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159 result(s) for "Stern, Roger"
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Iranian petroleum crisis and United States national security
The U.S. case against Iran is based on Iran's deceptions regarding nuclear weapons development. This case is buttressed by assertions that a state so petroleum-rich cannot need nuclear power to preserve exports, as Iran claims. The U.S. infers, therefore, that Iran's entire nuclear technology program must pertain to weapons development. However, some industry analysts project an Irani oil export decline [e.g., Clark JR (2005) Oil Gas J 103(18):34-39]. If such a decline is occurring, Iran's claim to need nuclear power could be genuine. Because Iran's government relies on monopoly proceeds from oil exports for most revenue, it could become politically vulnerable if exports decline. Here, we survey the political economy of Irani petroleum for evidence of this decline. We define Iran's export decline rate (edr) as its summed rates of depletion and domestic demand growth, which we find equals 10-12%. We estimate marginal cost per barrel for additions to Irani production capacity, from which we derive the \"standstill\" investment required to offset edr. We then compare the standstill investment to actual investment, which has been inadequate to offset edr. Even if a relatively optimistic schedule of future capacity addition is met, the ratio of 2011 to 2006 exports will be only 0.40-0.52. A more probable scenario is that, absent some change in Irani policy, this ratio will be 0.33-0.46 with exports declining to zero by 2014-2015. Energy subsidies, hostility to foreign investment, and inefficiencies of its state-planned economy underlie Iran's problem, which has no relation to \"peak oil.\"
Oil Market Power and United States National Security
It is widely believed that an oil weapon could impose scarcity upon the United States. Impending resource exhaustion is thought to exacerbate this threat. However, threat seems implausible when we consider strategic deficits of prospective weapon users and the improbability of impending resource exhaustion. Here, we explore a hypothesis relating oil to national security under a different assumption, abundance. We suggest that an oil cartel exerts market power to keep abundance at bay, commanding monopoly rents [or wealth transfers (wt)] that underwrite security threats. We then compare security threats attributed to the oil weapon to those that may arise from market power. We first reexamine whether oil is abundant or scarce by reviewing current development data, then we estimate a competitive price for oil. From this, we derive$wt_{2004}$collections by Persian Gulf states ≈ $132-178 x 10⁹. We find that wt and the behavior of states collecting it interact to actuate security threats. Threats underwritten by wt are (i) the potential for emergence of a Persian Gulf superpower and (ii) terrorism. It is therefore oil market power, not oil per se, that actuates threats. We also describe a paradox in the relation of market power to the United States' defense doctrine of force projection to preempt a Gulf superpower. Because the superpower threat derives from wt, force alone cannot preempt it. A further paradox is that because foreign policy is premised on oil weapon fear, market power is appeased. Threats thereby grow unimpeded.
Legends of tomorrow : The Atom
\"The greatest stories from one of DC's greatest heroes, The Atom, are collected here in LEGENDS OF TOMORROW: THE ATOM! From his debut in SHOWCASE to his membership amongst the mighty Justice League, Professor Ray Palmer has shown that there is no size that determines heroism! The Atom has maintained his status amongst the pantheon of great heroes in the DC Universe, nowhere more apparent than in these incredible stories! With tales from such creators as Gardner Fox, Gil Kane, Roger Stern, Dwayne Turner, Steve Dillon and more, LEGENDS OF TOMORROW: THE ATOM is a great starting place to learn more about one of the star characters of the hit CW show!\"-- Provided by publisher.
PEAK OIL, PROGRESSIVISM, AND JOSEPHUS DANIELS, 1913–21
Stern describes the management of an imaginary oil-scarcity crisis by US Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels. The affair arose in response to \"peak oil\" claims by scientists of the US Department of the Interior between 1908 and 1920. With increasing vehemence over those years, these scientists forecast--mistakenly--that a decline of domestic oil production was imminent, with total exhaustion to follow by the 1930s. Progressivism was the political ideology from which Interior's peak-oil science sprang, and Progressivism likewise guided Daniels's effort to protect the Navy from the ostensible peak-oil crisis. Early-twentieth-century Progressivism was a movement for social and economic reform. Progressives of that era were alarmed over industrialization and urbanization and resented the power wielded by new, giant business organizations such as oil, automobile, and steel corporations. Progressives sought to reduce the great concentration of wealth that such new kinds of businesses had put into the hands of a few. They also resented the unfamiliar new workers in their midst: black laborers from the South and immigrants from Ireland and eastern and southern Europe. Today, Progressivism is mainly an urban, racially diverse movement, but in Daniels's time it also was a rural one.
PEAK OIL, PROGRESSIVISM, AND JOSEPHUS DANIELS, 1913–21
Daniels’s time as Secretary of the Navy was activated by Progressivism and peak oil. To preserve the Naval Oil Reserve, Daniels ultimately resorted to seizing oil, always at a below-market price and sometimes without compensation at all. His campaign to save the Navy from both peak oil and the ostensible predations of “big oil” ended in fiasco—fuel-oil seizures led by armed Marines.
Disseminated Armillifer Infection in Humans: A Rare Entity
Armillifer parasites, belonging to the Pentastomida subclass, are commonly known to cause infection in animals, particularly reptiles. Although rare, cases of Armillifer infection in humans have been reported. Most cases are asymptomatic or mildly symptomatic, with severe presentations being uncommon. Symptoms can vary depending on whether the nymph is encysted or actively dying, leading to immune-mediated reactions. Diagnostic imaging findings can be characteristic of Armillifer infection. We present the case of a 61-year-old male from West Africa with a history of snake consumption, who presented with night sweats, fevers, and chills, and imaging consistent with disseminated Armillifer infection.