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In this brief review, we argue that attention operates along a hierarchy from peripheral through central mechanisms. We further argue that these mechanisms are distinguished not just by their functional roles in cognition, but also by a distinction between serial mechanisms (associated with central attention) and parallel mechanisms (associated with midlevel and peripheral attention). In particular, we suggest that peripheral attentional deployments in distinct representational systems may be maintained simultaneously with little or no interference, but that the serial nature of central attention means that even tasks that largely rely on distinct representational systems will come into conflict when central attention is demanded. We go on to review both the behavioral and neural evidence for this prediction. We conclude that even though the existing evidence mostly favors our account of serial central and parallel noncentral attention, we know of no experiment that has conclusively borne out these claims. As such, this article offers a framework of attentional mechanisms that will aid in guiding future research on this topic.

Efficient execution of perceptual-motor tasks requires rapid voluntary reconfiguration of cognitive task sets as circumstances unfold. Such acts of cognitive control, which are thought to rely on a network of cortical regions in prefrontal and posterior parietal cortex, include voluntary shifts of attention among perceptual inputs or among memory representations, or switches between categorization or stimulus-response mapping rules. A critical unanswered question is whether task set shifts in these different domains are controlled by a common, domain-independent mechanism or by separate, domain-specific mechanisms. Recent studies have implicated a common region of medial superior parietal lobule (mSPL) as a domain-independent source of cognitive control during shifts between perceptual, mnemonic, and rule representations. Here, we use fMRI and event-related multivoxel pattern classification to show that spatial patterns of brain activity within mSPL reliably express which of several domains of cognitive control is at play on a moment-by-moment basis. Critically, these spatiotemporal brain patterns are stable over time within subjects tested several months apart and across a variety of tasks, including shifting visuospatial attention, switching categorization rules, and shifting attention in working memory.

Neuroimaging provides a unique tool to investigate otherwise difficult-to-access mental processes like visual imagery. Prior studies support the idea that visual imagery is a top-down reinstatement of visual perception, and it is likely that this extends to object processing. Here we use functional MRI and multi-voxel pattern analysis to ask if mental imagery of cars engages the fusiform face area, similar to what is found during perception. We test only individuals who we assumed could imagine individual car models based on their above-average perceptual abilities with cars. Our results provide evidence that cars are represented differently from common objects in face-selective visual areas, at least in those with above-average car recognition ability. Moreover, pattern classifiers trained on data acquired during imagery can decode the neural response pattern acquired during perception, suggesting that the tested object categories are represented similarly during perception and visual imagery. The results suggest that, even at high-levels of visual processing, visual imagery mirrors perception to some extent, and that face-selective areas may in part support non-face object imagery.

Crises such as natural disasters or pandemics negatively impact the mental health of the affected community, increasing rates of depression, anxiety, or stress. It has been proposed that this stems in part from crisis-related stimuli triggering negative reactions that interrupt daily life. Given the frequency and prominence of crisis events, it is crucial to understand when crisis-related stimuli involuntarily capture attention and trigger increased stress and distraction from obligations. The emotional attentional blink (EAB) paradigm—in which emotional distractors hinder report of subsequent targets in streams of rapidly displayed stimuli—allows examination of such attentional capture in a rapidly changing dynamic environment. EABs are typically observed with generally disturbing stimuli, but stimuli related to personal traumas yield similar or greater effects, indicating strong attentional capture by stimuli related to individual trauma history. The current study investigated whether a similar comparable or increased crisis-related EAB exists within a community affected by large-scale crisis. Specifically, effects of conventional emotional distractors and distractors related to recent crises were compared using EABs in university students without a mental health diagnosis. Experiment 1 used images related to Hurricane Harvey, evaluating a crisis 4 years prior to data collection. Experiment 2 used words related to the COVID pandemic, evaluating an ongoing crisis at the time of data collection. In both experiments, the conventional EAB distractors yielded strong EABs, while the crisis-related distractors yielded absent or weak EABs in the same participants. This suggests that crisis-related stimuli do not have special potency for capturing attention in the general university student population. More generally, crises affecting communities do not necessarily yield widespread, strong reactivity to crisis-related stimuli.

In the emotional attentional blink (EAB; also termed emotion-induced blindness/EIB), a target in a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) stream of fillers is difficult to report when it is preceded by a task-irrelevant emotional distractor. This is typically interpreted as capture of temporal attention by emotion. However, recent research has pointed out that many EAB tasks use emotional distractors that are visually distinct from other task stimuli, and that controlling for visual distinctiveness attenuates the EAB. This suggests that emotion alone is not a strong driver of the initial attentional capture in the EAB. The current study thus asked if this “emotional” blink is best understood as a salience-driven pop-out initiated by visual salience that is subsequently modulated by emotion. Using RSVP of images with unusually dense temporal sampling and factorial manipulations of critical distractor emotion and visual salience, the results support this account, and further suggest that the EAB can be characterized as two phases. Specifically, Phase 1 reflects visual salience, evidenced by an immediate but rapidly attenuating blink elicited by low emotion + high visual salience distractors. Phase 2 reflects emotional modulation, evidenced by a longer-latency and weaker blink elicited by high emotion + low visual salience distractors. High emotion + high visual salience distractors highlighted both phases: an immediate blink, presumably from visual salience, that continued into later lags. These results yield a mechanistic understanding of how emotion and visual salience interact to drive visual attention in rapidly-changing environments.

