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Recent progress in the study of attention and performance is discussed, focusing on the nature of attentional control and the effects of practice. Generally speaking, the effects of mental set are proving more pervasive than was previously suspected, whereas automaticity is proving less robust.

Certain stimuli have the power to rapidly and involuntarily capture spatial attention against our will. The present study investigated whether such stimuli capture spatial attention even when they appear in ignored regions of visual space. In other words, which force is more powerful: attentional capture or spatial filtering? Participants performed a spatial cuing task, searching for a letter target defined by color (e.g., green) and then reporting that letter’s identity. Two of the four search locations were always irrelevant. Unlike many previous experiments, participants were forced to ignore these locations because they always contained a target-colored distractor letter. Experiment 1 assessed capture by a salient-but-irrelevant abrupt onset cue appearing 150 ms before the search display. One might expect onset cues to capture attention even at ignored locations given that the main function of capture, presumably, is to rapidly alert observers to unexpected yet potentially important stimuli. However, they did not. Experiment 2 replicated this result with a different neutral baseline condition. Experiment 3 replicated the absence of capture effects at ignored locations with an even more potent stimulus: a relevant cue possessing the target color. We propose that people are effectively immune to attentional capture by objects in ignored locations – spatial filtering dominates attentional capture.

There is considerable evidence that salient items can be suppressed in order to prevent attentional capture. However, this evidence has relied almost exclusively on paradigms using color singletons as salient distractors. It is therefore unclear whether other kinds of salient stimuli, such as abrupt onsets, can also be suppressed. Using an additional singleton paradigm optimized for detecting oculomotor suppression, we directly compared color singletons with abrupt onsets. Participants searched for a target shape (e.g., green diamond) and attempted to ignore salient distractors that were either abrupt onsets or color singletons. First eye movements were used to assess whether salient distractors captured attention or were instead suppressed. Initial experiments using a type of abrupt onset from classic attentional capture studies (four white dots) revealed that abrupt onsets strongly captured attention whereas color singletons were suppressed. After controlling for important differences between the onsets and color singletons – such as luminance and color – abrupt-onset capture was reduced but not eliminated. We ultimately conclude that abrupt onsets are not suppressed like color singletons.

Does the suppression of irrelevant visual features require attentional resources? McDonald et al. (2023, Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 30, 224-234) proposed that suppression processes are unavailable while a person is busy performing another task. They reported the absence of the PD (believed to index suppression) when two tasks were presented close together in time. We looked for converging evidence using established behavior measures of suppression. Following McDonald et al., our participants performed a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) task followed by a search task. For the RSVP task, participants determined whether the target digit 4 or 6 appeared within a string of other digits. The search display appeared at a lag of 2 or 8 digits after the RSVP target. Participants searched for a yellow target circle amongst nine background circles, which included a uniquely colored distractor for some trials. The main question was whether distractor suppression would occur at Lag 2, while attentional resources were still processing the RSVP target. Suppression was assessed using the captureprobe paradigm. On 30% of trials, probe letters appeared inside the colored circles and participants reported those letters. Probe recall accuracy was lower at locations with distractor colors than those with neutral colors (the baseline), suggesting proactive suppression. Critically, this difference in probe recall accuracy was similar at Lag 2 and Lag 8, suggesting that the ability to proactively suppress distractors remains intact while dual-tasking. We argue that although reactive suppression likely requires attentional resources, proactive suppression-an implicit process-does not.

It is commonly assumed that salient singletons generate an “attend-to-me signal” which causes suppression to develop over time, eventually preventing capture. Despite this assumption and the name “singleton suppression,” a causal link between salience and suppression has not yet been clearly established. We point out the plausibility of a simple alternative mechanism: distractors might be suppressed because they are distractors rather than targets, even when non-salient. To look for evidence of salience-based suppression, we had participants search for a target shape among distractors, which sometimes included irrelevant-colored distractors. The critical manipulation was whether the irrelevant-colored distractor was salient (a color singleton) or non-salient (three non-target colored shapes; a triplet). On 30% of trials, probe letters were presented briefly inside each shape and participants were to report those letters. Probe recall below baseline indicates suppression. Experiment 1 showed that suppression was not triggered any more strongly by salient distractors (singletons) than by non-salient distractors (triplets). Experiment 2 showed that strong suppression effects developed rapidly even in the absence of salient singletons. These findings raise the thus far neglected question of whether salience plays any role in suppression.

The present study assessed three hypotheses of how practice reduces dual-task interference: Practice teaches participants to efficiently integrate performance of a task pair; practice promotes automatization of individual tasks, allowing the central bottleneck to be bypassed; practice leaves the bottleneck intact but shorter in duration. These hypotheses were tested in two transfer-of-training experiments. Participants received one of three training types (Task 1 only, or Task 2 only, or dual-task), followed by dual-task test sessions. Practice effects in Experiment 1 (Task 1: auditory-vocal; Task 2: visual-manual) were fully explained by the intact bottleneck hypothesis, without task integration or automatization. This hypothesis also accounted well for the majority of participants when the task order was reversed (Experiment 2). In this case, however, there were multiple indicators that several participants had succeeded in eliminating the bottleneck by automatizing one or both tasks. Neither experiment provided any evidence that practice promotes efficient task integration.

