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PurposeSince 2011, the Extremism Risk Guidance (ERG 22+) has been the primary risk assessment framework used for terrorist and violent extremist offenders in England and Wales. The aim of this study was to conduct a rapid evidence assessment to examine the research literature on the ERG22+ factors and to identify possible significant new and emerging knowledge around potential new factors.Design/methodology/approachSearches were conducted of the Google Scholar database to identify relevant literature published between 2012 and 2020. In total, 29 documents were identified, which examined new radicalisation models and frameworks, 339 were identified, which explored to some extent one or more of the current ERG factors, and a further 138 articles were identified, which focused on potentially relevant additional issues/factors.FindingsMost of the ERG factors were the focus of substantial research activity between 2012 and 2020. Six factors, however, received very little research attention. Potential implications of these trends are considered. Ten research themes were identified with the potential to either form new factors or which could play a significant role in the updating or revision of some existing factors.Originality/valueThis paper is the first rapid evidence assessment on the ERG22+ risk factors. It provides an important picture of the published scientific research of potential relevance in this area and helps to inform the review process for the ERG22+.

This edited book explores how psychology can be used to improve our understanding of terrorism and counterterrorism. This work firstly aims to provide balanced and objective insight into the psychology of terrorists; what their motivations are, what keeps them involved in terrorist groups, and what eventually forces most to end their active involvement in terrorism. Secondly, the contributors focus on the challenging issue of how to respond to terrorism. These chapters provide information for those concerned with short-term tactical problems (e.g. interviewing), as well as those looking towards the more long-term strategic questions of bringing an entire terrorist campaign to an end. Ultimately, the individuals involved in terrorism require a more complex response from society than simply a quest for their apprehension. Believing inaccurate and misleading characterizations leads inevitably to damaging policies and deficient outcomes and campaigns of violence are needlessly prolonged. It is from this perspective that the concern arises with how researchers – and the policy makers guided by them – perceive the psychology of terrorists and of terrorism. This innovative book will be of great interest to students of terrorism and counter-terrorism, security studies, psychology and politics, as well as security professionals and military colleges. 1. The Psychology of Counterterrorism: Critical Issues and Challenges Andrew Silke 2. Understanding Terrorist Psychology Randy Borum 3. The Psychology of Violent Radicalisation Brooke Rogers 4. Why People Support Terrorism Reena Kumari 5. The Evolutionary Logic of Terrorism Rick O’Gorman 6. The Internet and Terrorism Lorraine Bowman-Grieve 7. The Impact of the Media on Terrorism and Counterterrorism Deborah Browne and Andrew Silke 8. Disengaging from Terrorism Neil Ferguson 9. Terrorists and Extremists in Prison: Psychological Issues in Management and Reform Andrew Silke 10. Interrogation Tactics and Terrorist Suspects John Pearse 11. Terrorist Tactics and Counter-Terrorism Graeme Steven 12. Deterring Terrorism: Target-Hardening, Surveillance and the Prevention of Terrorism Pete Fussey 13. Countering the Psychological Impact of Terrorism: Challenges for Homeland Security Anthony Richards ‘Although there is a growing recognition of the value of psychology in the study of terrorism, the field still lacks the substantive literature that might extend and develop our knowledge. This volume makes a significant contribution to that literature by drawing together, through specialist contributors, perspectives and insights from psychology focussed on a range of problem areas directly relevant to the problems of terrorism we now face. In terms of both depth and breadth, this book greatly adds to our understanding.’ Professor Max Taylor, University of St Andrews, UK ‘Terrorists and governments try mightily to influence our thoughts and actions. Professor Silke has assembled a remarkable collection of experts whose critical insights frame a more sophisticated understanding of this epic struggle. ’ Dr James Forest, Combating Terrorism Center, US Military Academy at West Point, USA ‘Not only has Andrew Silke provided the first textbook on the psychology of counter-terrorism, but he has provided a gold standard for all others to follow. An outstanding collection of thought-provoking and sometimes controversial essays. This is essential reading for researchers and responders alike.’ Dr John Horgan, Director, International Center for the Study of Terrorism, Penn State University, USA Andrew Silke is the Field Leader for Criminology and the Director of Terrorism Studies at the University of East London. He is author of several books and over 100 articles on terrorism.

