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Although organizations appear to learn from obvious failures, we argue that it is harder for them to learn from \"near-misses\"—events in which chance played a role in averting failure. In this paper, we formalize the concept of near-misses and hypothesize that organizations and managers fail to learn from near-misses because they evaluate such events as successes and thus feel safer about the situation. We distinguish perceived (\"felt\") risk from calculated statistical risk and propose that lower levels of perceived risk encourage people with near-miss information to make riskier subsequent decisions compared to people without near-miss information. In our first study, we confirm the tendency to evaluate near-misses as successes by having participants rate a project manager whose decisions result in either (a) mission success, (b) near-miss, or (c) failure. Participants (both students and NASA employees and contractors) give similar ratings to managers whose decisions produced near-misses and to managers whose decisions resulted in successes, and both ratings are significantly different from ratings of managers who experienced failures. We suggest that the failure to hold managers accountable for near-misses is a foregone learning opportunity for both the manager and the organization. In our second set of studies, we confirm that near-miss information leads people to choose a riskier alternative because of a lower perceived risk following near-miss events. We explore several alternative explanations for these findings, including the role of Bayesian updating in processing near-miss data. Ultimately, the analysis suggests that managers and organizations are reducing their perception of the risk, although not necessarily updating (lowering) the statistical probability of the failure event. We speculate that this divergence arises because perceived risk is the product of associative processing, whereas statistical risk arises from rule-based processing.

We develop an 18-item self-report measure of receptiveness to opposing views. Studies 1a and 1b present the four-factor scale and report measures of internal, convergent, and discriminant validity. In study 2, more receptive individuals chose to consume proportionally more information from U.S. senators representing the opposing party than from their own party. In study 3, more receptive individuals reported less mind wandering when viewing a speech with which they disagreed, relative to one with which they agreed. In study 4, more receptive individuals evaluated supporting and opposing policy arguments more impartially. In study 5, we find that voters who opposed Donald Trump but reported being more receptive at the time of the election were more likely to watch the inauguration, evaluate the content of the inauguration speech in a more even-handed manner, and select a more balanced portfolio of news outlets for later consumption than their less receptive counterparts. We discuss the scale as a tool to investigate the role of receptiveness for conflict, decision making, and collaboration. This paper was accepted by Elke Weber, judgment and decision making.

In the aftermath of many natural and man-made disasters, people often wonder why those affected were underprepared, especially when the disaster was the result of known or regularly occurring hazards (e.g., hurricanes). We study one contributing factor: prior near-miss experiences. Near misses are events that have some nontrivial expectation of ending in disaster but, by chance, do not. We demonstrate that when near misses are interpreted as disasters that did not occur , people illegitimately underestimate the danger of subsequent hazardous situations and make riskier decisions (e.g., choosing not to engage in mitigation activities for the potential hazard). On the other hand, if near misses can be recognized and interpreted as disasters that almost happened , this will counter the basic \"near-miss\" effect and encourage more mitigation. We illustrate the robustness of this pattern across populations with varying levels of real expertise with hazards and different hazard contexts (household evacuation for a hurricane, Caribbean cruises during hurricane season, and deep-water oil drilling). We conclude with ideas to help people manage and communicate about risk. This paper was accepted by Teck Ho, decision analysis.

We examine the effects of subjectively experienced (as opposed to objectively prescribed) subgroups in a team. We propose two mechanisms that might explain the consequences of subgroup perceptions in teams: Affective integration (the degree to which teammates think they have quality interpersonal relationships) and cognitive integration (CI) (the degree to which teammates have learned to understand others interpretive frameworks). We test our theory using 64 MBA project teams. Cognitive integration moderated the effect of subgroup formation on team effectiveness, while affective integration mediated the decrement that subgroup formation had on team satisfaction. Our model is general for any team that has subgroups (regardless of their reason for forming), and so provides prescriptions as to how to maximize the benefits of subgroups while minimizing their liabilities.

Despite rhetoric supporting the advancement of women on corporate boards, meager evidence supports significant progress over the past decade in the United States. The authors examine archival board data (for more than 3,000 U.S. publicly traded firms) from 2002 to 2011 and find that a female is most likely to be appointed to a corporate board when a woman has just exited the position. A similar propensity occurs to reappoint a male when a man leaves, although the effect is smaller than for women. The authors argue that this “gender-matching heuristic” can impede progress in attaining gender diversity, regardless of intention, because it emphasizes the replacement of existing women rather than changing board composition. The authors replicate this effect in follow-up laboratory studies and show that “what works” to increase the representation of women on boards, irrespective of gender matching, is to increase the number of women in the candidate pool.

