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Using U.S. firm level panel data we simultaneously assess the contributions to productivity of three potential sources of research and development spillovers: geographic, technological, and product market (\"horizontal\"). To do so, we construct new measures of geographic proximity based on the distribution of a firm's inventor locations as well as its headquarters. We find that geographic location is important for productivity, as are technology (but not product) spillovers, and that both intra and inter—regional (counties) spillovers matter. The geographic location of a firm's researchers is more important than its headquarters. These benefits may be the reason why local policy makers compete so hard for the location of local R&D labs and high tech workers.

We investigate the nature of price competition among firms that produce differentiated products and compete in markets that are limited in extent. We propose an instrumental variables series estimator for the matrix of cross price response coefficients, demonstrate that our estimator is consistent, and derive its asymptotic distribution. Our semiparametric approach allows us to discriminate among models of global competition, in which all products compete with all others, and local competition, in which products compete only with their neighbors. We apply our semiparametric estimator to data from U.S. wholesale gasoline markets and find that, in this market, competition is highly localized.

This article surveys recent empirical evidence on efficiencies and competitive harm that are associated with vertical mergers. It discusses both ex post or retrospective empirical studies that rely on post–merger data and ex ante or forecasting techniques that use premerger data. It develops the idea that although there is a need for vertical merger screening tools there are a number of problems that are associated with attempts to adapt horizontal screens to the vertical context. Mergers in the technology, media, and telecom sectors are emphasized because they tend to dominate contested vertical mergers.

COVID-19 has affected all industrial sectors and regions of the world and, in many cases, the impact has been devastating. Nevertheless, there are large differences across sectors and regions, with a few winners as well as many losers. This paper assesses the impact of the first wave of the virus on Canadian industries and provinces in the short and medium run. In particular, time series forecasting models for 39 threedigit industries in each of the 10 provinces are estimated and used to predict postlockdown losses: percentage differences between forecast and observed economic activity. Econometric analysis of the estimates is then used to quantify and rank industries and provinces in terms of short-and medium-term losses and gains. Provincial ranks are then compared with the stringency of provincial economic restrictions. La crise de la COVID-19 n’a épargné aucun secteur industriel ni aucune région du monde, et dans la plupart des cas, les conséquences se sont avérées dévastatrices. Néanmoins, l’on observe de grandes disparités d’un secteur àl’autre et d’une région du monde à l’autre, avec quelques gagnants mais également de nombreux perdants. Cet article évalue l’incidence de la première vague du virus sur les industries et les provinces canadiennes à court et à moyen terme. De manière plus spécifique, et afin de prévoir les pertes consécutives au confinement, nous estimons et utilisons des modèles de prévision chronologique pour les 39 industries à trois chiffres dans chacune des dix provinces du pays. Nous calculons ainsi les écarts de pourcentage entre l’activité économique estimée et celle observée. Nous utilisons ensuite l’analyse économétrique de nos évaluations pour mesurer et classer les différentes industries et provinces en termes de gains et pertes à court et moyen terme. Les classements des provinces sont ensuite comparés à l’aune de la rigueur des restrictions économiques mises en place au niveau local.

Vertical mergers have attracted much attention in recent years. We assess the role of presumptions and likelihoods in vertical merger analysis and guidelines. We focus in particular on the role that we believe statistical evidence in general—and retrospective analyses more specifically—should play in determining presumptions. We also discuss how horizontal merger guidelines provide frameworks to analyze the horizontal issues that can be associated with vertical mergers. We conclude that while some vertical mergers may raise concerns, the evidence at this point does not provide sufficient guidance to develop presumptions that are related to strictly vertical issues.

Market power and joint dominance are examined in U.K. brewing. I assess unilateral and coordinated effects, where the latter is equated with joint dominance, and show how one can distinguish between the two econometrically. The application makes use of two demand equations: the nested logit of McFadden [1978a] and the distance-metric of Pinkse, Slade, and Brett [2002]. The two equations yield very different predictions concerning elasticities and markups. Nevertheless, although there is evidence of market power using either demand model, that power is due entirely to unilateral effects. In other words, neither model uncovers evidence of coordinated effects (tacit collusion).

In 1989, the United Kingdom Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) recommended measures that eventually led brewers to divest themselves of 14,000 public houses. The MMC claimed that their recommendations would lower retail prices and increase consumer choice. Since that time, however, retail prices have risen. This paper contains an econometric analysis of the transition period. The analysis is based on a model of the relationship between retail price and retail-organisational form that emphasises how exclusive-dealing clauses and strategic factors interact.

We summarize a number of regularities that arise in the empirical literature on contractual relationships between manufacturers and their exclusive resellers. We do this using studies of traditional and business-format-franchise relationships, as well as studies of sales-force-integration decisions. Some of the patterns that we uncover are consistent with a standard incentive-cum-insurance theory of organization, while others are not. We briefly review some theoretical extensions that seem promising in terms of reconciling seeming conflicts between theory and practice.

We review the empirical literature that extends and tests the Hotelling model of the optimal depletion of an exhaustible resource. The theory is briefly described to set the stage for the review of empirical tests and applications. Those tests can be roughly divided into two broad categories—descriptive and structural—and we discuss the strengths and weaknesses of each before presenting the empirical studies of optimal extraction under conditions of exhaustibility. We also discuss some econometric pitfalls that applied researchers face when attempting to test the model.

The multitask-agency problem is examined empirically using contracts between private, integrated oil companies and their service stations in the city of Vancouver. The empirical tests assess how variations in the characteristics of one task affect the choice of agent-compensation scheme for another. Comparative statics from the model predict that higher-powered incentives will be offered for gasoline sales when the secondary activity is not highly complementary with gasoline retailing, where complementarity is measured by the crossprice demand effect, the covariation in uncertainty, and the degree of effort substitutability.