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Building stock growth around the world drives extensive material consumption and environmental impacts. Future impacts will be dependent on the level and rate of socioeconomic development, along with material use and supply strategies. Here we evaluate material-related greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions for residential and commercial buildings along with their reduction potentials in 26 global regions by 2060. For a middle-of-the-road baseline scenario, building material-related emissions see an increase of 3.5 to 4.6 Gt CO2eq yr-1 between 2020–2060. Low- and lower-middle-income regions see rapid emission increase from 750 Mt (22% globally) in 2020 and 2.4 Gt (51%) in 2060, while higher-income regions shrink in both absolute and relative terms. Implementing several material efficiency strategies together in a High Efficiency (HE) scenario could almost half the baseline emissions. Yet, even in this scenario, the building material sector would require double its current proportional share of emissions to meet a 1.5 °C-compatible target. Building construction causes large material-related emissions which present a serious decarbonization challenge. Here, the authors show that the building material sector could halve emissions by increasing efficiency until 2060 but even then its emissions would be twice as high as needed to meet the 1.5 °C target.

The world is shifting to electric vehicles to mitigate climate change. Here, we quantify the future demand for key battery materials, considering potential electric vehicle fleet and battery chemistry developments as well as second-use and recycling of electric vehicle batteries. We find that in a lithium nickel cobalt manganese oxide dominated battery scenario, demand is estimated to increase by factors of 18–20 for lithium, 17–19 for cobalt, 28–31 for nickel, and 15–20 for most other materials from 2020 to 2050, requiring a drastic expansion of lithium, cobalt, and nickel supply chains and likely additional resource discovery. However, uncertainties are large. Key factors are the development of the electric vehicles fleet and battery capacity requirements per vehicle. If other battery chemistries were used at large scale, e.g. lithium iron phosphate or novel lithium-sulphur or lithium-air batteries, the demand for cobalt and nickel would be substantially smaller. Closed-loop recycling plays a minor, but increasingly important role for reducing primary material demand until 2050, however, advances in recycling are necessary to economically recover battery-grade materials from end-of-life batteries. Second-use of electric vehicles batteries further delays recycling potentials. Lithium-ion-based batteries are a key enabler for the global shift towards electric vehicles. Here, considering developments in battery chemistry and number of electric vehicles, analysis reveals the increasing amounts of lithium, cobalt and nickel that could be needed.

The energy transition will require a rapid deployment of renewable energy (RE) and electric vehicles (EVs) where other transit modes are unavailable. EV batteries could complement RE generation by providing short-term grid services. However, estimating the market opportunity requires an understanding of many socio-technical parameters and constraints. We quantify the global EV battery capacity available for grid storage using an integrated model incorporating future EV battery deployment, battery degradation, and market participation. We include both in-use and end-of-vehicle-life use phases and find a technical capacity of 32–62 terawatt-hours by 2050. Low participation rates of 12%–43% are needed to provide short-term grid storage demand globally. Participation rates fall below 10% if half of EV batteries at end-of-vehicle-life are used as stationary storage. Short-term grid storage demand could be met as early as 2030 across most regions. Our estimates are generally conservative and offer a lower bound of future opportunities. Renewable energy and electric vehicles will be required for the energy transition, but the global electric vehicle battery capacity available for grid storage is not constrained. Here the authors find that electric vehicle batteries alone could satisfy short-term grid storage demand by as early as 2030.

Function‐oriented business models or product–service systems (PSSs) are often seen as an excellent means for achieving ‘factor 4’. SusProNet, an EU network on PSSs, showed a more complicated reality. At least eight different types of PSS exist, with quite diverging economic and environmental characteristics. The economic potential of each type was evaluated in terms of (i) tangible and intangible value for the user, (ii) tangible costs and risk premium for the provider, (iii) capital/investment needs and (iv) issues such as the providers' position in the value chain and client relations. The environmental potential was evaluated by checking the relevance of certain impact reduction mechanisms (e.g. more intensive use of capital goods, inherent incentives for sustainable user and provider behaviour etc.). Most PSS types will result in marginal environmental improvements at best. The exception is the PSS type known as functional results, but here liability and risk premium issues, amongst others, need a solution. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.

This study shows the environmental impacts and economic performance due to agricultural trade through The Netherlands. Using the demand-driven input–output model and the database EXIOBASE (2011), we first analysed the environmental impacts and value added directly generated abroad by the agricultural sector through imported final consumption in The Netherlands; we then compared the environmental impacts and value added generated in The Netherlands by the agricultural sector due to exports to other countries. The results show that the Dutch consumption of imported agricultural products had significant greenhouse gas emissions of 19,386 kt CO2-eq, land use of 280,525 km2 and water consumption of 50,373 M.m3, while impacts in The Netherlands due to agricultural exports amounted, respectively, to 13,022 kt CO2-eq, 9282 km2 and 3339 M.m3. At the same time, we found that Dutch agricultural production had a higher value added to pressure ratio than abroad. These differences highlight the great dependency of Dutch final consumption on foreign natural resources, a significant trade imbalance for environmental impacts with relatively smaller economic benefits for countries exporting to The Netherlands. With these results, we suggest that it is of great importance that sustainability policies for the agricultural sector not only address environmental impacts domestically but also impacts and value creation abroad.

