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By providing guarantees and direct lending, public export credit agencies (ECAs) de-risk and thus enable energy projects worldwide. Despite their importance for global greenhouse gas emission pathways, a systematic assessment of ECAs’ role and financing patterns in the low-carbon energy transition is still needed. Using commercial transaction data, here we analyze 921 energy deals backed by ECAs from 31 OECD and non-OECD countries (excluding Canada) between 2013 and 2023. We find that while the share of renewables in global ECA energy commitments rose substantially between 2013 and 2023, ECAs remain heavily involved in the fossil fuel sector, with support varying substantially across technologies, value chain stages, and countries. Portfolio ‘greening’ is primarily driven by members of the E3F climate club, impacting deal financing structures and shifting finance flows towards high-income countries. Our results call for reconsidering ECA mandates and strengthening international climate-related cooperation in export finance. This paper analyzes energy financing patterns of public export credit agencies (ECAs). It demonstrates that mainly European ECAs shifted away from fossil fuels, a transition accompanied by shifting support towards high-income countries.

The Paris Agreement has been celebrated as a breakthrough for international climate policy. However, relatively scant attention has been given to the emergent ecosystem of climate finance facilities that support it. We provide an overview of the rising number of climate-related trust funds at multilateral development banks (MDBs). These funds can be distinguished into mitigation funds and adaptation funds. Some funds have a focus on capacity building activities. To maximize their effect on sustainable development, the different types of funds should follow different resource allocation criteria: For adaptation funds, vulnerability should represent the primary criterion. For mitigation funds, the main criterion should be the emission reduction potential. Capacity building should primarily focus on countries with weak institutions. Using a novel dataset of disbursements of climate-related trust funds, available for the World Bank, we examine whether fund allocations correspond to these expectations, and compare them with those of bilateral donors. We find that while trust funds with a focus on mitigation generally allocate aid in line with efficiency considerations, trust funds with a focus on adaptation do not seem to prioritize the countries most strongly in need, contrary to bilateral aid. Furthermore, capacity building activities do not seem to focus on countries with weak institutions. These findings have important implications for the effectiveness and legitimacy of climate aid to developing countries.

This paper reviews the monitoring, reporting and verification of greenhouse-gas emissions needed for carbon-pricing and management mechanisms. The monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) of greenhouse-gas emissions is the cornerstone of carbon pricing and management mechanisms. Here we consider peer-reviewed articles and 'grey literature' related to existing MRV requirements and their costs. A substantial part of the literature is the regulatory texts of the 15 most important carbon pricing and management mechanisms currently implemented. Based on a comparison of key criteria such as the scope, cost, uncertainty and flexibility of procedures, we conclude that conventional wisdom on MRV is not often promoted in existing carbon pricing mechanisms. Quantification of emissions uncertainty and incentives to reduce this uncertainty are usually only partially applied, if at all. Further, the time and resources spent on small sources of emissions would be expected to be limited. Although provisions aiming at an effort proportionate to the amount of emissions at stake — 'materiality' — are widespread, they are largely outweighed by economies of scale: in all schemes, MRV costs per tonne are primarily driven by the size of the source.

This article assesses the environmental and economic efficiency of three different approaches to treat monitoring uncertainty in climate policy, namely prescribing uncertainty, setting minimum certainty thresholds and pricing uncertainty through a discount. Our model of the behavior of profit-maximizing agents demonstrates that under the simplest set of assumptions the regulator has no interest in reducing monitoring uncertainty. However, in the presence of information asymmetry, monitoring uncertainty may hamper the economic and environmental performance of climate policy due to adverse selection. In a mandatory policy, prescribing a reasonable level of uncertainty is preferable if the regulator has enough information to determine this level. For voluntary mechanisms, such as carbon offsets, allowing agents to set their own monitoring uncertainty below a maximum threshold or discounting carbon revenues in proportion to monitoring uncertainty are the best approaches for the regulator to mitigate the negative effects of information asymmetry. These conclusions are much more pronounced when agents do not accrue revenues from their mitigation action, other than carbon. Our analysis of monitoring uncertainty under information asymmetry, which results in heterogeneity in the agents’ benefits from abatement, generalizes the classical trade-off between production efficiency and information rents.

Nature Clim. Change 5, 319–328 (2015); published online 25 March 2015; corrected after print 8 September 2015 In the version of this Review Article originally published, the following affiliation should have been included for Igor Shishlov: CIRED (Centre International de Recherche sur l'Environnement et le Développement), 94736 Nogent-sur-Marne, France.

This article assesses the environmental and economic efficiency of three different approaches to treat monitoring uncertainty in climate policy, namely prescribing uncertainty, setting minimum certainty thresholds and pricing uncertainty through a discount. Our model of the behavior of profit-maximizing agents demonstrates that under the simplest set of assumptions the regulator has no interest in reducing monitoring uncertainty. However, in the presence of information asymmetry, monitoring uncertainty may hamper the economic and environmental performance of climate policy due to adverse selection. In a mandatory policy, prescribing a reasonable level of uncertainty is preferable if the regulator has enough information to determine this level. For voluntary mechanisms, such as carbon offsets, allowing agents to set their own monitoring uncertainty below a maximum threshold or discounting carbon revenues in proportion to monitoring uncertainty are the best approaches for the regulator to mitigate the negative effects of information asymmetry. These conclusions are much more pronounced when agents do not accrue revenues from their mitigation action, other than carbon. Our analysis of monitoring uncertainty under information asymmetry, which results in heterogeneity in the agents’ benefits from abatement, generalizes the classical trade-off between production efficiency and information rents.

This article assesses the environmental and economic efficiency of three different approaches to treat monitoring uncertainty in climate policy, namely prescribing uncertainty, setting minimum certainty thresholds and pricing uncertainty through a discount. Our model of the behavior of profit-maximizing agents demonstrates that under the simplest set of assumptions the regulator has no interest in reducing monitoring uncertainty. However, in the presence of information asymmetry, monitoring uncertainty may hamper the economic and environmental performance of climate policy due to adverse selection. In a mandatory policy, prescribing a reasonable level of uncertainty is preferable if the regulator has enough information to determine this level. For voluntary mechanisms, such as carbon offsets, allowing agents to set their own monitoring uncertainty below a maximum threshold or discounting carbon revenues in proportion to monitoring uncertainty are the best approaches for the regulator to mitigate the negative effects of information asymmetry. These conclusions are much more pronounced when agents do not accrue revenues from their mitigation action, other than carbon. Our analysis of monitoring uncertainty under information asymmetry, which results in heterogeneity in the agents’ benefits from abatement, generalizes the classical trade-off between production efficiency and information rents.