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Polarization is a topic of intense interest among social scientists, but there is significant disagreement regarding the character of the phenomenon and little understanding of underlying mechanics. A first problem, we argue, is that polarization appears in the literature as not one concept but many. In the first part of the article, we distinguish nine phenomena that may be considered polarization, with suggestions of appropriate measures for each. In the second part of the article, we apply this analysis to evaluate the types of polarization generated by the three major families of computational models proposing specific mechanisms of opinion polarization.

The Hong and Page 'diversity trumps ability' result has been used to argue for the more general claim that a diverse set of agents is epistemically superior to a comparable group of experts. Here we extend Hong and Page's model to landscapes of different degrees of randomness and demonstrate the sensitivity of the 'diversity trumps ability' result. This analysis offers a more nuanced picture of how diversity, ability, and expertise may relate. Although models of this sort can indeed be suggestive for diversity policies, we advise against interpreting such results overly broadly.

Sympathetic Crashing Acute Pulmonary Edema (SCAPE) describes patients who present with acute hypertensive cardiogenic pulmonary edema. These patients present in respiratory distress, and requiring immediate medical and airway management. The treatment of SCAPE includes non-invasive positive pressure ventilation (NIPPV) to maintain oxygenation, and high dose nitrates to lower blood pressure and reduce afterload. We present a case report of a patient with refractory hypertension to high dose nitrates likely due to nitroglycerin resistance or an attenuated response. The addition of nicardipine led to marked clinical improvement, normalized blood pressure and spared the patient from endotracheal intubation and admission to the intensive care unit.

A number of formal models, including a highly influential model from Hong and Page, purport to show that functionally diverse groups often beat groups of individually high-performing agents in solving problems. Thompson argues that in Hong and Page's model, that the diverse groups are created by a random process explains their success, not the diversity. Here, I defend the diversity interpretation of the Hong and Page result. The failure of Thompson's argument shows that to understand the value of functional diversity, we should be clearer about how we conceive of and measure that diversity.

Abstract Epistemic consequentialists think that epistemic norms are about believing the truth and avoiding error. Recently, a number of authors have rejected epistemic consequentialism on the basis that it incorrectly sanctions tradeoffs of epistemic goodness. Here, I argue that epistemic consequentialists should borrow two lessons from ethical consequentialists to respond to these worries. Epistemic consequentialists should construe their view as an account of right belief, which they distinguish from other notions like rational and justified belief. Epistemic consequentialists should also make their view ‘sophisticated,’ in the sense of Railton. Epistemic consequentialism, I conclude, is best construed as sharing much of its structure with prominent act-consequentialist views in ethics. Epistemic consequentialism has an advantage over its ethical counterpart though: the key claim of the view is practically universally accepted, which gives us an additional reason to think it’s true.

Public discussions of political and social issues are often characterized by deep and persistent polarization. In social psychology, it's standard to treat belief polarization as the product of epistemic irrationality. In contrast, we argue that the persistent disagreement that grounds political and social polarization can be produced by epistemically rational agents, when those agents have limited cognitive resources. Using an agent-based model of group deliberation, we show that groups of deliberating agents using coherence-based strategies for managing their limited resources tend to polarize into different subgroups. We argue that using that strategy is epistemically rational for limited agents. So even though group polarization looks like it must be the product of human irrationality, polarization can be the result of fully rational deliberation with natural human limitations.

Prior to 2001 there was no standard for early management of severe sepsis and septic shock in the emergency department. In the presence of standard or usual care, the prevailing mortality was over 40-50 %. In response, a systems-based approach, similar to that in acute myocardial infarction, stroke and trauma, called early goal-directed therapy was compared to standard care and this clinical trial resulted in a significant mortality reduction. Since the publication of that trial, similar outcome benefits have been reported in over 70 observational and randomized controlled studies comprising over 70,000 patients. As a result, early goal-directed therapy was largely incorporated into the first 6 hours of sepsis management (resuscitation bundle) adopted by the Surviving Sepsis Campaign and disseminated internationally as the standard of care for early sepsis management. Recently a trio of trials (ProCESS, ARISE, and ProMISe), while reporting an all-time low sepsis mortality, question the continued need for all of the elements of early goal-directed therapy or the need for protocolized care for patients with severe and septic shock. A review of the early hemodynamic pathogenesis, historical development, and definition of early goal-directed therapy, comparing trial conduction methodology and the changing landscape of sepsis mortality, are essential for an appropriate interpretation of these trials and their conclusions.

According to Hume, people should not be able to learn about how things ought to be just from how things are. The idea is often summed up as \"no ought from an is.\" This is the putative is-ought gap. A. N. Prior purported to give several counterexamples to the is-ought gap, and there are many proposed modifications and defenses of the gap in response. Here, Singer argues for a new way to understand the is-ought gap. He claims that the is-ought gap is best understood in terms of the semantics, rather than the syntax, of arguments. He also provides a complete and correct formulation of the is-ought gap that offers a natural explanation of why the counterexamples fail and stays true to Hume's original motivation.

We motivate a picture of social epistemology that sees forgetting as subject to epistemic evaluation. Using computer simulations of a simple agent-based model, we show that how agents forget can have as large an impact on group epistemic outcomes as how they share information. But, how we forget, unlike how we form beliefs, isn’t typically taken to be the sort of thing that can be epistemically rational or justified. We consider what we take to be the most promising argument for this claim and find it lacking. We conclude that understanding how agents forget should be as central to social epistemology as understanding how agents form beliefs and share information with others.

In the original publication of the article, the Acknowledgement section was inadvertently not included. The Acknowledgement is given in this Correction.