It has been proposed that salient objects have high potential to disrupt target performance, and so people learn to proactively suppress them, thereby preventing these salient distractors from capturing attention in the future. Consistent with this hypothesis, Gaspar et al. {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 773(13), 3693-3698, 2016) reported that the PD (believed to index suppression) was larger for high-salient color distractors than for low-salient color distractors. The present study looked for converging evidence that salience triggers suppression using established behavior measures of suppression. Following Gaspar et al., our participants searched for a yellow target circle among nine background circles, which sometimes included one circle with a unique color. The distractor was either high or low in salience with respect to the background circles. The question was whether the high-salient color would be proactively suppressed more strongly than the low-salient color. This was assessed using the capture-probe paradigm. On 33% of trials, probe letters appeared inside colored circles and participants were to report those letters. If high-salient colors are more strongly suppressed, then probe recall accuracy should be lower at locations with the high-salient color than those with the low-salient color. Experiment 1 found no such effect. A similar finding was observed in Experiment 2 after addressing possible floor effects. These findings suggest that proactive suppression is not caused by salience. We propose that the PD reflects not only proactive suppression but also reactive suppression.

Does the suppression of irrelevant visual features require attentional resources? McDonald et al. ( 2023 , Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 30, 224–234) proposed that suppression processes are unavailable while a person is busy performing another task. They reported the absence of the P D (believed to index suppression) when two tasks were presented close together in time. We looked for converging evidence using established behavior measures of suppression. Following McDonald et al., our participants performed a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) task followed by a search task. For the RSVP task, participants determined whether the target digit 4 or 6 appeared within a string of other digits. The search display appeared at a lag of 2 or 8 digits after the RSVP target. Participants searched for a yellow target circle amongst nine background circles, which included a uniquely colored distractor for some trials. The main question was whether distractor suppression would occur at Lag 2, while attentional resources were still processing the RSVP target. Suppression was assessed using the capture-probe paradigm. On 30% of trials, probe letters appeared inside the colored circles and participants reported those letters. Probe recall accuracy was lower at locations with distractor colors than those with neutral colors (the baseline), suggesting proactive suppression. Critically, this difference in probe recall accuracy was similar at Lag 2 and Lag 8, suggesting that the ability to proactively suppress distractors remains intact while dual-tasking. We argue that although reactive suppression likely requires attentional resources, proactive suppression—an implicit process—does not.

It has been proposed that salient objects have high potential to disrupt target performance, and so people learn to proactively suppress them, thereby preventing these salient distractors from capturing attention in the future. Consistent with this hypothesis, Gaspar et al. ( Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 113 (13), 3693–3698, 2016 ) reported that the P D (believed to index suppression) was larger for high-salient color distractors than for low-salient color distractors. The present study looked for converging evidence that salience triggers suppression using established behavior measures of suppression. Following Gaspar et al., our participants searched for a yellow target circle among nine background circles, which sometimes included one circle with a unique color. The distractor was either high or low in salience with respect to the background circles. The question was whether the high-salient color would be proactively suppressed more strongly than the low-salient color. This was assessed using the capture-probe paradigm. On 33% of trials, probe letters appeared inside colored circles and participants were to report those letters. If high-salient colors are more strongly suppressed, then probe recall accuracy should be lower at locations with the high-salient color than those with the low-salient color. Experiment 1 found no such effect. A similar finding was observed in Experiment 2 after addressing possible floor effects. These findings suggest that proactive suppression is not caused by salience. We propose that the P D reflects not only proactive suppression but also reactive suppression.

Maquestiaux, Lyphout-Spitz, Ruthruff, and Arexis (2020) demonstrated that ideomotor-compatible (IM) tasks (e.g., pressing the left key when an arrow points left) can operate automatically, entirely bypassing the central bottleneck that constrains dual-task performance. But is bottleneck bypassing a specific consequence of IM compatibility or is it due to task ease? To answer this question, we tested the automaticity of a task that was easy but not IM. The task was easy due to the high semantic compatibility between the stimulus and the response: saying “ping” when hearing “pong” and “pong” to “ping” in Experiment 1, saying “low” when hearing “high” and “high” to “low” in Experiment 2. We presented it as Task 2, along with a Task 1 that was not easy, due to the use of an arbitrary stimulus-response mapping. Single-task trials were randomly intermixed with dual-task trials and then used as baselines to assess dual-task costs and to simulate distributions of inter-response intervals (IRIs) predictive of bottleneck bypassing vs. bottlenecking. The results of both experiments provided converging evidence that the entire Task 2 bypassed the bottleneck on virtually all trials: very small dual-task costs, high percentages of response reversals, and a close match between the observed IRI distributions and that predicted by bottleneck bypassing. Neither ideomotor compatibility nor task speed (the semantic task was not particularly fast) explain these findings. We therefore propose that the key to bypassing the central bottleneck is the ease with which people can fully load the stimulus-response mapping into working memory.