and older in the US, administered from May 13-June 2, 2022. The exposure was social network size, defined by the number of strong social connections. We examined three violence-related outcomes: support for non-political violence, support for political violence, and personal willingness to engage in political violence. We estimated prevalence ratios for associations using survey-weighted Poisson regression with robust standard errors, adjusting for hypothesized confounders and including interaction terms to examine effect measure modification.ResultsThe sample included 8,620 respondents. Median age was 48.4 years (95% CI = 47.9–48.8), 51.5% were female (95% CI = 50.4–52.7%), and 62.7% self-identified as non-Hispanic White (95% CI = 61.4–65.9%). In adjusted models, those with zero strong connections were more likely than those with 1–4 strong social connections to consider political violence usually/always justified in general (PR = 2.43, 95% CI = 1.47–4.01). Those with 50 + strong connections were more likely than those with 1–4 strong social connections to consider political violence usually/always justified in at least one situation (PR = 1.19, 95% CI = 1.03–1.37) and were more likely to report being willing to personally use political violence (PR = 1.52, 95% CI = 1.13–2.04). Associations varied somewhat by social media use, perceptions of the government as an enemy, and racialized identity.ConclusionsIndividuals who reported very few and very many strong social connections were more likely than others to support political violence or be personally willing to engage in it in one form or another. Findings point toward potential intervention and prevention opportunities.

Background Current conditions in the USA suggest an increasing risk for political violence. Little is known about the prevalence of beliefs that might lead to political violence, about support for and personal willingness to engage in political violence, and about how those measures vary with individual characteristics, lethality of violence, political objectives that violence might advance, or specific populations as targets. Methods This cross-sectional US nationally representative survey was conducted on May 13 to June 2, 2022, of adult members of the Ipsos KnowledgePanel. Outcomes are weighted, population-representative proportions of respondents endorsing selected beliefs about American democracy and society and violence to advance political objectives. Results The analytic sample included 8620 respondents; 50.5% (95% confidence interval (CI) 49.3%, 51.7%) were female; and weighted mean (± standard deviation) age was 48.4 (± 18.0) years. Nearly 1 in 5 (18.9%, 95% CI 18.0%, 19.9%) agreed strongly or very strongly that “having a strong leader for America is more important than having a democracy”; 16.2% (95% CI 15.3%, 17.1%) agreed strongly or very strongly that “in America, native-born white people are being replaced by immigrants,” and 13.7% (95% CI 12.9%, 14.6%) agreed strongly or very strongly that “in the next few years, there will be civil war in the United States.” One-third of respondents (32.8%, 95% CI 31.7%, 33.9%) considered violence to be usually or always justified to advance at least 1 of 17 specific political objectives. Among all respondents, 7.7% (95% CI 7.0%, 8.4%) thought it very or extremely likely that within the next few years, in a situation where they believe political violence is justified, “I will be armed with a gun”; 1.1% (95% CI 0.9%, 1.4%) thought it very or extremely likely that “I will shoot someone with a gun.” Support for political violence and for the use of firearms in such violence frequently declined with increasing age, education, and income. Conclusions Small but concerning proportions of the population consider violence, including lethal violence, to be usually or always justified to advance political objectives. Prevention efforts should proceed urgently based on the best evidence available.

Concern for political violence in the United States remains high. The limited information available indicates that approval of specific extreme right-wing organizations and social movements is associated with support for and willingness to engage in political violence, but systematic data are lacking. The study objective is to quantify those associations at the individual level in a nationally representative survey sample. Cross-sectional analysis from Wave 1 of a nationally representative survey of members of the Ipsos KnowledgePanel, conducted May-June 2022. The exposure is approval (categorized from non-approval to strong approval) of 8 named organizations and social movements, considered individually and together. Principal outcomes are justification for political violence, in general and to advance specific political objectives; willingness to engage in political violence, by type of violence and target population; and expectation of firearm use in political violence. Outcomes are expressed as weighted percentages and adjusted prevalence differences (aPDs, expressed in absolute percentage points (pp)). The completion rate was 55.8%; there were 8,620 respondents. After weighting, 50.6% of respondents (95% CI 49.4%, 51.7%) were female, and 62.6% (95% CI 61.4%, 63.9%) were white, non-Hispanic; the weighted mean (SD) age was 48.4 (18.0) years. Few respondents (1.4%, 95% CI 1.0%, 1.8%) strongly approved of the organizations and movements considered together. However, strong approvers were much more likely than non-approvers to consider violence usually or always justified to advance specific political objectives and much more willing to engage in political violence; aPDs frequently exceeded 30% points. To advance a political objective, 29.1% (95% CI 18.4%, 39.8%) of strong approvers were very or completely willing to kill someone, and 18.1% (95% CI 8.5%, 27.7%) thought it very or extremely likely that they would shoot someone; prevalences among non-approvers were 0.9% (95% CI 0.5%, 1.2%) and 0.6% (95% CI 0.3%, 0.9%), respectively. Approval of extreme right-wing organizations and social movements is strongly associated with support for and willingness to engage in political violence. Given continued concern for political violence in the United States and the new possibility that such individuals might join federal law enforcement in large numbers, focused prevention measures are urgently needed.

