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Placing constraints on elected officials is thought to bind their hands and render government policies credible. In turn, credible policies attract investment because investors can extend their policy and regulatory time horizons. Yet, a scholarship on LMICs suggests that too many constraints on policymakers may preclude necessary reforms, which repels capital. I motivate the study with an example from Liberia. Then, I evaluate political constraints and FDI for 182 countries between 1996 and 2022 and demonstrate that the rule of law conditions relationships between constraints on governments and FDI; in places with high rule of law, constraining government attracts FDI. In contrast, high constraints push investment away in contexts where the rule of law is lower. The logic is that constraining government makes credible high-income governments' previous commitments to property rights and contract enforcement. However, the very same constraints on government may prevent LMICs from making credible commitments in the first place. Constraining government thus prevents desirable reforms under many circumstances, which I illustrate by returning to the Liberia example in the discussion. Ultimately, this study raises questions about universal benefits emerging from policy credibility and extends our understanding of political institutions, credible commitment, and FDI

Community health worker (CHW)-led education is an important strategy to increase awareness and access to breast cancer screening in medically-underserved communities. This study aimed to develop a context-specific, culturally-appropriate training intervention for South Florida CHWs to educate Latinx immigrant farmworkers on breast cancer and early detection. A community-based participatory research (CBPR) study, conducted 2017-2019, informed the design of a training curriculum for CHWs and educational dissemination materials. Twenty-two CHWs were trained and knowledge gains were measuring using a one-group pre-and post-test design. Triangulated evaluation consisted of field observations of CHW-client interactions, CHW self-reports, and rapid assessment surveys of community members. A community stakeholder-informed breast cancer training curriculum resulted in significant, sustained breast cancer knowledge gains among CHWs when comparing pre-, post-, and 4-6 month post-training follow-up test scores. Field observations of educational material dissemination, CHW self-reported evaluations, and community rapid assessment surveys at three health fairs demonstrated this was an effective strategy to engage female Latinx farmworkers in breast cancer education. Community and key stakeholder participation in the development of a breast cancer educational intervention allowed for tailored design priorities around knowledge-based content, comprehensiveness, relevance, appropriateness, and ease of dissemination to community members. This model of participatory CHW training intervention design can enable future train-the-trainer approaches to disseminate and scale-up evidence-based health education interventions.

The Zika virus is a mosquito-borne virus spread primarily by Aedes mosquitoes. Zika cases have been detected throughout the mosquito’s range, with an epidemic occurring from 2015 to 2017 in Brazil. Many Zika cases are mild or asymptomatic, but infections in pregnant women can cause microcephaly in children, and a small percentage of cases result in Guillan–Barré syndrome. There is currently little systematic information surrounding the municipal spread of the Zika Virus in Brazil. This article uses coarsened exact matching with negative binomial estimation and ordinary least squares estimation to assess the determinants of Zika incidence across the ~280,000 cases confirmed and recorded by Brazil’s Ministry of Health in 2016 and 2017. These data come from Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests in Brazil and have not been published. We use data on the universe of individual Zika cases in Brazil and Geographic Information Systems (GIS) software to examine the virus at the municipal level across 5570 municipalities and construct a unique, unusually rich dataset covering daily Zika transmission. Additionally, our dataset includes corresponding local data on democratic governance, mosquito control efforts, and environmental conditions to estimate their relationship to Zika transmission. The results demonstrate that the presence of subnational democratic, participatory policymaking institutions and high levels of local state capacity are associated with low rates of Zika contraction. These models control for local healthcare spending and economic conditions, among other factors, that also influence Zika contraction rates. In turn, these findings provide a better understanding of what works for local health governance and mosquito control and makes important data public so that scholars and practitioners can perform their own analyses. Stronger models of Zika transmission will then inform mosquito abatement efforts across the Global South, as well as provide a blueprint for combatting Dengue fever, which is also transmitted by Aedes mosquitoes.

Nonpharmaceutical interventions such as stay-at-home orders continue to be the main policy response to the COVID-19 pandemic in countries with limited or slow vaccine rollout. Often, nonpharmaceutical interventions are managed or implemented at the subnational level, yet little information exists on within-country variation in nonpharmaceutical intervention policies. We focused on Latin America, a COVID-19 epicenter, and collected and analyzed daily subnational data on public health measures in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru to compare within- and across-country nonpharmaceutical interventions. We showed high heterogeneity in the adoption of these interventions at the subnational level in Brazil and Mexico; consistent national guidelines with subnational heterogeneity in Argentina and Colombia; and homogeneous policies guided by centralized national policies in Bolivia, Chile, and Peru. Our results point to the role of subnational policies and governments in responding to health crises. We found that subnational responses cannot replace coordinated national policy. Our findings imply that governments should focus on evidence-based national policies while coordinating with subnational governments to tailor local responses to changing local conditions.

