Explore the vast range of titles available.

The growth of global finance since 1960 constitutes one of the most important transformations in social relations during the twentieth century. Using historical, statistical, and graphical techniques, State Institutions, Private Incentives, and Global Capital examines three important aspects of this phenomenal shift in the international political economy. First, Andrew Sobel explores the reawakening of the international financial markets, mapping their extraordinary transformation since the early 1960s and discussing the role of politics in that metamorphosis. The author then offers a fresh understanding of the systematic differences in access for borrowers in this rapidly transforming and expanding global capital pool. He then demonstrates the influence of political factors in producing differential access to the global capital pool. Showing how the character and stability of a country's political system affects investors's decisions to invest in that country, Sobel breaks new ground in understanding the basis for the frequent admonitions by the World Bank and others that a stable political and legal system are essential for states to attract significant foreign investment. With the growing debate about the effect of financial interdependence on the ability of states to conduct economic policy and indeed to preserve their independence in the face of unprecedented economic linkages, this book will be of interest to political scientists and economists as well as policy makers concerned with the impact of financial globalization and the causes of differentials in access to capital.

Vigorous debates swirl around issues of globalization, as global political economic relations in a nation-state system are complex and incompletely understood phenomena. The experiences of the late 1800's and first half of the twentieth century suggest that globalization requires nurturing to ensure that societies garner the advantages offered by globalization and manage the risks and fears unleashed by such dramatic transformation in social affairs. Featuring contributions by experts from a variety of disciplinary backgrounds including economics, political science and law, this edited volume offers a timely examination of the complexities surrounding modern globalization. Through discussion and evaluation of the problems associated with immigration, social welfare and income inequality, and global governance the book offers a significant contribution to the continuing globalization debate. Providing both an overview of the debate and detailed discussion of specific examples, Challenges of Globalization will be of great interest to scholars of international political economy, international relations and globalization studies. 1. Opportunities and Challenges Andrew Sobel 2. Sustainable Labor Migration Policies in a Globalizing World Philip Martin 3. The Last Bastions of State Sovereignty: Immigration and Nationality Go Global Stephen Legomsky 4. The Era of Free Migration: Lessons for Today Kevin O’Rourke 5. Cultural Communities in a Global Labor Market: Immigration Restrictions as Residential Segregation Howard Chang 6. Economics Versus Identity: Mass and Elite Attitudes Toward Trade, Migration and Outsourcing Mariana Medina and Andrew Sobel 7. Globalization and Inequality in Latin America and the Carribean Evelyene Huber and John Stephens 8. Capital Mobility and State Social Welfare Provisions in the Late 1800s Zahra Egal and Andrew Sobel 9. Global Governance Redefined Miles Kahler Andrew C. Sobel is a member of the Department of Political Science, a Resident Fellow in the Center in Political Economy, and on the Board of Directors of the Center for the New Institutional Social Sciences at Washington University in St. Louis. He is the author of three books and specializes in the politics of international finance with a focus upon domestic explanations of international behaviour.

What is the origin of the structural independence of the Federal Reserve System? Unlike existing explanations on central bank independence, we show that the structural independence of the Fed is not the result of intentional design but a product of compromise among disparate groups. Using agenda-constrained ideal point estimation techniques to estimate both the preferences of senators on key questions of Fed structure and the locations of alternative forms of the bill with respect to those preferences, we show that the structural features of the Fed in the final bill differed markedly from the original preferences of legislators representing competing groups. The result was a compromise that offered the prospect of significant independence for the new agency. The Fed case shows that political compromise can provide useful bureaucratic insulation when the short-term incentives of political principals promote unstable, self-seeking policy choices (JEL N41, N21).

Trade, terrorism, clash of cultures, migration, off-shoring banking, international portfolio and foreign direct investment, multinational corporations, outsourcing, Avian flu and SARS, global warming, the importation of foreign invasive species that gain ecological advantages over native species, ordering Vietnamese or Ethiopian food in rural America restaurants, choosing between a Big Mac or KFC in Beijing, and study abroad are just the tip of an iceberg labeled globalization. Globalization consists of multiple processes by which people in one society become culturally, economically, politically, socially, informationally, strategically, epidemiologically, and ecologically closer to peoples in geographically distant societies. These processes include the expansion of cross-border trade, production of goods and services via the multinational corporation, outsourcing of work across borders, movement of peoples, exchange of ideas and popular culture, flow of environmental effects and disease from one state to another, and routine transfer of billions of dollars across borders in an nanosecond. They connect communities, cultures, national markets for goods and services, and national markets for labor and capital. The food we consume, clothes we wear, jobs we perform, air we breathe, water we drink, cars we drive, transport that delivers our goods, information we access, capital that powers our economies, services we use, computers we use, places we travel, education we seek, diseases we contract, drugs and therapies we employ to combat illness, and just about every aspect of day-to-day life have some global component. The world is figuratively shrinking as activities in one nation increasingly spill over to influence activities in other nations.

