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"STEVEN J. ALVAREZ"
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Selling war : a critical look at the military's PR machine
\"In the spring of 2004, army reservist and public affairs officer Steven J. Alvarez waited to be called up as the U.S. military stormed Baghdad and deposed Saddam Hussein. But soon after President Bush's famous PR stunt in which an aircraft carrier displayed the banner 'Mission Accomplished,' the dynamics of the war shifted. Selling War recounts how the U.S. military lost the information war in Iraq by engaging the wrong audiences--that is, the Western media--by ignoring Iraqi citizens and the wider Arab population, and by paying mere lip service to the directive to 'Put an Iraqi face on everything.' In the absence of effective communication from the U.S. military, the information void was swiftly filled by Al Qaeda and, eventually, ISIS. As a result, efforts to create and maintain a successful, stable country were complicated and eventually frustrated. Alvarez couples his experiences as a public affairs officer in Iraq with extensive research on communication and government relations to expose why communications failed and led to the breakdown on the ground. A revealing glimpse into the inner workings of the military's PR machine, where personnel become stewards of presidential legacies and keepers of flawed policies, Selling War provides a critical review of the outdated communication strategies executed in Iraq. Alvarez's candid account demonstrates how a fundamental lack of understanding about how to wage an information war has led to the conditions we face now: the rise of ISIS and the return of U.S. forces to Iraq\"-- Provided by publisher.
Book
Selling War
In the spring of 2004, army reservist and public affairs officer Steven J. Alvarez waited to be called up as the U.S. military stormed Baghdad and deposed Saddam Hussein. But soon after President Bush's famous PR stunt in which an aircraft carrier displayed the banner \"Mission Accomplished,\" the dynamics of the war shifted.Selling Warrecounts how the U.S. military lost the information war in Iraq by engaging the wrong audiences-that is, the Western media-by ignoring Iraqi citizens and the wider Arab population, and by paying mere lip service to the directive to \"Put an Iraqi face on everything.\" In the absence of effective communication from the U.S. military, the information void was swiftly filled by Al Qaeda and, eventually, ISIS. As a result, efforts to create and maintain a successful, stable country were complicated and eventually frustrated.Alvarez couples his experiences as a public affairs officer in Iraq with extensive research on communication and government relations to expose why communications failed and led to the breakdown on the ground. A revealing glimpse into the inner workings of the military's PR machine, where personnel become stewards of presidential legacies and keepers of flawed policies,Selling Warprovides a critical review of the outdated communication strategies executed in Iraq. Alvarez's candid account demonstrates how a fundamental lack of understanding about how to wage an information war has led to the conditions we face now: the rise of ISIS and the return of U.S. forces to Iraq.
eBook
DAVID VERSUS GOLIATH
In May 2004, a little more than a month before the transfer of authority, I sent an e-mail to then U.S. Army major general David H. Petraeus. It was about nine o’clock in the morning in Baghdad, which meant it was around two o’clock in the morning back in the States. I introduced myself as the current pao for the command and gave him a short update about press activity surrounding his arrival in Baghdad. Within minutes of my sending the e-mail, I got a reply from him thanking me, and he said he looked forward to getting a full
Book Chapter
THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY DAYS
In late 2003 I was at the Pentagon doing an Army Reserve two-week annual training tour as a military reporter for the Defense Department website Defend America. I had just covered a meeting between Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Iraqi women in a Pentagon meeting room. My assignment editor had told me the Iraqi women had concerns about getting photographed given the security situation back in Iraq, so I did not take their pictures, but a staff photographer from Wolfowitz’s office had no problem sticking his lens in their faces and making them squirm. I had no idea
Book Chapter
TRAINING THE IRAQI MINISTRIES
On October 23, 2004, soldiers from the Iraqi Army graduated from basic military training at Kirkush Military Training Base, just several miles from the Iranian border. After graduation ceremonies they donned civilian clothes and boarded buses and vans on their way home for a few days of leave before reporting to their assignments. U.S. trainers from our command said the mood was jovial as forty- nine of the Iraqi soldiers headed south from Kirkush near Baladruz through desolate desert roads in Diyala Province in several small buses.
The next time anyone saw the soldiers was on the side of the
Book Chapter
THE BLOG OF WAR
I have always had issues with the way the military does business, particularly the Army. If there is a complex and inefficient way of doing something, they will find it, and many commissioned officers are programmed to first say no to new ideas and then look for ways to impede methods that can improve a process. The Army is an organization that loves to get wrapped up in processes.
I’ve always tried to eliminate red tape and find the fastest and most effective way to do things while trying to improve the way I do my job along the way.
Book Chapter
THE IRAQI FACE
There was a confluence of events all stirring in Iraq in the summer of 2004, and if we played our cards right the coalition and the Iraqi government would be able to entrench themselves and not lose further ground in the communications war. More and more reports of violence in Iraq were dominating the headlines, as reporters began to peel back the truth and reveal that progress was not truly being made in Iraq and was not as widespread as reported by the cpa. The occupation’s first year was not a banner year, as touted by the Bush administration. Satellite
Book Chapter
INSULATION
My son walked next to me and held my hand as the creamy, sweet smell of jasmine drifted by us on a warm breeze. Occasionally, he glanced at me, mostly after thunder rumbled in the distance, well beyond the Spanish moss- covered oaks that canopied our neighborhood in central Florida.
“Don’t be scared,” I told him. “It’s just thunder.” But nonetheless we quickened our pace, his hand firmly clasped in mine, as the thunder roared again, closer this time, louder than before, shaking the ground beneath us. Then something I couldn’t see began to pull at my leg almost like
Book Chapter
IRAQI MEDIA TEAM
Early in my tour in Iraq after the coalition failed to help us train Sabeeh, I knew I wasn’t going to receive additional personnel, despite the fact that we needed a team of at least eight public affairs soldiers. I had contacted a short list of people I considered to be public affairs thoroughbreds shortly after I took over as the chief of public affairs for the training mission. Many volunteered. I asked Jared if he could recommend any military journalists to come support us, and he gave me names of people he knew and considered to be studs. I
Book Chapter
ARAB MEDIA
Iraqi journalists had little professional credibility in the eyes of American paos while I was in Iraq. In speaking to paos who had experience dealing with Iraqi press, many said they were unrefined and unprofessional. Part of the problem, I suspect, is that journalism in the Pan- Arab world is much different from American journalism. Most Arab news agencies ordinarily are no more than public relations mechanisms for their nations. They file reports that are rarely critical of their governments and serve the interests of their administrations or kingdoms. There are exceptions, of course, such as al- Jazeera and al-Arabiya,
Book Chapter