Mexican state governments' actions are essential to control the COVID-19 pandemic within the country. However, the type, rigor and pace of implementation of public policies have varied considerably between states. Little is known about the subnational (state) variation policy response to the COVID-19 pandemic in Mexico. We collected daily information on public policies designed to inform the public, as well as to promote distancing, and mask use. The policies analyzed were: School Closure, Workplace Closure, Cancellation of Public Events, Restrictions on Gatherings, Stay at Home Order, Public Transit Suspensions, Information Campaigns, Internal Travel Controls, International Travel Controls, Use of Face Masks We use these data to create a composite index to evaluate the adoption of these policies in the 32 states. We then assess the timeliness and rigor of the policies across the country, from the date of the first case, February 27, 2020. The national average in the index during the 143 days of the pandemic was 41.1 out of a possible 100 points on our index. Nuevo León achieved the highest performance (50.4); San Luis Potosí the lowest (34.1). The differential between the highest versus the lowest performance was 47.4%. The study identifies variability and heterogeneity in how and when Mexican states implemented policies to contain COVID-19. We demonstrate the absence of a uniform national response and widely varying stringency of state responses. We also show how these responses are not based on testing and do not reflect the local burden of disease. National health system stewardship and a coordinated, timely, rigorous response to the pandemic did not occur in Mexico but is desirable to contain COVID-19.

Populist leaders have consistently rejected evidence-based policies in responding to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. They acted later and with less intensity than non-populists in implementing public health measures such as physical distancing, lockdowns, and developing public health data sets. We describe the responses of ten large countries with populist leadership at the onset of the pandemic (Brazil, Hungary, India, Mexico, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States). Together, these countries account for a disproportionately large number of cases and deaths associated with COVID-19 relative to their population. We categorize the policy responses into two types: (1) slow and ineffective, and (2) strict and illiberal. We conclude that while not all countries that responded poorly to the pandemic were led by populists, no countries with populist leadership performed well in either applying public health measures or achieving desirable health outcomes.

Many governments in semi-democratic regimes have adopted participatory democratic institutions to promote development and accountability. But limited resources, weak civil society, and a history of authoritarian politics make building subnational democratic institutions daunting. Do participatory institutions expand accountability in these environments? We address this question by evaluating citizen decision-making in Kenya’s local participatory processes. We first administered a survey experiment surrounding citizens’ development policy preferences to 9,928 respondents in four Kenyan counties. We then nest this survey experiment in participant observation and over 80 elite interviews. Our conclusions are mixed: respondents readily change their policy preferences to align with the government’s policy actions, which suggests limited prospects for accountability. However, respondents use participatory budgeting venues to question government officials about missing projects, which provides a potential foundation for accountability. Yet, uncompetitive local elections, the absence of independent civil society’s participation, and new program rules are likely to limit democratic accountability.

The release of classified documents through outlets like WikiLeaks has transformed American politics by shedding light on the innerworkings of governments, parties, and corporations. The high-profile criminal cases associated with such releases – those of Julian Assange, Chelsea Manning, and Edward Snowden – have highlighted important questions about journalism, government secrecy, and the public’s “right to know.” Scholars have focused on the journalistic and legalistic implications but have yet to explore how the public views those who release classified materials, and what factors affect those views. Using data from the 2018 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, we provide results from three embedded experiments testing the effects of two forms of framing on favorability ratings toward Assange, Manning, and Snowden. The first frame addresses partisanship (i.e., which party is injured by the release) and the second addresses how the action is framed (i.e., did the person “leak” or “blow the whistle”). The data show that both the party and leaking/whistleblowing frames significantly affect favorability in expected ways. The release of classified materials comes with both costs and benefits, but public opinion appears to be more sensitive to its implications for partisan competition.

IntroductionTo present an analysis of the Brazilian health system and subnational (state) variation in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, based on 10 non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs).Materials and methodsWe collected daily information on implementation of 10 NPI designed to inform the public of health risks and promote distancing and mask use at the national level for eight countries across the Americas. We then analyse the adoption of the 10 policies across Brazil’s 27 states over time, individually and using a composite index. We draw on this index to assess the timeliness and rigour of NPI implementation across the country, from the date of the first case, 26 February 2020. We also compile Google data on population mobility by state to describe changes in mobility throughout the COVID-19 pandemic.ResultsBrazil’s national NPI response was the least stringent among countries analysed. In the absence of a unified federal response to the pandemic, Brazilian state policy implementation was neither homogenous nor synchronised. The median NPI was no stay-at-home order, a recommendation to wear masks in public space but not a requirement, a full school closure and partial restrictions on businesses, public transportation, intrastate travel, interstate travel and international travel. These restrictions were implemented 45 days after the first case in each state, on average. Rondônia implemented the earliest and most rigorous policies, with school closures, business closures, information campaigns and restrictions on movement 24 days after the first case; Mato Grosso do Sul had the fewest, least stringent restrictions on movement, business operations and no mask recommendation.ConclusionsThe study identifies wide variation in national-level NPI responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. Our focus on Brazil identifies subsequent variability in how and when states implemented NPI to contain COVID-19. States’ NPIs and their scores on the composite policy index both align with the governors’ political affiliations: opposition governors implemented earlier, more stringent sanitary measures than those supporting the Bolsonaro administration. A strong, unified national response to a pandemic is essential for keeping the population safe and disease-free, both at the outset of an outbreak and as communities begin to reopen. This national response should be aligned with state and municipal implementation of NPI, which we show is not the case in Brazil.