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"Spicer, Finn"
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Perception, action, and consciousness : sensorimotor dynamics and two visual systems
\"What is the relationship between perception and action, between an organism and its environment, in explaining consciousness? These are issues at the heart of philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences. This book explores the relationship between perception and action from a variety of interdisciplinary perspectives, ranging from theoretical discussion of concepts to findings from recent scientific studies. It incorporates contributions from leading philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists, and an artificial intelligence theorist. The contributions take a range of positions with respect to the view that perception is an achievement by an agent acting in a complex environment in which sensorimotor dynamics constitute an essential ingredient to perceptual experience. A key focus of the book is on the debate about action-oriented theories of visual perception versus the dual-visual systems hypothesis The former champions the role of sensorimotor dynamics in perceptual awareness while the latter favours a functional dichotomy between perception and action. At least on the surface, these two approaches are in conflict. Where one emphasizes the interdependence of action and perception, the other suggests that action and perception are functionally distinct. The dialogue between these two approaches brings out wider theoretical issues underlying the research paradigm of cognitive sciences and philosophy of mind. Exploring one of the major debates in the philosophy and psychology, this book is fascinating reading for all those in the cognitive sciences and philosophy of mind\"-- Provided by publisher.
Book
Cultural Variations in Folk Epistemic Intuitions
Among the results of recent investigation of epistemic intuitions by experimental philosophers is the finding that epistemic intuitions show cultural variability between subjects of Western, East Asian and Indian Sub-continent origins. In this paper I ask whether the finding of this variation is evidence of cross-cultural variation in the folk-epistemological competences that give rise to these intuitions—in particular whether there is evidence of variation in subjects’ explicit or implicit theories of knowledge. I argue that positing cross-cultural variation in subjects’ implicit theories of knowledge is not the only possible explanation of the intuitions, and I suggest other explanations, including the hypothesis that each subject’s implicit theory of knowledge might contain a heterogeneous set of heuristics for ascribing knowledge. Variation in intuitions, then, might be the result of within-subject heterogeneity rather than across-subject heterogeneity.
Journal Article
Psychopathology and Morality
Psychopaths Tankersley distinguishes psychopaths from Damasio's category of acquired sociopaths; the latter are patients who present with symptoms after a lesion to the prefrontal cortex (PFC), amygdala, and/or limbic system. Inferences from their answers to these questions to conclusions about what vmPFC and normal subjects would actually do, were they in these morally significant situations are shaky-it is well known that subjects are poor at predicting their own behavior in hypothetical situations that would be novel or emotionally charged.1 One possible explanation of this is that there are systematic differences between the cognitive processes that are used in here-and-now moral or practical decision making and the processes that are used in counterfactual reasoning about decision making.
Journal Article
On Always being Right (about What One is Thinking)
There are a number of strands to the knowledge we have of our own minds; two strands are these: we often know with ease what we are thinking and we often know with ease what it is we believe. This paper concerns the knowledge of what we are thinking; it pursues questions as to what kind of judgment subjects make about their own thoughts, how those judgments are formed and why they constitute knowledge; it also asks how these judgments relate to the judgments subjects make about their own beliefs when they know with ease what they believe. It focuses on the account developed by Tyler Burge (1988, 1996, 2003) as part of his project of reconciling externalism about thought content with privileged self-knowledge. Burge's account is well known and influential; as such it is a fitting target for examination and criticism.
Journal Article
III-Are There Any Conceptual Truths About Knowledge?
In this paper I investigate the nature of the concept knowledge. I ask how this concept must be if it is to generate conceptual truths about knowledge, arguing that it must have a set of principles attached to it (a folk theory) that plays a reference‐determining role. I then produce evidence that suggests that the folk theory attached to our concept KNOWLEDGE—our folk epistemology—is inconsistent. If folk epistemology is inconsistent, I conclude, then either there are no conceptual truths about knowledge or any conceptual truths there are will not be a priori knowable.
Journal Article
Epistemic Intuitions and Epistemic Contextualism
In this paper I examine the way appeals to pretheoretic intuition are used to support epistemological theses in general and the thesis of epistemic contextualism in particular. After outlining the sceptical puzzle and the contextualist's resolution of that puzzle, I explore the question of whether this solution fits better with our intuitive take on the puzzle than its invariantist rivals. I distinguish two kinds of fit a theory might have with pretheoretic intuitions--accommodation and explanation, and consider whether achieving either kind of fit would be a virtue for a theory. I then examine how contextualism could best claim to accommodate and explain our intuitions, building the best case that I can for contextualism, but concluding that there is no reason to accept contextualism either in the way it accommodates nor the way it explains our intuitions about the sceptical puzzle.
Journal Article