Concerns regarding certain fMRI data analysis practices have recently evoked lively debate. The principal concern regards the issue of non-independence, in which an initial statistical test is followed by further non-independent statistical tests. In this report, we propose a simple, practical solution to reduce bias in secondary tests due to non-independence using a leave-one-subject-out (LOSO) approach. We provide examples of this method, show how it reduces effect size inflation, and suggest that it can serve as a functional localizer when within-subject methods are impractical.

The attentional blink (AB) reveals temporal limits of goal-driven attention: the second of two proximate targets presented in a rapid stream of non-targets is often missed. In the emotional AB (EAB, also termed emotion-induced blindness), an emotionally valenced distractor replacing the first target yields a similar blink. However, the AB and EAB have not been adequately compared, and thus the extent of their mechanistic similarity remains unclear. The current study interleaved AB and EAB trials using identical stimuli in the same participants and observed that the AB is consistently larger than the EAB. Moreover, the four main experiments varied in both target-defining features (semantic vs. perceptual) and EAB distractor salience (emotion alone vs. emotion plus physical distinctiveness); an EAB was observed only when distractors were physically distinct. Even when a large EAB was observed, the AB was still larger using a task with identical targets and fillers in the same individuals. These results suggest that: (1) goal-driven attentional control (measured by the AB) has a greater influence than stimulus-driven attentional control (measured by the EAB: emotion valence and physical distinctiveness) on selection from a dynamic series of stimuli, and (2) emotional valence is insufficient on its own to trigger an EAB. However, these results are consistent with the account that when attention has already been captured by a physically salient distractor, emotional content can interfere with disengagement from the already-attended stimulus.

The speed with which information from vision is transformed into working memory (WM) representations that resist interference from ongoing perception and cognition is the subject of conflicting results. Using distinct paradigms, researchers have arrived at estimates of the consolidation time course ranging from 25 ms to 1 s – a range of more than an order of magnitude. However, comparisons of consolidation duration across very different estimation paradigms rely on the implicit assumption that WM consolidation speed is a stable, structural constraint of the WM system. The extremely large variation in WM consolidation speed estimates across measurement approaches motivated the current work’s goal of determining whether consolidation speed truly is a stable structural constraint of WM encoding, or instead might be under strategic control as suggested by some accounts. By manipulating the relative task priority of WM encoding and a subsequent sensorimotor decision in a dual-task paradigm, the current experiments demonstrate that the long duration of WM consolidation does not change as a result of task-specific strategies. These results allow comparison of WM consolidation across estimation approaches, are consistent with recent multi-phase WM consolidation models, and are consistent with consolidation duration being an inflexible structural limit.

The prominent sensory recruitment model argues that visual working memory (WM) is maintained via representations in the same early visual cortex brain regions that initially encode sensory stimuli, either in the identical neural populations as perceptual representations or in distinct neural populations. While recent research seems to reject the former (strong) sensory recruitment model, the latter (flexible) account remains plausible. Moreover, this flexibility could explain a recent result of high theoretical impact (Harrison & Bays, The Journal of Neuroscience, 38 (12), 3116-3123, 2018 ) – a failure to observe interactions between items held in visual WM – that has been taken to reject the sensory recruitment model. Harrison and Bays ( The Journal of Neuroscience, 38 (12), 3116-3123, 2018 ) tested the sensory recruitment model by comparing the precision of memoranda in radially and tangentially oriented memory arrays. Because perceptual visual crowding effects are greater in radial than tangential arrays, they reasoned that a failure to observe such anisotropy in WM would reject the sensory recruitment model. In the present Registered Report or Replication, we replicated their study with greater sensitivity and extended their task by controlling a potential strategic confound. Specifically, participants might remap memory items to new locations, reducing interactions between proximal memoranda. To combat remapping, we cued participants to report either a memory item or its precise location – with this report cue presented only after a memory maintenance period. Our results suggest that, similar to visual perceptual crowding, location-bound visual memoranda interact with one another when remapping is prevented. Thus, our results support at least a flexible form of the sensory recruitment model.

Previous research suggests that bilingual language control requires domain-general cognitive control. Recent research suggests that exploration of individual differences is key for understanding the relationship between bilingual language control and cognitive control. The current study used multi-voxel pattern analysis (MVPA) to examine within-subject patterns of fMRI activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) during bilingual language switching and non-linguistic task-switching. We hypothesized that bilinguals would have identifiable, within-subject patterns of DLPFC activity for both types of switching and that bilinguals and monolinguals would differ in patterns of DLPFC activity for task-switching. We were unable to identify patterns of DLPFC activity associated with bilingual language switching. Task-switching was related to patterns of left DLPFC activity for both bilinguals and monolinguals, and there were identifiable patterns of right DLPFC activity for the bilinguals only. These findings suggest that the DLPFC is not the key brain structure connecting bilingual language and task-switching.