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result(s) for
"Rosoff, Philip M"
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Can the Case Report Withstand Ethical Scrutiny?
2019
Since antiquity, doctors have employed case reports as an essential and ongoing part in communicating information about patients and their diseases to their colleagues and, at times, to the wider, nonmedical world. Given how useful case reports have been, a legitimate and persuasive argument could be made to retain them in modern medical literature. But there is an emerging problem with case reports. As the ability to publish and disseminate the information contained in them has become easier, the capacity for individuals to maintain their privacy and restrict access to their personal information has become more strained, and it has become more difficult for doctors who tell clinical stories to respect the confidentiality of their patients while still communicating the pertinent details of their cases. Does the acknowledged educational and scientific value of (some) case reports justify the threat to personal privacy that may be entailed by the format itself?
Journal Article
Drawing the line : healthcare rationing and the cutoff problem
Rosoff \"discusses how to decide what should and should not be covered in a generous [health care] benefits plan for all. He considers a variety of ways this might be done and concludes that the most just approach is to utilize a transparent process in which experts and lay people develop a consensus on what should be covered by focusing on both clinical evidence of need and the effective and appropriate means to address those needs. He also considers the various objections and impediments to this proposal and concludes that they are obstacles that can be successfully met\"--Amazon.com.
Discriminatory Demands by Patients
2018
Most of us working in health care are concerned—perhaps even appalled—when patients make demands for doctors or nurses or other caregivers that accord with their bigoted sentiments. Even though there may be some reasons to believe that matching certain characteristics of doctors with those of their patients (whether the latter ask for them or not) may produce both more patient satisfaction and even some health benefits, how does one tease apart or distinguish requests that are potentially beneficial from those we find abhorrent? What facts might make it acceptable for an African American patient to request an African American doctor or a Chinese Mandarin‐speaking patient to request a physician who is fluent in Mandarin and is also of Chinese ethnicity? At the same time, why do we recoil or find it objectionable that the father of the baby under Tonya Battle's care in Michigan might want a nurse caring for his child with whom he identifies ethnically, or racially or religiously, or based on any other superficial trait(s) that we use to characterize people?
Journal Article
When Religion and Medicine Clash: Non-beneficial Treatments and Hope for a Miracle
2019
Patient and family demands for the initiation or continuation of life-sustaining medically non-beneficial treatments continues to be a major issue. This is especially relevant in intensive care units, but is also a challenge in other settings, most notably with cardiopulmonary resuscitation. Differences of opinion between physicians and patients/families about what are appropriate interventions in specific clinical situations are often fraught with highly strained emotions, and perhaps none more so when the family bases their desires on religious belief. In this essay, I discuss non-beneficial treatments in light of these sorts of disputes, when there is a clash between the nominally secular world of fact- and evidence-based medicine and the faith-based world of hope for a miraculous cure. I ask the question whether religious belief can justify providing treatment that has either no or a vanishly small chance of restoring meaningful function. I conclude that non-beneficial therapy by its very definition cannot be helpful, and indeed is often harmful, to patients and hence cannot be justified no matter what the source or kind of reasons used to support its use. Therefore, doctors may legitimately refuse to provide such treatments, so long as they do so for acceptable clinical reasons. They must also offer alternatives, including second (and third) opinions, as well the option of transferring the care of the patient to a more accommodating physician or institution.
Journal Article
Compulsory Organ Retrieval: Morally, But Not Socially, Justified
2018
The number of patients with organ failure who could potentially benefit from transplantation continues to exceed the available supply of organs. Despite numerous efforts to increase the number of donors, there remains an enormous mismatch between demand and supply. Large numbers of people still die with potentially transplantable organs remaining in situ, most frequently as a result of family objections. I argue that there are no persuasive moral arguments against mandated organ retrieval from all dead individuals who meet clinical criteria. However, because of continuing endemic prejudice in United States society and its healthcare system and the distrust this engenders, I conclude that proceeding with a policy of compulsory organ retrieval, even if morally unobjectionable, would not be warranted.
