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The year 2011 marked the centenary of the death of one of the founders of British neurology, John Hughlings-Jackson (1835-1911). By common consent he was a great clinician. But he was more. He endeavored to use clinical observations to throw light on one of the great problems of the modern world, the problem of mind. Hughlings-Jackson's daily contact with mentalities warped by neurological disease caused him to ponder deeply the nature of the mind-brain relationship, nowadays often known simply as the \"hard problem.\" In particular, he saw the danger of conflating mind and brain, a danger that has grown greater with the spectacular growth of neu-roscientific knowledge during the last century. Although Hughlings-Jackson's neurosci-entific thought is long outdated, his philosophic endeavors remain highly instructive.

Last year (2009) marked the bicentenary of Charles Darwin's birth and the sesquicentenary of The Origin of Species . This article examines the influence of Erasmus Darwin on Charles's evolutionary thought and shows how, in many ways, Erasmus anticipated his much better-known grandson. It discusses the similarity in the mindsets of the two Darwins, asks how far the younger Darwin was exposed to the elder's evolutionary thought, examines the similarities and differences in their theories of evolution, and ends by showing the surprising similarity between their theories of inheritance. Erasmus's influence on Charles is greater than customarily acknowledged, and now is an opportune time to bring the grandfather out from behind the glare of his stellar grandson.

If aesthetics is a human universal, it should have a neurobiological basis. Although use of all the senses is, as Aristotle noted, pleasurable, the distance senses are primarily involved in aesthetics. The aesthetic response emerges from the central processing of sensory input. This occurs very rapidly, beneath the level of consciousness, and only the feeling of pleasure emerges into the conscious mind. This is exemplified by landscape appreciation, where it is suggested that a computation built into the nervous system during Paleolithic hunter-gathering is at work. Another inbuilt computation leading to an aesthetic response is the part-whole relationship. This, it is argued, may be traced to the predator-prey \"arms races\" of evolutionary history. Mate selection also may be responsible for part of our response to landscape and visual art. Aesthetics lies at the core of human mentality, and its study is consequently of importance not only to philosophers and art critics but also to neurobiologists.

The introduction situates the 'hard problem' in its historical context and argues that the problem has two sides: the output side (the Kant-Eccles problem of the freedom of the Will) and the input side (the problem of qualia). The output side ultimately reduces to whether quantum mechanics can affect the operation of synapses. A discussion of the detailed molecular biology of synaptic transmission as presently understood suggests that such affects are unlikely. Instead an evolutionary argument is presented which suggests that our conviction of free agency is an evolutionarily induced illusion and hence that the Kant-Eccles problem is itself illusory. This conclusion is supported by well-known neurophysiology. The input side, the problem of qualia, of subjectivity, is not so easily outflanked. After a brief review of the neurophysiological correlates of consciousness (NCC) and of the Penrose-Hameroff microtubular NeuroQuantology it is again concluded that the molecular neurobiology makes quantum wave-mechanics an unlikely explanation. Instead recourse is made to an evolutionarily- and neurobiologically-informed panpsychism. The notion of an 'emergent' property is carefully distinguished from that of the more usual 'system' property used by most dual-aspect theorists (and the majority of neuroscientists) and used to support Llinas' concept of an 'oneiric' consciousness continuously modified by sensory input. I conclude that a panpsychist theory, such as this, coupled with the non-classical understanding of matter flowing from quantum physics (both epistemological and scientific) may be the default and only solution to the problem posed by the presence of mind in a world of things.

Coleridge has been seen by some not so much as a poet spoiled by philosophy, but as a philosopher who was also a poet. It could be argued that his major endeavor was an attempt to save the life sciences form the mechanistic interpretation which he saw as the outcome of Lockean \"mechanico-corpuscularian\" philosophy. This contribution describes that endeavour. It shows its connection to the social circumstances of the time. It discussess its relationship to the poetic sensibility of the \"Lake poets\" and to the German thought which Coleridge absorbed during and after his sojourn in Gottingen in 1798-99. It describes the nature of his \"Theory of Life\" as seen not only from the posthumous publication itself, but also from the numerous hints and struggles recorded in his voluminous notebooks, letters and lecture notes. It is concluded that, although never adequately assembled, it forms the only serious attempt to construct a profound alternative to the ultimately mechanistic biology of Charles Darwin and the physiologists of the second half of the century. As such it strongly influenced the young Richard Owen and, as is well known, was eventually overwhelmed by the Darwin-Huxley synthesis of the 1860s. Nevertheless, insofar as Coleridge's concept of life ultimately derived from his ambition to find a way of healing the Cartesian divide, we may wonder whether the recent upsurge in consciousness studies may cause us to look again at his panentheistic ideas and, discarding the obsolete and fanciful metaphysics, recast them into a more acceptable form.

“Every one of the twenty-eight bones of the human skull has been inherited in an unbroken succession from the air-breathing fishes of the pre-Devonian seas.” (Gregory, 1967)