This paper presents a systematic review of organised crime data collection and analysis methods. It did this by reviewing all papers published in Trends in Organized Crime and Global Crime between 2004 and 2018 (N = 463). The review identified a number of key weaknesses. First, organised crime research is dominated by secondary data analysis of open-access documents, and documents are seldom subjected to the same principles guiding primary data collection methods. Second, data analysis lacked balance with a distinct lack of inferential statistical analysis. Third, there was a significant absence of victim or offender voices with an overreliance on data from state bodies and the media. The paper concludes that organised crime, as field of research, appears unbalanced by reliance upon a small number of methods and sources. Rebalancing the field requires more organised crime researchers to speak to offenders and victims, employ greater use of statistical analysis and tighten our methodologies.

The author examined the relation between anonymity and aggression in violent interpersonal assaults that occurred in Northern Ireland. Of the 500 violent attacks that the author studied, 206 were carried out by offenders who wore disguises to mask their identities. The findings revealed that significant positive relationships existed between the use of disguises and several measures of aggression. Disguised offenders inflicted more serious physical injuries, attacked more people at the scene, engaged in more acts of vandalism, and were more likely to threaten victims after the attacks. The author discussed these results within the framework of deindividuation theory.

Insurance represents an important but often overlooked component to managing and mitigating the impact of terrorism. It plays a key role in enhancing resilience to terrorism especially regarding high intensity terrorist campaigns or high impact terrorist attacks. Extremely little attention however has focused on how the insurance industry assesses and calculates terrorism risk and what the implications may be of this. This research article provides for the first time an overview of the three main terrorism risk-modelling platforms that are used in the insurance market today: Touchstone, RMS Probabilistic Terrorism Mode (PTM), and Sunstone. The article assesses the different approaches to threat and loss calculation that each of the models take. The anlaysis reveals that while the three models all approach the projection of terrorism loss in a broadly similar manner, there are variations in focus, which results in a significant difference in terrorism outlook and projected loss. The discussion concludes by considering some of the implications of these variations as well as potential avenues forward.

Why do only a few people radicalise when many appear to have been exposed to potential causes of radicalisation? This issue is referred to as the specificity problem and is widely recognised as one of the fundamental questions facing terrorism research. Also recognised is that meaningful answers will only be obtained through comparative research using control groups who share many of the same traits, characteristics and contexts of the terrorists, but who did not progress to involvement in terrorism. The current study was conducted in Northern Ireland and compares seventeen former paramilitary members with a control group of twelve paramilitary sympathisers using a structured survey. Twenty-two variables connected to radicalisation were examined. Significant differences were found between the two groups on four of these variables. The findings are discussed in relation to the specificity problem and the wider literature on radicalisation.

Over the past decade, government policy has repeatedly identified prisons as particularly important environments in terms of both the risks of radicalisation and of opportunities for de-radicalisation. This paper provides an overview of some of the most important research findings that have emerged on prison and violent extremism in recent years. Drawing on this research, the article synthesises and assesses the dominating themes and views in the literature. The paper also identifies a number of significant knowledge gaps that deserve further scholarly attention.

Understanding terrorist innovation has emerged as a critical research question. Terrorist innovation challenges status quo assumptions about the nature of terrorist threats and emphasises a need for counterterrorism policy and practice to attempt to not simply react to changes in terrorist tactics and strategies but also to try to anticipate them. This study focused on a detailed examination of the 1972 Munich Olympics attack and draws on the wide range of open source accounts available, including from terrorists directly involved but also from among the authorities and victims. Using an analytical framework proposed by Rasmussen and Hafez (Terrorist innovations in weapons of mass effect: preconditions, causes and predictive indicators, The Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Washington, DC, 2010), several key drivers are identified and described, both internal to the group and external to its environment. The study concludes that the innovation shown by Black September was predictable and that Munich represented a profound security failure as much as it did successful terrorist innovation.