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In a model calibrated to match micro- and macroeconomic evidence on household income dynamics, we show that a modest degree of heterogeneity in household preferences or beliefs is sufficient to match empirical measures of wealth inequality in the United States. The heterogeneity-augmented model's predictions are consistent with microeconomic evidence that suggests that the annual marginal propensity to consume (MPC) is much larger than the roughly 0.04 im- plied by commonly used macroeconomic models (even ones including some heterogeneity). The high MPC arises because many consumers hold little wealth despite having a strong precautionary motive. Our model also plausibly predicts that the aggregate MPC can differ greatly depending on how the shock is distributed across households (depending, e.g., on their wealth, or employment status).

This paper presents a simple new method for measuring \"wealth effects\" on aggregate consumption. The method exploits the stickiness of consumption growth (sometimes interpreted as reflecting consumption \"habits\") to distinguish between immediate and eventual wealth effects. In U.S. data, we estimate that the immediate (next quarter) marginal propensity to consume from a $1 change in housing wealth is about 2 cents, with a final eventual effect around 9 cents, substantially larger than the effect of shocks to financial wealth. We argue that our method is preferable to cointegration-based approaches, because neither theory nor evidence supports faith in the existence of a stable cointegrating vector.

This paper estimates the degree of stickiness in aggregate consumption growth (sometimes interpreted as reflecting consumption habits) for thirteen advanced economies. We find that after controlling for measurement error, consumption growth has a high degree of autocorrelation, with a stickiness parameter of about 0.7 on average across countries. The sticky consumption growth model outperforms the random walk model of Hall (1978) and typically fits the data better than the popular Campbell and Mankiw (1989) model, though in a few countries, the sticky consumption growth and Campbell-Mankiw models work about equally well.

We investigate determinants of disagreement—cross-sectional dispersion of individual forecasts—about key economic indicators. Disagreement about economic activity, in particular about GDP growth, has a distinct dynamic from disagreement about prices: inflation and interest rates. Disagreement about GDP growth intensifies strongly during recessions. Disagreement about prices rises with their level, declines under independent central banks, and both its level and its sensitivity to macroeconomic variables are larger in countries where central banks became independent only around the mid-1990s. Our findings suggest that credible monetary policy contributes to anchoring of expectations about inflation and interest rates. Disagreement for both groups of indicators increases with uncertainty about the actual series.

We argue that the U.S. personal saving rate's long stability (from the 1960s through the early 1980s), subsequent steady decline (1980s - 2007), and recent substantial increase (2008 - 2011) can all be interpreted using a parsimonious 'buffer stock' model of optimal consumption in the presence of labor income uncertainty and credit constraints. Saving in the model is affected by the gap between 'target' and actual wealth, with the target wealth determined by credit conditions and uncertainty. An estimated structural version of the model suggests that increased credit availability accounts for most of the saving rate's long-term decline, while fluctuations in net wealth and uncertainty capture the bulk of the business-cycle variation.

Using a standard, realistically calibrated model of buffer-stock saving with transitory and permanent income shocks, we study how cross-country differences in the wealth distribution and household income dynamics affect the marginal propensity to consume out of transitory shocks (MPC). Across the 15 countries in our sample, we find that the aggregate consumption response ranges between 0.1 and 0.4 and is stronger (i) in economies with large wealth inequality, where a larger proportion of households has little wealth, (ii) under larger transitory income shocks, and (iii) when we consider households only use liquid assets (rather than net wealth) to smooth consumption.

To match aggregate consumption dynamics, macroeconomic models must generate “excess smoothness” in consumption expenditures. But microfounded models are calibrated to match micro data, which exhibit no “excess smoothness.” So standard microfounded models fail to match the macro smoothness facts. We show that the micro and macro evidence are both consistent with a microfounded model where consumers know their personal circumstances but have “sticky expectations” about the macroeconomy. Aggregate consumption sluggishness reflects consumers’ imperfect attention to aggregate shocks. Our proposed degree of inattention has negligible utility costs because aggregate shocks constitute a tiny proportion of the uncertainty that consumers face.

This paper investigates the effects of EU enlargement on price convergence. The internal market is expected to boost integration and increase efficiency and welfare through a convergence of prices in product markets. Two principal drivers are crucial to explain price developments. On one hand, higher competition exerts downward pressure on prices because of lower markups. On the other hand, the catching-up process of lowincome countries leads to a rise in price levels and higher inflation over a transition period. Using comparative price levels for forty-one product categories, price convergence can be established. However, the speed of convergence is rather slow, with half-lives of approximately ten years. The enlargement has stimulated convergence slightly toward the mean price; this effect is robust across different groups of countries. Moreover, the driving forces of convergence are explored. In line with theoretical predictions, the rise in competition exerts downward pressure on prices, whereas catching-up of low-income countries leads to a rise in price levels and higher inflation. The findings have important implications, as price convergence facilitates the working of common economic policies.

We estimate the Sticky Information Phillips Curve model of Mankiw and Reis (2002) using survey expectations of professional forecasters from four major European economies. Our estimates imply that inflation expectations in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are updated about once a year, while in Italy, about once each 6 months.