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The production of public goods by the contribution of individual volunteers is a social dilemma because an individual that does not volunteer can benefit from the public good produced by the contributions of others. Therefore it is generally believed that public goods can be produced only in the presence of repeated interactions (which allow reciprocation, reputation effects and punishment) or relatedness (kin selection). Cooperation, however, often occurs in the absence of iterations and relatedness. We show that when the production of a public good is a Volunteer's Dilemma, in which a fixed number of cooperators is necessary to produce the public good, cooperators and defectors persist in a mixed equilibrium, without iterations and without relatedness. This mixed equilibrium is absent in the N-person Prisoner's Dilemma, in which the public good is a linear function of the individual contributions. We also show that the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Volunteer's Dilemma are the two opposite extremes of a general public goods game, and that all intermediate cases can have a mixed equilibrium like the Volunteer's Dilemma. The coexistence of cooperators and defectors, therefore, is a typical outcome of most social dilemmas, which requires neither relatedness nor iterations.

Microorganisms produce and secrete materials that are beneficial for themselves and their neighbors. We modeled the situation when cells can produce different costly secretions which increase the carrying capacity of the population. Strains that lose the function of producing one or more secretions avoid the cost of production and can exhaust the producers. However, secreting substances provides a private benefit for the producers in a density-dependent way. We developed a model to examine the outcome of the selection among different types of producer strains from the nonproducer strain to the partial producers, to the full producer strain. We were interested in circumstances under which selection maintains partners that produce complementary secreted materials thus forming an interdependent mutualistic interaction. We show that interdependent mutualism is selected under a broad range of conditions if private benefit decreases with density. Selection frequently causes the coexistence of more and less generalist cooperative strains, thus cooperation and exploitation co-occur. Interdependent mutualism is evolved under more specific circumstances if private benefit increases with density and these general observations are valid in a well-mixed and a structured deme model. We show that the applied population structure allows the invasion of rare cooperators and supports cooperation in general.

Males and females often display different behaviours and, in the context of reproduction, these behaviours are labelled sex roles. The Darwin–Bateman paradigm argues that the root of these differences is anisogamy (i.e., differences in size and/or function of gametes between the sexes) that leads to biased sexual selection, and sex differences in parental care and body size. This evolutionary cascade, however, is contentious since some of the underpinning assumptions have been questioned. Here we investigate the relationships between anisogamy, sexual size dimorphism, sex difference in parental care and intensity of sexual selection using phylogenetic comparative analyses of 64 species from a wide range of animal taxa. The results question the first step of the Darwin–Bateman paradigm, as the extent of anisogamy does not appear to predict the intensity of sexual selection. The only significant predictor of sexual selection is the relative inputs of males and females into the care of offspring. We propose that ecological factors, life-history and demography have more substantial impacts on contemporary sex roles than the differences of gametic investments between the sexes.

Background Quorum sensing (QS) is the ability of microorganisms to assess local clonal density by measuring the extracellular concentration of signal molecules that they produce and excrete. QS is also the only known way of bacterial communication that supports the coordination of within-clone cooperative actions requiring a certain threshold density of cooperating cells. Cooperation aided by QS communication is sensitive to cheating in two different ways: laggards may benefit from not investing in cooperation but enjoying the benefit provided by their cooperating neighbors, whereas Liars explicitly promise cooperation but fail to do so, thereby convincing potential cooperating neighbors to help them, for almost free. Given this double vulnerability to cheats, it is not trivial why QS-supported cooperation is so widespread among prokaryotes. Results We investigated the evolutionary dynamics of QS in populations of cooperators for whom the QS signal is an inevitable side effect of producing the public good itself (cue-based QS). Using spatially explicit agent-based lattice simulations of QS-aided threshold cooperation (whereby cooperation is effective only above a critical cumulative level of contributions) and three different (analytical and numerical) approximations of the lattice model, we explored the dynamics of QS-aided threshold cooperation under a feasible range of parameter values. We demonstrate three major advantages of cue-driven cooperation. First, laggards cannot wipe out cooperation under a wide range of reasonable environmental conditions, in spite of an unconstrained possibility to mutate to cheating; in fact, cooperators may even exclude laggards at high cooperation thresholds. Second, lying almost never pays off, if the signal is an inevitable byproduct (i.e., the cue) of cooperation; even very cheap fake signals are selected against. And thirdly, QS is most useful if local cooperator densities are the least predictable, i.e., if their lattice-wise mean is close to the cooperation threshold with a substantial variance. Conclusions Comparing the results of the four different modeling approaches indicates that cue-driven threshold cooperation may be a viable evolutionary strategy for microbes that cannot keep track of past behavior of their potential cooperating partners, in spatially viscous and in well-mixed environments alike. Our model can be seen as a version of the famous greenbeard effect, where greenbeards coexist with defectors in a evolutionarily stable polymorphism. Such polymorphism is maintained by the condition-dependent trade-offs of signal production which are characteristic of cue-based QS.

