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"Rose-Ackerman, Susan"
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International handbook on the economics of corruption. Volume 2
A companion volume to the International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption published in 2006, the specially commissioned papers in Volume Two present some of the best policy-oriented research in the field. They stress the institutional roots of corruption and include new research on topics ranging from corruption in regulation and procurement to vote buying and private firm payoffs. Understanding the consequences of corrupt transactions requires one to know what is being bought with a bribe and how the behavior of public and private actors has been affected. The contributors therefore emphasize how the economic analysis of corruption must take account of the broader context within which bribery and self-dealing operate. Several chapters offer new approaches to empirical research on corruption that range from individual-level data to the macro-economy. Chapters with an explicit policy focus deal with the efficacy of anti-corruption agencies, multi-stakeholder initiatives, red flag warning systems and international conventions. -- Publisher description.
Book
Electoral Rules and Constitutional Structures as Constraints on Corruption
Electoral rules and constitutional structures can influence the level of political corruption. We show that proportional representation (PR) systems are more susceptible to corrupt political rent-seeking than plurality systems. We argue that this result depends on the different loci of rents in PR and plurality systems, and on the monitoring difficulties faced by both voters and opposition parties under PR. We also examine the interaction between electoral rules and presidentialism. We test our main predictions and interaction effects on a cross-section of up to ninety-four democracies. The empirical findings strongly support our hypothesis that PR systems, especially together with presidentialism, are associated with higher levels of corrupt political rent-seeking.
Journal Article
When BITs have some bite: The political-economic environment for bilateral investment treaties
Political risk frequently impedes the flow of capital into developing countries. In response, governments often adopt innovative institutions that aim to attract greater flows of international investment and trade by changing the institutional environment and limiting the risk to outside investors. One primary example of this is the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), aimed specifically at increasing the flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) to developing countries. Yet the literature in political science and economics is inconclusive about whether or not BITs do indeed stimulate FDI, and it provides conflicting theoretical reasoning for the claimed connection. This article argues that BITs do attract FDI to developing countries, but the story is a complicated one. Two important factors must be taken into account. First, BITs cannot entirely substitute for an otherwise weak investment environment. Countries must have the necessary domestic institutions in place that interact with BITs to make these international commitments credible and valuable to investors. Second, as the coverage of BITs increases, overall FDI flows to developing countries increase. However, although remaining positive, the marginal effect of a country’s BITs on its own FDI may fall because of heightened competition for FDI from other BIT countries. Using data from 97 countries for 1984–2007, we provide empirical evidence consistent with both of these theoretical claims.
Journal Article
Regulation and public law in comparative perspective
Administrative law is a key determinant of legitimate executive-branch policy making. Democracies cannot realistically limit policy making to the legislature. Delegation under broad, framework statutes is essential for effective government, but it does not eliminate the need for democratic responsiveness. Those interested in strengthening democracy should not be content with the patterns of delegation, consultation, and oversight that arise from the self-interested behaviour of politicians. This essay summarizes a number of different models, but whatever route they choose, emerging democracies need to assure rights to participate beyond a predetermined group of stakeholders and to make these rights legally enforceable. Reformers in the emerging economies that have been a focus of Michael Trebilcock's work need to seek democratic legitimacy, not just in electoral systems, but also in public administration.
Journal Article
Corruption & Purity
Corruption is a complex and contested concept that raises difficult ethical and legal issues at the borderline between individuals’ public and private roles. What is appropriate or required in one role may be inappropriate or even illegal in another. Based on these concepts of role and responsibility, I begin this essay by analyzing three cases that fit comfortably into the “illegal corruption” category: so-called grand and petty corruption and electoral fraud. These categories express widely accepted boundaries at the interface between public power and private wealth. I then discuss more ambiguous cases, such as lobbying and campaign finance, that demand nuanced legal and policy solutions. Responses to both types of behavior must go beyond law enforcement to include the reorganization of government institutions and their relationship to the private sector.
Journal Article
Knights, Raiders, and Targets
Dramatic as the corporate takeovers of recent years have been, it is far from clear what underlying forces are at work, and what their long-term consequences will be. This book represents one of the first sustained efforts to examine the complex issues surrounding the corporate takeover. Based on papers presented at a symposium sponsored by Columbia Law School's Center for Law and Economic Studies, it airs new theories and offers vital insights into events that have become central to American corporate culture.
eBook
HONESTY AND TRUST IN OLD AND NEW DEMOCRACIES
In 2002, János Kornai and the author organized a project that sought to confront distrust, corruption, and dishonesty in the transition economies of Eastern Europe. In reflecting on that project, this essay highlights present-day weaknesses in the region’s transition and stresses equally troubling developments in the United States that could make government less open to input from civil society groups and low-income individuals. Building a trustworthy state and creating social trust remain challenges for committed democrats in both developed and developing societies.
Journal Article
Altruism, Nonprofits, and Economic Theory
The nonprofit sector is not just a receptacle for charitable donations. Although private charitable impulses are important determinants of nonprofit activity, they are not a sufficient explanation for the size and growth of the sector. Nonprofits also provide government subsidized services and sell their output to the public. The nonprofit form is not in itself a guarantee of high quality, altruistic performance, but neither is it a signal of a slack and inefficient organization. The benefits of the nonprofit form depend on the relative efficacy of alternative control mechanisms and on the benefits to consumers of purchasing from idealogues. Short of policies that simply improve the information available to consumers, the information available to consumers, 2 substitutes for organizational form are important. The first is government regulation with or without public subsidy, and the 2nd is professional training. Either or both can place for-profits on the same competitive plane with nonprofits in markets where customer information is imperfect.
Journal Article
Trust, honesty and corruption: reflection on the state-building process
Honesty and trust affect the functioning of the state and the market, and, conversely, the quality of formal rules and institutions has an impact on interpersonal trust. This paper organizes and critiques research on the relationship between trust and government; it stresses the mutual interaction between trust and democracy and the impact of corruption. Given this context, the concluding section discusses the transition process in post-socialist countries, highlighting the tensions between interpersonal trust and trust in public institutions. L'honnêteté et la confiance ont des incidences sur le fonctionnement de l'État et du marché. Inversement, la nature des règles juridiques et des institutions influent sur la confiance interpersonnelle. L'article propose une critique organisée des recherches sur la relation entre confiance et gouvernement; il souligne l'interaction mutuelle entre confiance et démocratie ainsi que l'impact de la corruption. La conclusion porte particulièrement sur le processus de transition dans les pays ex-communistes qui engendre des tensions fortes entre confiance interpersonnelle et confiance dans les institutions publiques. Aufrichtigkeit und Vertrauen beeinflussen die Staatsgeschäfte und die Wirtschaft. Umgekehrt bestimmt die Qualität des Rechtsstaats das persönliche Vertrauen. Es folgt eine Diskussion der Forschungsarbeiten über das Verhältnis von Vertrauen und Regierung; sie unterstreicht die Beziehung von Vertrauen und Demokratie sowie die Bedeutung der Korruption. Die Studie schließt mit der Wende in den ehemaligen kommunistischen Staaten, die zu starken Spannungen zwischen persönlichem Vertrauen und Vertrauen in die öffentlichen Behörden führt.
Journal Article