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16 result(s) for "Shi, Tianneng"
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Are You Getting What You Pay For? Auditing Model Substitution in LLM APIs
Commercial Large Language Model (LLM) APIs create a fundamental trust problem: users pay for specific models but have no guarantee that providers deliver them faithfully. Providers may covertly substitute cheaper alternatives (e.g., quantized versions, smaller models) to reduce costs while maintaining advertised pricing. We formalize this model substitution problem and systematically evaluate detection methods under realistic adversarial conditions. Our empirical analysis reveals that software-only methods are fundamentally unreliable: statistical tests on text outputs are query-intensive and fail against subtle substitutions, while methods using log probabilities are defeated by inherent inference nondeterminism in production environments. We argue that this verification gap can be more effectively closed with hardware-level security. We propose and evaluate the use of Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) as one practical and robust solution. Our findings demonstrate that TEEs can provide provable cryptographic guarantees of model integrity with only a modest performance overhead, offering a clear and actionable path to ensure users get what they pay for. Code is available at https://github.com/sunblaze-ucb/llm-api-audit
DeServe: Towards Affordable Offline LLM Inference via Decentralization
The rapid growth of generative AI and its integration into everyday workflows have significantly increased the demand for large language model (LLM) inference services. While proprietary models remain popular, recent advancements in open-source LLMs have positioned them as strong contenders. However, deploying these models is often constrained by the high costs and limited availability of GPU resources. In response, this paper presents the design of a decentralized offline serving system for LLM inference. Utilizing idle GPU resources, our proposed system, DeServe, decentralizes access to LLMs at a lower cost. DeServe specifically addresses key challenges in optimizing serving throughput in high-latency network environments. Experiments demonstrate that DeServe achieves a 6.7x-12.6x improvement in throughput over existing serving system baselines in such conditions.
CyberGym: Evaluating AI Agents' Real-World Cybersecurity Capabilities at Scale
AI agents have significant potential to reshape cybersecurity, making a thorough assessment of their capabilities critical. However, existing evaluations fall short, because they are based on small-scale benchmarks and only measure static outcomes, failing to capture the full, dynamic range of real-world security challenges. To address these limitations, we introduce CyberGym, a large-scale benchmark featuring 1,507 real-world vulnerabilities across 188 software projects. Adjustable to different vulnerability analysis settings, CyberGym primarily tasks agents with generating a proof-of-concept test that reproduces a vulnerability, given only its text description and the corresponding codebase. Our extensive evaluation highlights that CyberGym effectively differentiates agents' and models' cybersecurity capabilities. Even the top-performing combinations only achieve a ~20% success rate, demonstrating the overall difficulty of CyberGym. Beyond static benchmarking, we show that CyberGym leads to the discovery of 34 zero-day vulnerabilities and 18 historically incomplete patches. These results underscore that CyberGym is not only a robust benchmark for measuring AI's progress in cybersecurity but also a platform for creating direct, real-world security impact.
Autonomous Continual Learning of Computer-Use Agents for Environment Adaptation
Real-world digital environments are highly diverse and dynamic. These characteristics cause agents to frequently encounter unseen scenarios and distribution shifts, making continual learning in specific environments essential for computer-use agents (CUAs). However, a key challenge lies in obtaining high-quality and environment-grounded agent data without relying on costly human annotation. In this work, we introduce ACuRL, an Autonomous Curriculum Reinforcement Learning framework that continually adapts agents to specific environments with zero human data. The agent first explores target environments to acquire initial experiences. During subsequent iterative training, a curriculum task generator leverages these experiences together with feedback from the previous iteration to synthesize new tasks tailored for the agent's current capabilities. To provide reliable reward signals, we introduce CUAJudge, a robust automatic evaluator for CUAs that achieves 93% agreement with human judgments. Empirically, our method effectively enables both intra-environment and cross-environment continual learning, yielding 4-22% performance gains without catastrophic forgetting on existing environments. Further analyses show highly sparse updates (e.g., 20% parameters), which helps explain the effective and robust adaptation. Our data and code are available at https://github.com/OSU-NLP-Group/ACuRL.
Improving LLM Safety Alignment with Dual-Objective Optimization
Existing training-time safety alignment techniques for large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks. Direct preference optimization (DPO), a widely deployed alignment method, exhibits limitations in both experimental and theoretical contexts as its loss function proves suboptimal for refusal learning. Through gradient-based analysis, we identify these shortcomings and propose an improved safety alignment that disentangles DPO objectives into two components: (1) robust refusal training, which encourages refusal even when partial unsafe generations are produced, and (2) targeted unlearning of harmful knowledge. This approach significantly increases LLM robustness against a wide range of jailbreak attacks, including prefilling, suffix, and multi-turn attacks across both in-distribution and out-of-distribution scenarios. Furthermore, we introduce a method to emphasize critical refusal tokens by incorporating a reward-based token-level weighting mechanism for refusal learning, which further improves the robustness against adversarial exploits. Our research also suggests that robustness to jailbreak attacks is correlated with token distribution shifts in the training process and internal representations of refusal and harmful tokens, offering valuable directions for future research in LLM safety alignment. The code is available at https://github.com/wicai24/DOOR-Alignment
CyberGym: Evaluating AI Agents' Real-World Cybersecurity Capabilities at Scale
AI agents have significant potential to reshape cybersecurity, making a thorough assessment of their capabilities critical. However, existing evaluations fall short, because they are based on small-scale benchmarks and only measure static outcomes, failing to capture the full, dynamic range of real-world security challenges. To address these limitations, we introduce CyberGym, a large-scale benchmark featuring 1,507 real-world vulnerabilities across 188 software projects. Adjustable to different vulnerability analysis settings, CyberGym primarily tasks agents with generating a proof-of-concept test that reproduces a vulnerability, given only its text description and the corresponding codebase. Our extensive evaluation highlights that CyberGym effectively differentiates agents' and models' cybersecurity capabilities. Even the top-performing combinations only achieve a ~20% success rate, demonstrating the overall difficulty of CyberGym. Beyond static benchmarking, we show that CyberGym leads to the discovery of 35 zero-day vulnerabilities and 17 historically incomplete patches. These results underscore that CyberGym is not only a robust benchmark for measuring AI's progress in cybersecurity but also a platform for creating direct, real-world security impact.
