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We develop a model of monetary policy with two key features: the central bank has private information about its long-run target rate and is averse to bond market volatility. In this setting, the central bank gradually impounds changes in its target into the policy rate. Such gradualism represents an attempt to not spook the bond market. However, this effort is partially undone in equilibrium, as markets rationally react more to a given move when the central bank moves more gradually. This time-consistency problem means that society would be better off if the central bank cared less about the bond market.

It is widely argued that shadow banking grew rapidly before the recent financial crisis because of rising demand for \"money-like\" claims. This paper assesses a key premise of this argument: that investors actually treated short-term debt issued by shadow banks as a money-like claim. I present a model where the financial sector and the central bank jointly respond to demand for money-like claims. The model generates predictions about the prices and quantities of Treasury bills, central bank reserves, and shadow bank debt. These predictions are borne out in the data, suggesting investors did treat shadow bank debt as money-like.

We document frictions in money market mutual fund lending that lead to the transmission of distress across borrowers. Using novel security-level holdings data, we show that funds exposed to Eurozone banks suffered large outflows in mid-2011. These outflows had significant spillovers: non-European issuers relying on such funds raised less short-term debt financing. Issuer characteristics do not explain the results: holding fixed the issuer, funds with higher Eurozone exposure cut lending more. Due to credit market frictions, funds with low Eurozone exposure provided substitute financing only to issuers they had pre-existing relationships with, even though issuers are large, highly rated firms.

We present a framework where “model persuaders” influence receivers’ beliefs by proposing models that organize past data to make predictions. Receivers are assumed to find models more compelling when they better explain the data, fixing receivers’ prior beliefs. Model persuaders face a trade-off: better-fitting models induce less movement in receivers’ beliefs. Consequently, a receiver exposed to the true model can be most misled by persuasion when that model fits poorly, competition between persuaders tends to neutralize the data by pushing toward better-fitting models, and a persuader facing multiple receivers is more effective when he can send tailored, private messages.

We study the real effects of market segmentation due to credit ratings by using a matched sample of firms just above and just below the investment-grade cutoff. These firms have similar observables, including average investment rates. However, flows into high-yield mutual funds have an economically significant effect on the issuance and investment of the speculative-grade firms relative to their matches, especially for firms likely to be financially constrained. The effect is associated with the discrete change in label from investment- to speculative-grade, not with changes in continuous measures of credit quality. We do not find similar effects at other rating boundaries.

We develop a novel methodology to infer the amount of capital allocated to quantitative equity arbitrage strategies. Using this methodology, which exploits time-variation in the cross-section of short interest, we document that the amount of capital devoted to value and momentum strategies has grown significantly since the late 1980s. We provide evidence that this increase in capital has resulted in lower strategy returns. However, consistent with theories of limited arbitrage, we show that strategy-level capital flows are influenced by past strategy returns and strategy return volatility and that arbitrage capital is most limited during times when strategies perform best. This suggests that the growth of arbitrage capital may not completely eliminate returns to these strategies.

We propose three core principles that should inform the design of bank capital regulation. First, whenever possible, multiple constraints on the minimum level of equity capital should be consolidated into a single constraint. This helps to avoid a distortionary situation where different constraints bind for different banks performing the same activity. Second, the best way to deal with the inevitable gaming of any set of ex ante capital rules is not to propose further rules, but rather to allow the regulator sufficient flexibility to address unforeseen contingencies ex post. Third, though a regulatory framework that relies primarily on minimum capital ratios is appropriate for normal times, such a framework is inadequate in the wake of a large negative shock to the system. Following an adverse shock, it becomes critical to emphasize dynamic resilience, which involves forcing banks to actively recapitalize—that is, regulation needs to focus on getting banks to raise new dollars of equity capital, rather than just maintaining their capital ratios. Applying these principles, we suggest a number of modifications to the current set of risk-based capital requirements, to the leverage ratio, and to the Federal Reserve’s stress-testing framework.

We develop a pair of models that speak to the goals and design of the sort of business lending and corporate bond purchase programs that have been introduced by governments in response to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. An overarching theme is that, in contrast to the classic lender-of-last-resort thinking that underpinned much of the response to the 2007–2009 global financial crisis, an effective policy response to the pandemic will require the government to accept the prospect of significant losses on credit extended to private sector firms.

We develop a model of government portfolio choice in which the government chooses the scale of risky projects in the presence of market failures and tax distortions. These frictions motivate the government to manage social risk and fiscal risk. Social risk management favors programs that ameliorate market failures in bad times. Fiscal risk management makes unattractive programs involving large government outlays when other government programs also require large outlays. These two risk management motives often conflict. Using the model, we explore how the attractiveness of different financial stability programs varies with the government’s fiscal burden and characteristics of the economy.