Catalogue Search | MBRL
Are you sure you want to remove the book from the shelf?
{{itemTitle}}
18
result(s) for
"Sundby, Scott"
Sort by:
Cut down to size at high noon : a math adventure
A showdown between two barbers in the frontier town of Cowlick leads them to realize new uses for scale drawing.
Book
The Death Penalty's Future: Charting the Crosscurrents of Declining Death Sentences and the McVeigh Factor
While it is true that public support for the death penalty has waned slightly since the mid-1990s, approximately two out of every three Americans continue to voice approval of capital punishment, making it unlikely that public opposition will lead to widespread legislative repeals of the death penalty without further catalysts coming into play. This article argues, therefore, that what has occurred over the past decade with the death penalty requires a more nuanced understanding than simply assuming that the decline in annual death sentences reflects a gradual and inexorable erosion in support for the death penalty that eventually will lead to its abolition. An exploration of the reasons for the decline in death sentences over the past decade not only sheds light on the current state of capital punishment, but also helps to identify those factors that are likely to determine the future course of the death penalty in America.
Journal Article
The Jury as Critic: An Empirical Look at How Capital Juries Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony
Numerous questions exist about how juries react to expert testimony, including: 1. Do juries simply defer to the expert's credentials and abdicate their fact-finding responsibilities? 2. Can juries understand and properly integrate expert testimony into their decision-making process? 3. How do jurors react to professional expert testimony compared to testimony from other types of witnesses, such as lay experts? A paper attempts to provide some initial empirical answers to these questions by looking at how jurors in capital cases view and use different types of witness testimony presented during the guilt and penalty phases. The principal finding is that the messenger is often as important as the message in presenting evidence to the jury.
Journal Article
THE TRUE LEGACY OF ATKINS AND ROPER: THE UNRELIABILITY PRINCIPLE, MENTALLY ILL DEFENDANTS, AND THE DEATH PENALTY'S UNRAVELING
In striking down the death penalty for intellectually disabled and juvenile defendants, Atkins v. Virginia and Roper v. Simmons have been understandably heralded as important holdings under the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence that has found the death penalty \"disproportional\" for certain types of defendants and crimes. This Article argues, however, that the cases have a far more revolutionary reach than their conventional understanding. In both cases the Court went one step beyond its usual two-step analysis of assessing whether imposing the death penalty violated \"evolving standards of decency.\" This extra step looked at why even though intellectual disability and youth were powerful mitigators, juries were not able to reliably use them in their decisionmaking. The Court thus articulated expressly for the first time what this Article calls the \"unreliability principle:\" if too great a risk exists that constitutionally protected mitigation cannot be reliably assessed, the unreliability means that the death penalty cannot be constitutionally imposed. In recognizing the unreliability principle, the Court has called into serious question the death penalty for other offenders to whom the principle applies, such as mentally ill defendants. And, unlike with the \"evolving standards\" analysis, the unreliability principle does not depend on whether a national consensus exists against the practice. This Article identifies the six Atkins-Roper factors that bring the unreliability principle into play and shows why they make application of the death penalty to mentally ill defendants unconstitutional. The principle, which finds its constitutional home in the cases of Woodson v. North Carolina and Lockett v. Ohio, has profound implications for the death penalty, and if taken to its logical endpoint calls into question the Court's core premise since Furman v. Georgia, that by providing individualized consideration of a defendant and his crime, the death penalty decision will be free of arbitrariness.
Journal Article
\Everyman\ 's Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust between Government and Citizen?
Argues against narrowing of Fourth Amendment rights for purposes of the war on drugs; US.
Journal Article
An ode to probable cause: A brief response to professors Amar Slobogin
A response to the proposals from Professors Amar and Slobogin (1998) concerning the 4th Amendment is presented. The flexible \"reasonableness\" based 4th Amendment standard holds forth the promise of both accommodating a wide variety of governmental interests while still being able to address a myriad of concerns about government overstepping. It is suggested, however, that when it comes to the 4th Amendment, there can be an unreasonable side to reasonableness, that \"more can be less.\" It is worthwhile remembering that the 2 watershed cases for the Supreme Court's gradual movement towards an all-encompassing reasonableness balancing test - Camara v. Municipal Court (1967) and Terry v. Ohio (1968) - were efforts to make the 4th Amendment as expansive as the Court thought possible under the circumstances.
Journal Article
THE REASONABLE DOUBT RULE AND THE MEANING OF INNOCENCE
Although the presumption of innocence is universally acknowledged as central to the Anglo-American accusatorial system, considerable controversy surrounds how far the presumption of innocence should be extended through the requirement that the state prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Determining the scope of the presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt rule requires balancing the risk of acquitting the guilty against the danger of convicting innocent individuals. The balancing is made even more difficult when posed as a question of constitutional law because it raises concerns of federalism and separation of powers. This Article reviews the various judicial and scholarly approaches to striking the proper balance and analyzes their strengths and weaknesses. The Article concludes that only an expansive view of when the reasonable doubt rule applies adequately protects the presumption of innocence and that acceptable alternatives to limiting the reasonable doubt rule exist to minimize the risk of acquitting the guilty.
Journal Article
THE VIRTUES OF A PROCEDURAL VIEW OF INNOCENCE - A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ
In these essays, the authors explore different views of the criminal trial as a means of determining \"innocence.\" The more specific focus of the discussion is the role of the presumption of innocence and the best means for determining the facts to which the reasonable doubt rule should apply. Professor Schwartz, responding to an earlier article by Professor Sundby, argues that the presumption of innocence should be implemented through a standard by which a court would ask whether legislation or a procedure was \"arbitrary, incompatible with civilized respect for the individual, and shocks the conscience of the Court.\" In response, Professor Sundby calls for a procedural application of the reasonable doubt rule, requiring the rule to attach automatically to any fact which the legislature has used to define criminal behavior and the appropriate punishment. The two approaches reflect, in part, the striking of a different balance between the danger of convicting innocent individuals with the need to preserve public confidence in the criminal justice system. Despite their different approaches, both agree that the Supreme Court's current standards inadequately protect the values underlying the presumption of innocence.
Journal Article