Progent: Programmable Privilege Control for LLM Agents
LLM agents utilize Large Language Models as central components with diverse tools to complete various user tasks, but face significant security risks when interacting with external environments. Attackers can exploit these agents through various vectors, including indirect prompt injection, memory/knowledge base poisoning, and malicious tools, tricking agents into performing dangerous actions such as unauthorized financial transactions or data leakage. The core problem that enables attacks to succeed lies in over-privileged tool access. We introduce Progent, the first privilege control framework to secure LLM agents. Progent enforces security at the tool level by restricting agents to performing tool calls necessary for user tasks while blocking potentially malicious ones. Progent features a domain-specific language that allows for expressing fine-grained policies for controlling tool privileges, flexible fallback actions when calls are blocked, and dynamic policy updates to adapt to changing agent states. The framework operates deterministically at runtime, providing provable security guarantees. Thanks to our modular design, integrating Progent does not alter agent internals and only requires minimal changes to the existing agent implementation, enhancing its practicality and potential for widespread adoption. Our extensive evaluation across various agent use cases, using benchmarks like AgentDojo, ASB, and AgentPoison, demonstrates that Progent reduces attack success rates to 0%, while preserving agent utility and speed. Additionally, we show that LLMs can automatically generate effective policies, highlighting their potential for automating the process of writing Progent's security policies.
Can LLMs Ask Good Questions?
We evaluate questions generated by large language models (LLMs) from context, comparing them to human-authored questions across six dimensions: question type, question length, context coverage, answerability, uncommonness, and required answer length. Our study spans two open-source and two proprietary state-of-the-art models. Results reveal that LLM-generated questions tend to demand longer descriptive answers and exhibit more evenly distributed context focus, in contrast to the positional bias often seen in QA tasks. These findings provide insights into the distinctive characteristics of LLM-generated questions and inform future work on question quality and downstream applications.
Frontier AI's Impact on the Cybersecurity Landscape
The impact of frontier AI (i.e., AI agents and foundation models) in cybersecurity is rapidly increasing. In this paper, we comprehensively analyze this trend through multiple aspects: quantitative benchmarks, qualitative literature review, empirical evaluation, and expert survey. Our analyses consistently show that AI's capabilities and applications in attacks have exceeded those on the defensive side. Our empirical evaluation of widely used agent systems on cybersecurity benchmarks highlights that current AI agents struggle with flexible workflow planning and using domain-specific tools for complex security analysis -- capabilities particularly critical for defensive applications. Our expert survey of AI and security researchers and practitioners indicates a prevailing view that AI will continue to benefit attackers over defenders, though the gap is expected to narrow over time. These results show the urgent need to evaluate and mitigate frontier AI's risks, steering it towards benefiting cyber defenses. Responding to this need, we provide concrete calls to action regarding: the construction of new cybersecurity benchmarks, the development of AI agents for defense, the design of provably secure AI agents, the improvement of pre-deployment security testing and transparency, and the strengthening of user-oriented education and defenses. Our paper summary and blog are available at https://rdi.berkeley.edu/frontier-ai-impact-on-cybersecurity/.
An Illusion of Progress? Assessing the Current State of Web Agents
As digitalization and cloud technologies evolve, the web is becoming increasingly important in the modern society. Autonomous web agents based on large language models (LLMs) hold a great potential in work automation. It is therefore important to accurately measure and monitor the progression of their capabilities. In this work, we conduct a comprehensive and rigorous assessment of the current state of web agents. Our results depict a very different picture of the competency of current agents, suggesting over-optimism in previously reported results. This gap can be attributed to shortcomings in existing benchmarks. We introduce Online-Mind2Web, an online evaluation benchmark consisting of 300 diverse and realistic tasks spanning 136 websites. It enables us to evaluate web agents under a setting that approximates how real users use these agents. To facilitate more scalable evaluation and development, we also develop a novel LLM-as-a-Judge automatic evaluation method and show that it can achieve around 85% agreement with human judgment, substantially higher than existing methods. Finally, we present the first comprehensive comparative analysis of current web agents, highlighting both their strengths and limitations to inspire future research.