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result(s) for
"Rodogno, Raffaele"
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Long-term use of tDCS-clinical and ethical considerations
by
Rodogno, Raffaele
,
Malbois, Elodie
,
Guggisberg, Adrian G
in
citizen science
,
Electrical stimulation of the brain
,
Long-term effects
2026
Transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) is a non-invasive neuromodulation technique that delivers weak electrical currents to targeted brain regions in order to modulate neural activity and potentially enhance cognitive and motor functions. Clinical studies have reported benefits for conditions such as depression, stroke, and Parkinson's disease, typically with only minor and transient side effects. While short-term safety is relatively well established, the long-term effects require more systematic data and therefore require caution. At the same time, tDCS is increasingly being used at home without supervision for extended periods, as devices can be purchased online without prescription or even self-assembled. This situation highlights the need for appropriate safeguards to protect unsupervised users and to ensure that research into supervised long-term use is conducted under ethically acceptable conditions. In this paper, we specifically assess the risks that may arise from prolonged and unsupervised application of tDCS and propose measures that should be implemented by researchers, regulators, and commercial stakeholders involved in the distribution of tDCS devices.
Journal Article
Social robots, fiction, and sentimentality
2016
I examine the nature of human-robot pet relations that appear to involve genuine affective responses on behalf of humans towards entities, such as robot pets, that, on the face of it, do not seem to be deserving of these responses. Such relations have often been thought to involve a certain degree of sentimentality, the morality of which has in turn been the object of critical attention (Sparrow in Ethics Inf Technol 78:346–359,
2002
; Blackford in Ethics Inf Technol 14:41–51,
2012
). In this paper, I dispel the claim that sentimentality is involved in this type of relations. My challenge draws on literature in the philosophy of art and in cognitive science that attempts to solve the so called paradox of fictional emotions, i.e., the seemingly paradoxical way in which we respond emotionally to fictional or imaginary characters and events. If sentimentality were not at issue, neither would its immorality. For the sake of argument, however, I assume in the remaining part of the paper that sentimentality is indeed at play and bring to the fore aspects of its badness or viciousness that have not yet been discussed in connection with robot pets. I conclude that not even these aspects of sentimentality are at issue here. Yet, I argue that there are other reasons to be worried about the wide-spread use of ersatz companionship technology that have to do with the potential loss of valuable, self-defining forms of life.
Journal Article
Shame, Guilt, and Punishment
2009
The emotions of shame and guilt have recently appeared in debates concerning legal punishment, in particular in the context of so called shaming and guilting penalties. The bulk of the discussion, however, has focussed on the justification of such penalties. The focus of this article is broader than that. My aim is to offer an analysis of the concept of legal punishment that sheds light on the possible connections between punishing practices such as shaming and guilting penalties, on the one hand, and emotions such as guilt, shame, and perhaps humiliation, on the other. I contend that this analysis enhances our understanding of the various theories of punishment that populate this part of criminal law theory and thereby sharpens the critical tools needed to assess them. My general conclusion is that, in different ways, all of the theories we encounter in this area can benefit from paying renewed attention to the nature of the connection between the state's act of punishing and its expected or perceived emotional effect on the individual.
Journal Article
Selective patient and public involvement: The promise and perils of pharmaceutical intervention for autism
2018
Background Guidelines suggest the patient community should be consulted from the outset when designing and implementing basic biomedical research, but such patient communities may include conflicting views. We examined how engagement occurred in one such instance. Objective Our objective was to scrutinize patient and public involvement (PPI) by a pan‐European biomedical consortium working to develop drugs to treat autism. We aimed to use this as an example to illustrate how PPI has been utilized in biomedical research. Setting, participants and analysis Two public events, one in the UK and one in Denmark were conducted as part of the consortium's on‐going PPI activities in 2014 and 2015. Sixty‐six individuals submitted written comments on the consortium's research after these events. The textual data produced were analysed using a thematic approach. Approximately 71% of respondents reported themselves to be adults on the autism spectrum or parents of children with autism. Results The themes identified illustrated major differences between some community concerns and the biomedical research agenda. While treating autism per se. was seen as problematic by some, treating specific co‐occurring problems was seen as helpful in some circumstances. The biomedical consortium selected PPI with a limited user viewpoint at its outset and more widely once basic research was on‐going. Discussion This case illustrates what we term “selective PPI” where only a sympathetic and/or limited patient viewpoint is included. Findings highlight the perils of using selective PPI to legitimise scientific endeavours, and the possibilities for constructive dialogue.
Journal Article
Happiness and well-being: shifting the focus of the current debate
2014
The point of departure of this paper is the recently emphasised distinction between psychological theories of happiness, on the one hand, and normative theories of well-being, on the other. With this distinction in mind, I examine three possible kinds of relation that might exist between (psychological) happiness and (normative) well-being; to wit, happiness may be understood as playing a central part in (1) a formal theory of well-being, (2) a substantive theory of well-being or (3) as an indicator for well-being. I note that, in the relevant literature, happiness is mostly discussed in terms of either (1) or (2). In this paper, I attempt to motivate a shift of focus away from such accounts of happiness and towards (3), i.e. its epistemic role. When examined in connection to (normative) well-being, (psychological states of) happiness and unhappiness should be understood as psychological states that inform individuals about the contribution of various activities, pursuits, or situations to their well-being or ill-being.
Journal Article
Personal Identity Online
2012
Philosophers concerned with the question of personal identity have typically been asking the so-called re-identification question: what are the conditions under which a person at one point in time is properly re-identified at another point in time? This is a rather technical question. In our everyday interactions, however, we do raise a number of personal identity questions that are quite distinct from it. In order to explore the variety of ways in which the Internet may affect personal identity, I propose in this study to broaden the typical philosophical horizon to other more mundane senses of the question. In
Section 2
, I describe a number of possible meanings of personal identity observed in everyday contexts and more philosophical ones. With some caveats, I argue that it is the specific context in which the question arises that disambiguates the meaning of the question. Online contexts are novel and peculiar insofar as they afford prolonged disembodied and anonymous interaction with others. In line with our previous conclusion, then, there is reason to suspect that such contexts generate new and sui generis answers to the personal identity question. In Section
3
, I examine this question and, contrary to expectations, largely dispel this suspicion. Finally, in Section
4
, I discuss the often-heard claim to the effect that disembodiment and anonymity foster the creation of distinct and incompatible online and offline identities.
Journal Article
Happiness and well-being: shifting the focus of the current debate1
2014
The point of departure of this paper is the recently emphasised distinction between psychological theories of happiness, on the one hand, and normative theories of well-being, on the other. With this distinction in mind, I examine three possible kinds of relation that might exist between (psychological) happiness and (normative) well-being; to wit, happiness may be understood as playing a central part in (1) a formal theory of well-being, (2) a substantive theory of well-being or (3) as an indicator for well-being. I note that, in the relevant literature, happiness is mostly discussed in terms of either (1) or (2). In this paper, I attempt to motivate a shift of focus away from such accounts of happiness and towards (3), i.e. its epistemic role. When examined in connection to (normative) well-being, (psychological states of) happiness and unhappiness should be understood as psychological states that inform individuals about the contribution of various activities, pursuits, or situations to their well-being or ill-being.
Journal Article