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1,814 result(s) for "Sterba, James P"
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An Ethics without God That Is Compatible with Darwinian Evolution
Building on my recent argument that an all-good, all-powerful God is logically incompatible with all the evil in the world, I explore what grounding ethics can have without the God of traditional theism. While theists have argued that ethics is grounded either in God’s commands and/or in his nature, I show that no such adequate grounding exists, even if my argument—showing that the God of traditional theism is logically incompatible with all the evil in the world—were shown to be unsuccessful, and I further show that such a grounding is impossible, given that my argument is successful. I then go on to provide an account of the norms on which an ethics without God can be appropriately grounded and show how an ethics, so grounded, can be appropriately related to our biological and cultural past, present, and future, as understood through Darwinian evolutionary theory. In this way, I hope to undercut a recent attempt to use Darwinian evolutionary theory to debunk ethics.
Forty Contributors: A Response
In July of 2021, I finished guest-editing a Special Issue for Religions on the topic of my book Is a Good God Logically Possible [...]
Are liberty and equality compatible?
\"Are the political ideals of liberty and equality compatible? This question is of central and continuing importance in political philosophy, moral philosophy, and welfare economics. In this book, two distinguished philosophers take up the debate. Jan Narveson argues that a political ideal of negative liberty is incompatible with any substantive ideal of equality, while James P. Sterba argues that Narveson's own ideal of negative liberty is compatible, and in fact leads to the requirements of a substantive ideal of equality. Of course, they cannot both be right. Thus, the details of their arguments about the political ideal of negative liberty and its requirements will determine which of them is right. Engagingly and accessibly written, their debate will be of value to all who are interested in the central issue of what are the practical requirements of a political ideal of liberty\"--Provided by publisher.
Sixteen Contributors: A Response
It is a rare event indeed to have sixteen philosophers join together in a symposium to reflect up the central question of one’s book [...]
God and Purported Logical Arguments from Evil and Suffering
Logical arguments from evil against the existence of God are the strongest form of arguments from evil. They maintain that the all-good, all-powerful God of traditional theism is logically incompatible with the evil in the world. Given that the most well-known logical argument from evil remains the argument put forward by John Mackie over fifty years ago, I begin by setting out Mackie’s argument in detail as well as Alvin Plantinga’s well-regarded critique of it. I then discuss Mackie’s not well-known confusing response to Plantinga’s critique along with attempts by Hugh LaFollette and Quentin Smith to support Mackie’s argument, which fail to take into account Mackie’s own concession to Plantinga’s critique. I then discuss my own attempt in 2019 to provide a Mackie-style logical argument from evil and the reception it has received. I end by suggesting that further discussion might best be pursued by taking up the related question of whether an objective ethics can by adequately supported without appealing to the existence of the God of traditional theism.
Affirmative Action for the Future
At a time when private and public institutions of higher education are reassessing their admissions policies in light of new economic conditions, Affirmative Action for the Future is a clarion call for the need to keep the door of opportunity open. In 2003, U.S. Supreme Court's Grutter and Gratz decisions vindicated the University of Michigan Law School's affirmative action program while striking down the particular affirmative action program used for undergraduates at the university. In 2006 and 2008, state referendums banned affirmative action in some states while upholding it in others. Taking these developments into account, James P. Sterba draws on his vast experience as a champion of affirmative action to mount a new moral and legal defense of the practice as a useful tool for social reform. Sterba documents the level of racial and sexual discrimination that still exists in the United States and then, arguing that diversity is a public good, he calls for expansion of the reach of affirmative action as a mechanism for encouraging true diversity. In his view, we must include in our understanding of affirmative action the need to favor those who come from economically disadvantaged backgrounds, regardless of race and sex. Elite colleges and universities could best facilitate opportunities for students from working-class and poor families, in Sterba's view, by cutting back on legacy and athletic preferences that overwhelmingly benefit wealthy white applicants.
Eliminating the problem of hell
According to Marilyn Adams, hell poses the principal problem of evil for Christians. In this article, I show that the problem of hell can be eliminated, or solved, but not by any of four favoured theistic solutions (i.e. traditional, escapist, annihilationist and universalist) that have been provided. Rather, I argue that there is another theistic solution to the problem of hell, a morally realistic solution, which, by drawing on ethical theory, can be shown to be morally preferable to these other solutions.