Explore the vast range of titles available.

Dynamic and static body postures are a defining characteristic of mind-body practices such as Tai Chi and Qigong (TCQ). A growing body of evidence supports the hypothesis that TCQ may be beneficial for psychological health, including management and prevention of depression and anxiety. Although a variety of causal factors have been identified as potential mediators of such health benefits, physical posture, despite its visible prominence, has been largely overlooked. We hypothesize that body posture while standing and/or moving may be a key therapeutic element mediating the influence of TCQ on psychological health. In the present paper, we summarize existing experimental and observational evidence that suggests a bi-directional relationship between body posture and mental states. Drawing from embodied cognitive science, we provide a theoretical framework for further investigation into this interrelationship. We discuss the challenges involved in such an investigation and propose suggestions for future studies. Despite theoretical and practical challenges, we propose that the role of posture in mind-body exercises such as TCQ should be considered in future research.

Thoughts arise spontaneously in our minds with remarkable frequency, but tracking the brain systems associated with the early inception of a thought has proved challenging. Here we addressed this issue by taking advantage of the heightened introspective ability of experienced mindfulness practitioners to observe the onset of their spontaneously arising thoughts. We found subtle differences in timing among the many regions typically recruited by spontaneous thought. In some of these regions, fMRI signal peaked prior to the spontaneous arising of a thought — most notably in the medial temporal lobe and inferior parietal lobule. In contrast, activation in the medial prefrontal, temporopolar, mid-insular, lateral prefrontal, and dorsal anterior cingulate cortices peaked together with or immediately following the arising of spontaneous thought. We propose that brain regions that show antecedent recruitment may be preferentially involved in the initial inception of spontaneous thoughts, while those that show later recruitment may be preferentially involved in the subsequent elaboration and metacognitive processing of spontaneous thoughts. Our findings highlight the temporal dynamics of neural recruitment surrounding the emergence of spontaneous thoughts and may help account for some of spontaneous thought's peculiar qualities, including its wild diversity of content and its links to memory and attention. •Neural recruitment surrounding the arising of spontaneous thought is examined.•Antecedent neural systems include medial temporal and inferior parietal areas.•Subsequent neural activations include medial and lateral prefrontal cortices.

The accuracy of subjective reports, especially those involving introspection of one's own internal processes, remains unclear, and research has demonstrated large individual differences in introspective accuracy. It has been hypothesized that introspective accuracy may be heightened in persons who engage in meditation practices, due to the highly introspective nature of such practices. We undertook a preliminary exploration of this hypothesis, examining introspective accuracy in a cross-section of meditation practitioners (1-15,000 hrs experience). Introspective accuracy was assessed by comparing subjective reports of tactile sensitivity for each of 20 body regions during a 'body-scanning' meditation with averaged, objective measures of tactile sensitivity (mean size of body representation area in primary somatosensory cortex; two-point discrimination threshold) as reported in prior research. Expert meditators showed significantly better introspective accuracy than novices; overall meditation experience also significantly predicted individual introspective accuracy. These results suggest that long-term meditators provide more accurate introspective reports than novices.

Glioblastomas (GBMs) are aggressive and invasive cancers of the brain, associated with high rates of tumour recurrence and poor patient outcomes despite initial treatment. Targeting cell migration is therefore of interest in highly invasive cancers such as GBMs, to prevent tumour dissemination and regrowth. One current aim of GBM research focuses on assessing the anti-migratory properties of novel or repurposed inhibitors, including plant-based drugs which display anti-cancer properties. We investigated the potential anti-migratory activity of plant-based products with known cytotoxic effects in cancers, using a range of two-dimensional (2D) and three-dimensional (3D) migration and invasion assays as well as immunofluorescence microscopy to determine the specific anti-migratory and phenotypic effects of three plant-derived compounds, Turmeric, Indigo and Magnolia bark, on established glioma cell lines. Migrastatic activity was observed in all three drugs, with Turmeric exerting the most inhibitory effect on GBM cell migration into scratches and from the spheroid edge at all the timepoints investigated (p < 0.001). We also observed novel cytoskeletal phenotypes affecting actin and the focal adhesion dynamics. As our in vitro results determined that Turmeric, Indigo and Magnolia are promising migrastatic drugs, we suggest additional experimentation at the whole organism level to further validate these novel findings.

This paper is a response to Christian Coseru, ‘The Middle Way to Reality: On Why I Am Not a Buddhist and Other Philosophical Curiosities.’ I address Coseru’s critical comments about naturalism, evolutionary psychology, scientific realism, and Madhyamaka philosophy. I argue that scientific naturalism is not the right framework for relating Buddhism to science; rather, the proper framework is the ethics of knowledge. I argue that Coseru’s defence of evolutionary psychology is unconvincing and rests on a misunderstanding of the issues concerning the relations between evolutionary theory, evolutionary psychology, and Buddhist philosophy. Finally, I argue that there are considerable tensions between scientific realism and Buddhist philosophy.

Is it possible for there to be subjectivity without a subject, for conscious states to be truly real while there is no real self or owner that has them? One step toward answering this question involves a further question: is consciousness in some sense reflexive or self-aware? The chapters in this collection investigate the linked issues of egological vs nonegological accounts of consciousness and the reflexivity of consciousness from the diverse perspectives of phenomenology, analytic philosophy, the Buddhist philosophical tradition, and the Indian school of Advaita Vedânta. The resulting dialogue illustrates the enhanced clarity that can be achieved by philosophizing across boundaries. Together the chapters lay out the full range of possible views concerning the nature of the self and proofs of its existence or non-existence, and the full spectrum of positions on the question of consciousness' allegedly self-intimating or self-illuminating nature. In doing so they help clarify just what is involved in giving an account of consciousness that takes subjectivity and the first-person perspective seriously.

This paper explores some of the differences between the enactive approach in cognitive science and the extended mind thesis. We review the key enactive concepts of autonomy and sense-making . We then focus on the following issues: (1) the debate between internalism and externalism about cognitive processes; (2) the relation between cognition and emotion; (3) the status of the body; and (4) the difference between ‘incorporation’ and mere ‘extension’ in the body-mind-environment relation.

This paper critically examines Jay Garfield’s accounts of the self, consciousness, and phenomenology in his book, Engaging Buddhism: Why It Matters to Philosophy. I argue that Garfield’s views on these topics are shaped, in problematic ways, by views he takes over from Wilfrid Sellars and applies to Buddhist philosophy.