Abstract Maintaining a good reputation is crucial for humans. Altruism, e.g. charity, may serve as a costly signal that enhances reputation based on the real or communicated cost. Fundraising via charity running triggers competitive altruism when potential donors donate in reaction to the reputation increase of the fundraiser. Using real-life data of marathonists and half-marathonists (388 runners) and their 9281 donors, the present research focuses on how the communicated cost and goal of a charity run affected the potential donors. We analysed the introductory texts of the runners presented online according to the cost and the social benefit of the fundraising communicated by them. We have shown that emphasizing more the subjective cost of running and the social benefit of the goal, or writing a longer text, attracted more donors and, even though the average amount of donation per donor did not increase, still lead to a greater amount of donations collected overall by the fundraiser. It was also shown that a higher communicated subjective cost resulted in a higher ratio of opposite-sex donors, both in the case of male and female runners, suggesting that the communication of the cost of an altruistic act might be the object of sexual selection.Significance statementA good reputation is crucial for humans, as a reputable person enjoys several benefits. One way to maintain a good reputation is to be altruistic, e.g. doing charity. A seemingly high cost and a socially accepted goal may result in a higher reputation. Using data from a charity running community we demonstrate that fundraisers who emphasize their subjective cost (how difficult to run), and emphasize the good goal of the charity, attract more donors, and even though the average amount of each donation does not increase, a higher number of donors results in a greater amount of donations collected overall. Talking about the difficulties of the charity run results in a higher ratio of opposite-sex donors. Our results may be helpful to plan more successful charity events or to make a human community more altruistic and cooperative in general.

A stochastic evolutionary dynamics of two strategies given by 2x 2 matrix games is studied in finite populations. We focus on stochastic properties of fixation: how a strategy represented by a single individual wins over the entire population. The process is discussed in the framework of a random walk with site dependent hopping rates. The time of fixation is found to be identical for both strategies in any particular game. The asymptotic behavior of the fixation time and fixation probabilities in the large population size limit is also discussed. We show that fixation is fast when there is at least one pure evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) in the infinite population size limit, while fixation is slow when the ESS is the coexistence of the two strategies.

Many populations of cells cooperate through the production of extracellular materials. These materials (enzymes, siderophores) spread by diffusion and can be applied by both the cooperator and cheater (non-producer) cells. In this paper the problem of coexistence of cooperator and cheater cells is studied on a 1D lattice where cooperator cells produce a diffusive material which is beneficial to the individuals according to the local concentration of this public good. The reproduction success of a cell increases linearly with the benefit in the first model version and increases non-linearly (saturates) in the second version. Two types of update rules are considered; either the cooperative cell stops producing material before death (death-production-birth, DpB) or it produces the common material before it is selected to die (production-death-birth, pDB). The empty space is occupied by its neighbors according to their replication rates. By using analytical and numerical methods I have shown that coexistence of the cooperator and cheater cells is possible although atypical in the linear version of this 1D model if either DpB or pDB update rule is assumed. While coexistence is impossible in the non-linear model with pDB update rule, it is one of the typical behaviors in case of the non-linear model with DpB update rule.

Indirect reciprocity is often claimed as one of the key mechanisms of human cooperation. It works only if there is a reputational score keeping and each individual can inform with high probability which other individuals were good or bad in the previous round. Gossip is often proposed as a mechanism that can maintain such coherence of reputations in the face of errors of transmission. Random errors, however, are not the only source of uncertainty in such situations. The possibility of deceptive communication, where the signallers aim to misinform the receiver cannot be excluded. While there is plenty of evidence for deceptive communication in humans the possibility of deception is not yet incorporated into models of indirect reciprocity. Here we show that when deceptive strategies are allowed in the population it will cause the collapse of the coherence of reputations and thus in turn it results the collapse of cooperation. This collapse is independent of the norms and the cost and benefit values. It is due to the fact that there is no selection for honest communication in the framework of indirect reciprocity. It follows that indirect reciprocity can be only proposed plausibly as a mechanism of human cooperation if additional mechanisms are specified in the model that maintains honesty.

As of today, the most credible scientific paradigm pertaining to the origin of life on Earth is undoubtedly the RNA World scenario. It is built on the assumption that catalytically active replicators (most probably RNA-like macromolecules) may have been responsible for booting up life almost four billion years ago. The many different incarnations of nucleotide sequence (string) replicator models proposed recently are all attempts to explain on this basis how the genetic information transfer and the functional diversity of prebiotic replicator systems may have emerged, persisted and evolved into the first living cell. We have postulated three necessary conditions for an RNA World model system to be a dynamically feasible representation of prebiotic chemical evolution: (1) it must maintain and transfer a sufficient diversity of information reliably and indefinitely, (2) it must be ecologically stable and (3) it must be evolutionarily stable. In this review, we discuss the best-known prebiotic scenarios and the corresponding models of string-replicator dynamics and assess them against these criteria. We suggest that the most popular of prebiotic replicator systems, the hypercycle, is probably the worst performer in almost all of these respects, whereas a few other model concepts (parabolic replicator, open chaotic flows, stochastic corrector, metabolically coupled replicator system) are promising candidates for development into coherent models that may become experimentally accessible in the future.