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148 result(s) for "Shanks, David R"
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Unconscious influences on decision making: A critical review
To what extent do we know our own minds when making decisions? Variants of this question have preoccupied researchers in a wide range of domains, from mainstream experimental psychology (cognition, perception, social behavior) to cognitive neuroscience and behavioral economics. A pervasive view places a heavy explanatory burden on an intelligent cognitive unconscious, with many theories assigning causally effective roles to unconscious influences. This article presents a novel framework for evaluating these claims and reviews evidence from three major bodies of research in which unconscious factors have been studied: multiple-cue judgment, deliberation without attention, and decisions under uncertainty. Studies of priming (subliminal and primes-to-behavior) and the role of awareness in movement and perception (e.g., timing of willed actions, blindsight) are also given brief consideration. The review highlights that inadequate procedures for assessing awareness, failures to consider artifactual explanations of “landmark” results, and a tendency to uncritically accept conclusions that fit with our intuitions have all contributed to unconscious influences being ascribed inflated and erroneous explanatory power in theories of decision making. The review concludes by recommending that future research should focus on tasks in which participants' attention is diverted away from the experimenter's hypothesis, rather than the highly reflective tasks that are currently often employed.
Priming Intelligent Behavior: An Elusive Phenomenon
Can behavior be unconsciously primed via the activation of attitudes, stereotypes, or other concepts? A number of studies have suggested that such priming effects can occur, and a prominent illustration is the claim that individuals' accuracy in answering general knowledge questions can be influenced by activating intelligence-related concepts such as professor or soccer hooligan. In 9 experiments with 475 participants we employed the procedures used in these studies, as well as a number of variants of those procedures, in an attempt to obtain this intelligence priming effect. None of the experiments obtained the effect, although financial incentives did boost performance. A Bayesian analysis reveals considerable evidential support for the null hypothesis. The results conform to the pattern typically obtained in word priming experiments in which priming is very narrow in its generalization and unconscious (subliminal) influences, if they occur at all, are extremely short-lived. We encourage others to explore the circumstances in which this phenomenon might be obtained.
Regressive research: The pitfalls of post hoc data selection in the study of unconscious mental processes
Many studies of unconscious processing involve comparing a performance measure (e.g., some assessment of perception or memory) with an awareness measure (such as a verbal report or a forced-choice response) taken either concurrently or separately. Unconscious processing is inferred when above-chance performance is combined with null awareness. Often, however, aggregate awareness is better than chance, and data analysis therefore employs a form of extreme group analysis focusing post hoc on participants, trials, or items where awareness is absent or at chance. The pitfalls of this analytic approach are described with particular reference to recent research on implicit learning and subliminal perception. Because of regression to the mean, the approach can mislead researchers into erroneous conclusions concerning unconscious influences on behavior. Recommendations are made about future use of post hoc selection in research on unconscious cognition.
The anchoring effect in metamemory monitoring
Judgments about future memory performance ( metamemory judgments ) are known to be susceptible to illusions and bias. Here we asked whether metamemory judgments are affected, like many other forms of judgment, by numerical anchors. Experiment 1 confirmed previous research showing an effect of informative anchors (e.g., past peer performance) on metamemory monitoring. In four further experiments, we then explored the effects of uninformative anchors. All of the experiments obtained significant anchoring effects on metamemory monitoring; in contrast, the anchors had no effect on recall itself. We also explored the anchoring effect on metamemory control (restudy choices) in Experiment 4. The results suggested that anchors can affect metamemory monitoring, which in turn affects metamemory control. The present research reveals that informative and, more importantly, uninformative numbers that have no influence on recall itself can bias metamemory judgments. On the basis of the current theoretical understanding of the anchoring effect and metamemory monitoring, these results offer insight into the processes that trigger metacognitive biases.
