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For centuries, legal theorists and political philosophers have unsuccessfully sought a unified theory of judging able to account for the diverse, and oftentimes conflicting, responsibilities judges possess. This paper reveals how the law governing fiduciary relationships sheds new light on this age-old pursuit, and therefore, on the very nature of the judicial office itself. The paper first explores the routinely overlooked, yet deeply embedded historical provenance of our judges-as-fiduciaries framework in American political thought and in the framing of the U.S. Constitution. It then explains why a fiduciary theory of judging offers important insights into what it means to be a judge in a democracy, while providing practical guidance in resolving a range of controversial legal issues surrounding judicial performance, such as judicial ethics at the Supreme Court, campaign contributions in state judicial elections, and the role of public opinion in constitutional interpretation.

In this Comment, we demonstrate the ingenuity of San Francisco's Health Care Security Ordinance and explain why local experimentation with health care solutions is an invaluable component of America's ongoing efforts to solve the national health care crisis. We then analyze the Golden Gate Restaurant Association's legal challenge to the Ordinance, which argues that the Ordinance's employer pay-or-play provision is preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (\"ERISA\"). After demonstrating that the jurisprudence surrounding ERISA's preemption clause is a model of uncertainty and ambiguity, we argue that state and local governments deserve clarity on whether ERISA preempts their pay-or-play laws, and that the political branches are best suited to resolve this issue. We conclude by proposing both legislative and administrative approaches to ERISA reform.

(Twenty-two percent thought the court couldn't do so, and 23 percent said they didn't know.) As the late University of California Hastings law professor Ray Forrester aptly characterized the problems with Supreme Court opinions: \"The practical result of the verbosity and sheer bulk of the opinions is to erect a heavy curtain of words between an unfortunate decision and the public awareness and understanding of what is going on.\" To help draft these public opinions, the court might hire a small staff of legal and civic education experts who could communicate difficult concepts in plain English and help the justices translate traditional opinions into public ones.

Apple rolls out iTunes 10, new iPod Nano, and Apple TV During the late 1990s, I witnessed first-hand how the shift toward electronic communications led to a decrease in meaningful interpersonal interactions in my own life and the lives of my friends, leading to a sense of alienation and unhappiness. Sitting at a coffee shop or standing in line at the grocery store, I began attempting to engage every willing and interested participant in some form of a meaningful conversation.

On my Metro ride to and from work each day, I watch as hundreds of faces filled with contemplation, frustration, and annoyance look past one another. Although it is mildly entertaining to see the lengths to which some will go to avoid making eye contact-- or worse yet, engage in actual conversation --it is also sadly ironic. The human contact that these commuters take such pains to avoid might also reduce the emotional baggage they carry.

Yet, as commentators rightly examine and analyze the serious impact that the oil spill is having on the Gulf Coast's way of life, media coverage often glosses over what I believe is an extraordinary facet of the current crisis: The improbable resilience of the Gulf Coast residents themselves. Both Hurricane Katrina and the Deepwater Horizon spill imposed tremendous personal and economic hardship on the Gulf Coast, but there appears to be no hardship severe enough to wrestle the spirit of perseverance away from its residents. Since the spill occurred, and as the nation held its collective breath daily as BP tried to cap the spill, interview footage has shown dignified Gulf residents explaining that this too shall pass, and that the Gulf will rise again.

With Elena Kagan's Supreme Court confirmation hearings behind us, the tempest of political rhetoric decrying her failure (and previous nominees' failure) to provide definite answers regarding her substantive legal views will soon subside. However, before the public eye completely averts from the important work that judges do, there is an important point to be made about judicial nominations and the profusion of commentary that accompanies them. Due to the overwhelming emphasis the media places on discovering, discussing and critiquing a judicial nominee's \"substantive legal views\" (for example, whether the judge supports harsher restrictions on abortion or campaign finance), it consistently overlooks the most important aspect of judging. That aspect is none other than the art of judicial interpretation: the methods judges use to derive meaning from the legal texts they are called upon to interpret. Rather, the public was offered a speculative discussion as to Kagan's so-called \"judicial philosophy.\" But the media have erroneously conceptualized \"judicial philosophy\" as ends-oriented: whether a person supports abortion rights or anti-abortion, or whether they're for or against the death penalty.