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This book examines accountability in the EU from different perspectives and considers whether EU citizens have real opportunities for holding decision-makers accountable. This book critically analyses five arguments which claim there are sufficient means for holding decision-makers to account in the Union. The main conclusion is that the current institutional set-up and practice of decision-making in the EU is one that merely creates an illusion of accountability. Using a strict framework focusing on the difference between formal mechanisms and actual opportunities for accountability, this highly coherent volume will be of interest to students and scholars of European politics, especially those interested in the democratic foundations of the European political system. Chapter 1 of this book is freely available as a downloadable Open Access PDF under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 3.0 license. https://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/tandfbis/rt-files/docs/Open+Access+Chapters/9780415480994_oachapter1.pdf Sverker Gustavsson is Jean Monnet Professor of European political integration at the Department of Government, Uppsala University, Sweden. His main research interests are European constitutional affairs, welfare state theory and research policy doctrines. Christer Karlsson is Associate Professor in the Department of Government, Uppsala University. His main research interests are democratic theory, European Union politics and international climate change negotiations. Thomas Persson is Researcher in the Department of Government, Uppsala University. His research interests include the involvement of civil society and interest groups in European Union politics, and the impact of European integration on national political systems. 1: Examining the illusion of accountability - Sverker Gustavsson, Christer Karlsson and Thomas Persson 2: Accountability in world politics - Robert O. Keohane 3: Accountability and democracy - Heidrun Abromeit 4: Putting limits on accountability avoidance - Sverker Gustavsson 5: Irretrievable powers and democratic accountability - Hans Agné 6: EU treaty reform and accountability - Christer Karlsson 7: Delegation to the permanent representation and mechanisms of accountability - Thomas Larue 8: European intelligence cooperation and accountability - Thorsten Wetzling 9: Executive power and accountability in the European Union - Jonas Tallberg 10: The European Central Bank – independent and accountable? - Daniel Naurin 11: Civil society participation and accountability - Thomas Persson 12: Improving accountability in the European Union – the potential role of NGOs - Louisa Parks 13: Taking accountability seriously - Sverker Gustavsson, Christer Karlsson and Thomas Persson

Political theorists tend to argue one-sidedly in favour of more democratic accountability (Ross 1952; Kielmansegg 1977; Spitz 1984; Abromeit 2002; Lewin 2007). When the EU is in question, however, arguments for less accountability must be considered as well. Otherwise, we will fail to understand that the existing Union is the result of two contrary strivings. On the one hand, the sphere of national decision-making is subject to democratic control. On the other, 'we the people' are bound by a suprastate beyond electoral reach. As a matter of pure logic, accountability avoidance is the opposite ofaccountability promotion. In real politics, however, the inconsistency between these two ambitions is overcome on the basis of the notion that 'output' legitimacy can compensate for a lack of 'input' legitimacy. This is another way of describing the everyday distinction between substance and procedure. It is the idea of government 'for' the people - rather than 'of ' or 'by' them - that supposedly makes such a double standard acceptable (Scharpf 1999: 6-28; Bartolini 2005: 165-76). The notion of output legitimacy raises an important problem. According tothis idea, an order is accepted on account of 'its capacity to solve problems requiring collective solutions because they could not be solved through individual action, through market exchanges, or through voluntary cooperation in civil society' (Scharpf 1999: 11). Such a notion would seem, on the face of it, to be both reasonable and pragmatically sound. But if output legitimacy is such a good idea, how is it that accountability avoidance has not become the only game in town? Why do limiting procedural arrangements persist - arrangements defended on a basis 'unrelated to any costs and benefits calculations'? (Bartolini 2005: 168). The answer I offer is close to common sense. Universal suffrage, freedom ofspeech, and freedom of association were conquered in the aftermath of the French and American revolutions, and they remained contested in wars and political upheavals throughout the twentieth century. Therefore, output legitimacy cannot entirely compensate for the absence of opposition, or the lack of any opportunity to change office-holders and public policies. It is for this reason that accountability avoidance cannot always have the upper hand.

The contributors to this book examine the issues of constitutional choice that face the governments and citizens of today's Europe. Divided into three sections this study addresses: questions of political legitimacy and the meaning of democratic deficit in the EU; the reality of what institutional reforms and decision making processes are possible; and the rights of citizenship and values that should be protected.

Accountability analysis is no isolated or self-contained academic island. An historic turning of the tide has occurred in this area. It took place twenty years ago, when the Berlin Wall was torn down. Prior to that time, there was not much discussion of the kind found in the preceding twelve chapters, or in three closely related volumes from recent years (Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2007; Niznik and Ryabinska 2007; Curtin and Wille 2008). During the Cold War, the existence of an iron curtain cutting throughEurope determined how the EU's accountability problem was perceived. The key concept was 'permissive consensus' (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970: 24978). According to this notion, citizens accepted European integration even though they were unable to hold its supranational decision-makers to account. The underlying rationale was that citizens, while not very interested in European integration, were nonetheless well-disposed to it - leaving decision-makers free to take the necessary steps towards an ever closer Union. Against the background, moreover, of the more flagrant democratic deficiencies east of the iron curtain, the shortcomings in the West could be easily overlooked. However, after the breakdown of the Soviet Union and the dissolution ofthe Warsaw Pact, it was not possible to view the matter from such a broad geopolitical and historical perspective. Scholars, politicians, and opinionmakers were then faced with a problem which they had never before encountered. Now that the Cold War had suddenly disappeared from the historical scene, what could induce citizens to accept an executive, a legislature, a central bank, and a court of justice beyond electoral reach at the supranational level? Why should they accept such a political order?

Do EU citizens have real opportunities to hold decision-makers accountable, or does the current institutional set-up in the Union merely create an illusion of accountability? That is the central question of this volume. There are widespread and growing concerns that the political system of the EU does not, in fact, afford citizens appropriate mechanisms of accountability. The aim of the current study is to ascertain whether such concerns are warranted.