The Effects of emotion on judgments of learning and memory: a meta-analytic review
Emotional information pervades experiences in daily life. Numerous studies have established that emotional materials and information are easier to remember than neutral ones, a phenomenon known as the emotional salience effect on memory. In recent years, an emerging body of research has begun to explore the effect of emotion on metamemory. Preliminary findings show that participants offer higher judgments of learning (JOLs) to emotional than to neutral stimuli, a phenomenon termed the emotional salience effect on JOLs. The present meta-analysis integrated data from 1,887 participants, extracted from 17 qualifying studies, to examine the effects of emotion on JOLs and memory and to explore potential moderators of these effects. The results showed a medium-sized (g = 0.53 [0.41, 0.64]) emotional salience effect on JOLs, which was moderated by age and material type, as well as a small to medium (g = 0.38 [0.25, 0.51) emotional salience effect on memory, which was moderated by test format. These findings establish that emotionality is a salient cue in the theoretical framework of metamemory, and also provide some practical implications (e.g., in eyewitness testimony). However, more research is needed, especially employing high-powered pre-registered experiments, to address the signals of publication bias detected in this meta-analysis.
A re-evaluation of gender bias in receptiveness to scientific evidence of gender bias
Gender bias has been documented in many aspects of Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) careers, yet efforts to identify the underlying causes have been inconclusive. To what extent do cognitive biases, including unequal receptiveness in women and men to evidence of gender bias, contribute to gender bias in STEM? We investigated receptiveness in a STEM context among members of the general public, by undertaking a high-powered (total N = 1171) replication, including three experiments (2 pre-registered) of the prominent study by Handley et al . [22]. It was hypothesized that men would evaluate a research summary reporting evidence of gender bias less favourably than women but that there would be no difference between men and women’s evaluations of research summaries unrelated to gender bias. The results revealed no effect of the assessor’s gender on receptiveness to scientific evidence of gender bias. The different results compared to those of Handley et al . [22] suggest either that the gender bias they detected has diminished in the past decade or that their findings are a false positive. The present research adds to a growing body of evidence suggesting that some influential studies on cognitive ‘markers’ of gender bias warrant re-examination.
Underpowered samples, false negatives, and unconscious learning
The scientific community has witnessed growing concern about the high rate of false positives and unreliable results within the psychological literature, but the harmful impact of false negatives has been largely ignored. False negatives are particularly concerning in research areas where demonstrating the absence of an effect is crucial, such as studies of unconscious or implicit processing. Research on implicit processes seeks evidence of above-chance performance on some implicit behavioral measure at the same time as chance-level performance (that is, a null result) on an explicit measure of awareness. A systematic review of 73 studies of contextual cuing, a popular implicit learning paradigm, involving 181 statistical analyses of awareness tests, reveals how underpowered studies can lead to failure to reject a false null hypothesis. Among the studies that reported sufficient information, the meta-analytic effect size across awareness tests was d z = 0.31 (95 % CI 0.24–0.37), showing that participants’ learning in these experiments was conscious. The unusually large number of positive results in this literature cannot be explained by selective publication. Instead, our analyses demonstrate that these tests are typically insensitive and underpowered to detect medium to small, but true, effects in awareness tests. These findings challenge a widespread and theoretically important claim about the extent of unconscious human cognition.
Improving research quality: the view from the UK Reproducibility Network institutional leads for research improvement
The adoption and incentivisation of open and transparent research practices is critical in addressing issues around research reproducibility and research integrity. These practices will require training and funding. Individuals need to be incentivised to adopt open and transparent research practices (e.g., added as desirable criteria in hiring, probation, and promotion decisions, recognition that funded research should be conducted openly and transparently, the importance of publishers mandating the publication of research workflows and appropriately curated data associated with each research output). Similarly, institutions need to be incentivised to encourage the adoption of open and transparent practices by researchers. Research quality should be prioritised over research quantity. As research transparency will look different for different disciplines, there can be no one-size-fits-all approach. An outward looking and joined up UK research strategy is needed that places openness and transparency at the heart of research activity. This should involve key stakeholders (institutions, research organisations, funders, publishers, and Government) and crucially should be focused on action. Failure to do this will have negative consequences not just for UK research, but also for our ability to innovate and subsequently commercialise UK-led discovery.