Decades of research have sought to understand how disaster preparedness decisions are made. We believe one understudied factor is the impact of near-miss events. A near-miss occurs when an event (such as a hurricane or terrorist attack) has some non-trivial probability of ending in disaster (loss of life, property damage), but the negative outcome is avoided largely by chance (e.g., at the last minute, the storm dissipates or the bomb fails to detonate). In the first of two experiments, we study reactions to a hurricane threat when participants are told about prior near-miss events. We find that people with information about a prior near-miss event that has no negative consequences are less likely to take protective measures than those with either no information or information about a prior near-miss event that has salient negative information. Similar results have been shown in prior research, but we seek to understand people’s reasoning for the different reactions. We examine the role of an individual’s risk propensity and general level of optimism as possible explanatory variables for the “near-miss” effect. We find risk propensity to be stable across conditions, whereas general optimism is influenced by the type of prior near-miss information, so that optimism mediates how near-miss information impacts protective decisions. People who experience a potentially hazardous near-miss but escape without obvious cues of damage will feel more optimistic and take less protective action. In the second study, we test messages about the hazard’s risk and examine the impact of these messages to offset the influence of near-misses. We end by discussing the implications of near-misses for risk communication.

In the aftermath of many natural and man-made disasters, people often wonder why those affected were underprepared, especially when the disaster was the result of known or regularly occurring hazards (e.g., hurricanes). We study one contributing factor: prior near-miss experiences. Near misses are events that have some nontrivial expectation of ending in disaster but, by chance, do not. We demonstrate that when near misses are interpreted as disasters that did not occur, people illegitimately underestimate the danger of subsequent hazardous situations and make riskier decisions (e.g., choosing not to engage in mitigation activities for the potential hazard). On the other hand, if near misses can he recognized and interpreted as disasters that almost happened, this will counter the basic \"near-miss\" effect and encourage more mitigation. We illustrate the robustness of this pattern across populations with varying levels of real expertise with hazards and different hazard contexts (household evacuation for a hurricane, Caribbean cruises during hurricane season, and deep-water oil drilling). We conclude with ideas to help people manage and communicate about risk. Key words: near miss; risk; decision making; natural disasters; organizational hazards; hurricanes; oil spills History: Received June 29, 2010; accepted November 27, 2011, by Teck Ho, decision analysis. Published In the aftermath of many natural and man-made disasters, people often wonder why those affected were underprepa red, especially when the disaster was the result of known or regularly occurring hazards (e.g., hurricanes). We study one contributing factor: prior near-miss experiences. Near misses are events that have some nontrivial expectation of ending in disaster but, by chance, do not. We demonstrate that when near misses are interpreted as disasters that did not occur, people illegitimately underestimate the danger of subsequent hazardous situations and make riskier decisions (e.g., choosing not to engage in mitigation activities for the potential hazard). On the other hand, if near misses can be recognized and interpreted as disasters that almost happened, this will counter the basic \"near-miss\" effect and encourage more mitigation. We illustrate the robustness of this pattern across populations with varying levels of real expertise with hazards and different hazard contexts (household evacuation for a hurricane, Caribbean cruises during hurricane season, and deep-water oil drilling). We conclude with ideas to help people manage and communicate about risk.

Research evidence across a number of disciplines and fields has shown that women can encounter both social and financial backlash when they behave assertively, for example, by asking for resources at the bargaining table. But this backlash appears to be most evident when a gender stereotype that prescribes communal, nurturing behavior by women is activated. In situations in which this female stereotype is suppressed, backlash against assertive female behavior is attenuated. We review several contexts in which stereotypic expectations of females are more dormant or where assertive behavior by females can be seen as normative. We conclude with prescriptions from this research that suggest how women might attenuate backlash at the bargaining table and with ideas about how to teach these issues of gender and backlash to student populations in order to make students, both male and female, more aware of their own inclination to backlash and how to rectify such inequities from both sides of the bargaining table. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]

In 1980, the conglomerate firm, a firm composed of several unrelated businesses, was perhaps the dominant corporate form in the United States. Yet, by 1990 this form had in effect become deinstitutionalized. Using comprehensive time-series data from the 1980s on a population of the largest industrial firms in the United States, we demonstrate that this deinstitutionalization was effected by two processes: First, diversified firms were taken over at a high rate and their unwanted parts were typically sold off, and second, the less diversified firms that survived shunned the strategy of conglomerate growth. The aggregate result was that by 1990 the largest industrial firms in the United States became considerably less diversified. Business rhetoric tracked the shift in this prevalent organizational form and practice by denouncing the \"firm-as-portfolio\" model in favor of a network model of regularized economic exchange. We argue that an unintended consequence of the successful spread of the conglomerate form was to replace the conceptualization of the corporation as a sovereign actor with a reductionist view of the firm as a network without boundaries or a nexus-of-contracts among separate individuals. We discuss the implications of this conceptualization for organization theory.

We tested the relationships between Chinese employees' goal orientation and their performance, as well as the moderating effects of temporal norms (future planning and scheduling) on this relationship. Results from employees across seven different organizations in China demonstrated that the mastery goal orientation was positively related to job performance. The performance goal orientation was unrelated to employment outcomes. Further, results showed that a mastery goal orientation was most useful when future planning was emphasized and scheduling was de-emphasized.