Background Too little is known about the distribution of risk for committing political violence, a serious concern for the United States. This study explores the association between affiliation with the “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) movement and support for and willingness to engage in political violence. Methods Findings are from Wave 3 of a nationally representative annual longitudinal survey of members of the Ipsos KnowledgePanel, conducted May 23-June 14, 2024. All KnowledgePanel members who responded to prior waves were invited to participate. Political party and MAGA affiliations were reported by respondents; the principal comparison is between MAGA Republicans and non-MAGA non-Republicans. Outcomes are expressed as weighted proportions and adjusted prevalence differences (aPDs, reported as percentage point (pp) differences), with p-values adjusted for the false discovery rate. Results The completion rate was 88.4%; there were 8896 respondents. MAGA Republicans were more likely than non-MAGA non-Republicans to endorse violence to effect sociopolitical change and to consider violence usually or always justified to advance at least 1 of 21 specific political objectives (MAGA Republicans, 55.9% (95% CI 52.3%, 59.4%); non-MAGA non-Republicans, 25.5% (95% CI 23.7%, 27.2%); aPD 30.1pp (95% CI 26.0pp, 34.2pp), q < 0.001). They were not more willing to commit political violence. Similarly, while MAGA Republicans more frequently predicted that they would be armed in a setting where they considered political violence justified, they were not more likely to shoot someone (very or extremely likely: MAGA Republicans, 2.1% (95% CI 0.8%, 3.4%); non-MAGA non-Republicans, 1.6% (95% CI 1.0%, 2.1%); aPD 1.5pp (95% CI -0.1pp, 3.0pp), q = 0.43). Prevalences for other Republicans generally fell between those for MAGA Republicans and non-MAGA non-Republicans. In secondary analyses, MAGA Republicans endorsed attributes associated with political violence—racism, hostile sexism, homonegativity, transphobia, xenophobia, and Islamophobia; support for the QAnon movement and Christian nationalism; conspiracism; trait aggression; and authoritarianism—more frequently than did non-MAGA non-Republicans. Conclusions In 2024, MAGA Republicans were more likely than others to endorse political violence and attributes associated with political violence. They were not more willing to commit political violence themselves; their endorsement may increase the risk that political violence will occur.

BackgroundA 2022 survey in the USA found concerningly high prevalences of support for and personal willingness to engage in political violence, of beliefs associated with such violence, and of belief that civil war was likely in the near future. It is important to determine the durability of those findings.MethodsWave 2 of a nationally representative cohort survey was conducted May 18-June 8, 2023; the sample comprised all respondents to 2022’s Wave 1. Outcomes are expressed as weighted proportions; changes from 2022 to 2023 are for respondents who participated in both surveys, based on aggregated individual change scores.ResultsThe completion rate was 84.2%; there were 9385 respondents. After weighting, 50.7% (95% confidence interval (CI) 49.4%, 52.1%) were female; weighted mean (SD) age was 48.5 (25.9) years. About 1 in 20 respondents (5.7%, 95% CI 5.1%, 6.4%) agreed strongly/very strongly that “in the next few years, there will be civil war in the United States,” a 7.7% decrease.In 2023, fewer respondents considered violence to be usually/always justified to advance at least 1 of 17 specific political objectives [25.3% (95% CI 24.7%, 26.5%), a 6.8% decrease]. However, more respondents thought it very/extremely likely that within the next few years, in a situation where they consider political violence justified, “I will be armed with a gun” [9.0% (95% CI 8.3%, 9.8%), a 2.2% increase] and “I will shoot someone with a gun” [1.8% (95% CI 1.4%, 2.2%), a 0.6% increase]. Among respondents who considered violence usually/always justified to advance at least 1 political objective, about 1 in 20 also thought it very/extremely likely that they would threaten someone with a gun (5.4%, 95% CI 4.0%, 7.0%) or shoot someone (5.7%, 95% CI 4.3%, 7.1%) to advance such an objective.ConclusionsIn this cohort, support for political violence declined from 2022 to 2023, but predictions of firearm use in political violence increased. These findings can help guide prevention efforts, which are urgently needed.

Background Young children’s digital media use may adversely affect child development, but the mechanisms of this association are unclear. We evaluated whether screen time displaces reading and peer play time, which are subsequently associated with child development. Methods When children were 12, 18, 24, 30, and 36 months, mothers ( n  = 3894) reported the time their children spent on screens, being read to by an adult, and playing with other children. At 36 months, mothers completed the Ages and Stages Questionnaire©, an assessment of their child’s developmental status. Results In unadjusted models, screen time from 12 to 36 months was not associated with reading but was associated with less time engaging in play with peers. In adjusted models accounting for developmental delay at 12 months, family and child characteristics, screen time was not directly associated with developmental delay. More peer play time was associated with a lower likelihood of developmental delay, and having higher screen time increased the likelihood of developmental delay indirectly through reduced peer play time. Results were similar for developmental delays in fine and gross motor, communication, and personal-social domains. Conclusions Screen time in early childhood did not displace reported time spent reading, but did displace reported peer play time. Impact Among children 1–3 years of age, more screen time was associated with less time engaged in peer play but not less reading with an adult. Having higher screen time from 1 to 3 years increased the odds of developmental delay indirectly through reduced peer play time. Ensuring that children engage in adequate time playing with peers may offset the negative associations between screen time and child development.