Journal Article
Adolescent Medical Decisionmaking Rights: Reconciling Medicine and Law
2021
Dennis Lindberg came into his aunt’s care when he was in the 4 th grade because his parents struggled with drug addiction and could not provide for him. At thirteen, he was baptized in his aunt’s faith as a Jehovah’s Witness. Just days after he turned fourteen, on November 6, he was diagnosed with acute lymphoblastic leukemia. The prognosis was that Dennis had a 75% chance of cure with standard oncology treatment. Consistent with the requirements of his new faith, however, Dennis told his doctors, “I do not want to be treated if the requirement is that I would have to take a blood transfusion.” His aunt, whose custodial rights seem not to have included medical decisionmaking, was adamant that “[t]his is Dennis’s decision.” The hospital social worker assigned to Dennis’s case assured his aunt that “having just turned 14, [he] could be considered mature enough to make his own decisions.” But hospital psychologists declined to evaluate Dennis’s maturity because they did “not have the tools for such an assessment.” Established hospital policy described the failure to provide a minor with necessary, life-saving care as medical neglect. Hospital ethicists advised that Dennis’s autonomy interests were outweighed by the benefits associated with treatment. And, standard oncology practice norms are that doctors should push back against minors’ lifesaving treatment refusals. Still, Dennis’s doctor agreed with his social worker and aunt, saying, “We owe respect to a 14-year-old[.]” In this view, he was supported by colleagues on staff and by hospital counsel. A county judge got the case only at the eleventh hour, on an emergency motion filed by Dennis’s parents and Child Protective Services for a declaration of dependency and to compel the necessary transfusion. Although Dennis was degrading rapidly, his doctor testified that if a transfusion were ordered that day, Dennis still had a 70% chance of survival. The judge had no background in the applicable law and no time to research the issues; nevertheless, he denied the motion concluding, “It is time to do what Dennis has decided.” “Seven hours later, at 6 p.m., on Nov. 28, Dennis died.” 1
Journal Article
Transplants for non-lethal conditions: a case against hand transplantation in minors
2018
Human allografts for life-threatening organ failure have been demonstrated to be lifesaving and are now considered to be standard of care for many conditions. Transplantation of non-vital anatomic body parts has also been accomplished. Hand transplantation after limb loss in adults has been shown to offer some promising benefits in both functional and psychological measures in preliminary studies. It has been suggested to expand eligibility criteria to include minors, with one such operation having already been performed. With this in mind, we examine the current state of hand transplantation research in the context of available alternatives. We examine the ethics of carrying out these operations in minors, including under the protections of clinical research. We argue that children should not be considered for this surgery due to the substantial risks of immunosuppressive medication, the likelihood that the graft will need to be replaced during the patient’s lifetime and the lack of significant compensatory advantages over modern prosthetics.
Journal Article
Licensing Surrogate Decision-Makers
2017
As medical technology continues to improve, more people will live longer lives with multiple chronic illnesses with increasing cumulative debilitation, including cognitive dysfunction. Combined with the aging of society in most developed countries, an ever-growing number of patients will require surrogate decision-makers. While advance care planning by patients still capable of expressing their preferences about medical interventions and end-of-life care can improve the quality and accuracy of surrogate decisions, this is often not the case, not infrequently leading to demands for ineffective, inappropriate and prolonged interventions. In 1980 LaFollette called for the licensing of prospective parents, basing his argument on the harm they can do to vulnerable people (children). In this paper, I apply his arguments to surrogate decision-makers for cognitively incapacitated patients, rhetorically suggesting that we require potential surrogates to qualify for this position by demonstrating their ability to make reasonable and rational decisions for others. I employ this theoretical approach to argue that the loose criteria by which we authorize surrogates’ generally unchallenged power should be reconsidered.
Journal Article