In this chapter we use history to gain perspective on the relationship between globalization and the social welfare state. In the late 1900s and early 2000s, the increasing exposure of national economies to global economic relations prompted much academic examination and punditry. The postWorld War II era witnessed a tremendous expansion of global exchange in goods and services-connecting consumers in one country with producers in other countries. Since the 1970s, the demise of many barriers to capital mobility and the resurgence of global finance led to massive increases in cross-border capital flows (currency trading, portfolio investment, and direct investment). The pace of these changes, particularly on the financial side, has since accelerated. The growing density of cross-national economic relations raises questions about the changing role of markets and states, the limits of national and sub-national governance under globalization, the shifting risks that individuals face in this changing state of affairs, and the efficacy of the social welfare state by which many of those risks might be managed. Despite the many praises of globalization, which invoke the spirit of Ricardo’s and Mill’s enhanced social welfare, universal harmony, and common interest, many worry that globalization limits national policy autonomy and erodes the ability of the state to provide social welfare goods.

Advancing globalization, combined with uncertainty and fears over economic futures, has led to a globalization backlash characterized by escalated political rhetoric and debates surrounding issues of trade, outsourcing, and migration. This backlash as been depicted as primarily driven by economic fears of job loss, underemployment, and declining competitiveness vis-à-vis workers and producers located abroad. Communities, industries, and individuals threatened by competitive producers abroad increasingly rail for trade protections. Those who fear the outsourcing of jobs seek to limit multinationals from moving jobs from one nation to another, or penalize those industries that do. Those worried about the influx of workers from another nation argue for greater restrictions on immigration regardless of labor shortages and needs. Together these amount to an anti-globalization backlash that threatens to undo part, if not all, of the gains produced by globalization.

Considers why some countries are more successful than others in attracting international investment.

Capital markets play an essential role in a global economy. They provide funds for trade, investment, venture enterprises, and industrial growth. Relationships between financial markets and governments constitute the core of industrialized political-economies, affecting the very health and legitimacy of governments. Intangible commodities denominated in, and supported by, national currencies trade in such markets. Governments regulate and oversee such financial markets more intently than any other market. Securities markets are one type of financial market. In the 1970s and 1980s, the three major securities markets of New York, London, and Tokyo underwent radical regulatory shifts. Changes in price, entry, and safety regulation lowered national barriers, and the regulatory language suggests their internationalization. What explains the regulatory openings and internationalization of these markets, and also the remaining discontinuities? Explanations fit three categories: (1) systemic international pressures such as competitiveness or technological change; (2) foreign policy pressures exerted by other governments; and (3) domestic distributional and policy conflicts in the financial services industry. One and two are \"outside-in\" explanations, and the third is \"inside-out.\" Looking at the outcome, and inferring a motivation that could lead to such an outcome produces \"outside-in\" explanations as the outcome appears international--the opening of market barriers to overseas participants. I demonstrate the limitations of such approaches and conclude that regulatory openings emerged as a solution to domestic dilemmas. Reducing the level of analysis to examine the domestic political economy produces a qualitatively different explanation. The research considers international changes in behavior relative to domestic shifts. Comparing expectations with observations, the evidence suggests that the internationalization of these markets is more limited then regulatory language suggests. After the openings, international demand did not beat a path to the markets. London emerges as a possible exception and raises questions about the insularity of large actors to international pressures. As the explanation fits an \"inside-out\" approach, one might expect U.S. leadership to be negligible. Yet, the changes look remarkably similar across the markets, and converge on a U.S. style of regulation. Once policy makers decided to address a domestic distributional competition, then the international environment could play a critical role by providing alternatives and a means of assigning and avoiding blame. International affairs become important when domestic policy dilemmas are resolved by appealing to the international arena. Dominant powers wield influence through an embedded influence that constrains the perceived range of alternatives of other actors. As leaders in financial instrument, market, and regulatory innovation; American regulatory and financial institutions constrain the range of alternatives. They establish examples and reduce search costs for later reformers.