The environmental impact of traded plastic waste hinges on how it is treated. Existing studies often use domestic or scenario-based recycling rates for imported plastic waste, which is problematic due to differences in recyclability and the fact that importers pay for it. We estimate the minimum required recycling rate ( RRR ) needed to break even financially by analysing import prices, recycling costs, and the value of recycled plastics across 22 leading importing countries and four plastic waste types during 2013–2022. Here we show that at least 63% of imported plastic waste must be recycled, surpassing the average domestic recycling rate of 23% by 40 percentage points. This discrepancy suggests that recycled plastics volumes from the global North-to-South trade may be underestimated. The country-specific RRR provided could enhance research and policy efforts to better quantify and mitigate the environmental impact of plastic waste trade. Kai and colleagues found that at least 63% of imported plastic waste needed to be recycled for economic viability in 22 top importing countries during 2013–2022, exceeding the average domestic recycling rate of 23%.

Biodiversity and ecosystem service losses driven by land-use change are expected to intensify as a growing and more affluent global population requires more agricultural and forestry products, and teleconnections in the global economy lead to increasing remote environmental responsibility. By combining global biophysical and economic models, we show that, between the years 2000 and 2011, overall population and economic growth resulted in increasing total impacts on bird diversity and carbon sequestration globally, despite a reduction of land-use impacts per unit of gross domestic product (GDP). The exceptions were North America and Western Europe, where there was a reduction of forestry and agriculture impacts on nature accentuated by the 2007–2008 financial crisis. Biodiversity losses occurred predominantly in Central and Southern America, Africa and Asia with international trade an important and growing driver. In 2011, 33% of Central and Southern America and 26% of Africa’s biodiversity impacts were driven by consumption in other world regions. Overall, cattle farming is the major driver of biodiversity loss, but oil seed production showed the largest increases in biodiversity impacts. Forestry activities exerted the highest impact on carbon sequestration, and also showed the largest increase in the 2000–2011 period. Our results suggest that to address the biodiversity crisis, governments should take an equitable approach recognizing remote responsibility, and promote a shift of economic development towards activities with low biodiversity impacts. Combining biophysical and economic models, the authors show that the impacts of land use on bird biodiversity and carbon sequestration have increased over the years 2000–2011, with cattle farming being a major driver of biodiversity loss.

Dietary choices drive both health and environmental outcomes. Information on diets come from many sources, with nationally recommended diets (NRDs) by governmental or similar advisory bodies the most authoritative. Little or no attention is placed on the environmental impacts within NRDs. Here we quantify the impact of nation-specific NRDs, compared with an average diet in 37 nations, representing 64% of global population. We focus on greenhouse gases (GHGs), eutrophication, and land use because these have impacts reaching or exceeding planetary boundaries. We show that compared with average diets, NRDs in high-income nations are associated with reductions in GHG, eutrophication, and land use from 13.0 to 24.8%, 9.8 to 21.3%, and 5.7 to 17.6%, respectively. In upper-middle–income nations, NRDs are associated with slight decrease in impacts of 0.8–12.2%, 7.7–19.4%, and 7.2–18.6%. In poorer middle-income nations, impacts increase by 12.4–17.0%, 24.5–31.9%, and 8.8–14.8%. The reduced environmental impact in high-income countries is driven by reductions in calories (∼54% of effect) and a change in composition (∼46%). The increased environmental impacts of NRDs in low- and middle-income nations are associated with increased intake in animal products. Uniform adoption of NRDs across these nations would result in reductions of 0.19–0.53 Gt CO₂ eq·a−1, 4.32–10.6 Gt PO 4 3 − eq·a−1, and 1.5–2.8 million km², while providing the health cobenefits of adopting an NRD. As a small number of dietary guidelines are beginning to incorporate more general environmental concerns, we anticipate that this work will provide a standardized baseline for future work to optimize recommended diets further.

High-income countries often outsource material demands to poorer countries along with the associated environmental damage. This phenomenon can also occur within (large) countries, such as China, which was responsible for 24 to 30% of the global material footprint (MF) between 2007 and 2010. Understanding the distribution and development of China’s MF is hence critical for resource efficiency and circular economy ambitions globally. Here we present a comprehensive analysis of China’s MF at the provincial and sectoral levels. We combine provincial-level input–output data with sector- and province-specific trade data, detailed material extraction data, and the global input–output database EXIOBASE. We find that some provinces have MFs equivalent to medium-sized, high-income countries and limited evidence of material decoupling. Lower-income regions with high levels of material extraction can have an MF per capita as large as developed provinces due to much higher material intensities. The higher-income south-coastal provinces have lower MF per capita than equally developed provinces. This finding relates partly to differences in economic structure but indicates the potential for improvement across provinces. Investment via capital formation is up to 4 times more resource-intensive than consumption and drives 49 to 86% of provincial-level MFs (the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development average is 37%). Resource-efficient production, efficient use of capital goods/infrastructure, and circular design are essential for reductions in China’s MF. Policy efforts to shift to a high-quality development model may reduce material intensities, preferably while avoiding the further outsourcing of high-intensity activities to other provinces or lower-income countries.

Sustainability transitions are purposeful and require deliberate collective action from multiple organizations, leading to the necessity to adopt new business models and redesign value networks. In both business model and sustainability transition research, the explicit activities needed to re-shape value creation and capture systems of organizations are largely unaddressed. We aim to fill this gap by proposing collaborative sustainable business modeling (CSBMing) as a participative multi-actor approach aimed at value network innovation to accelerate sustainability transitions. To do this, we first conceptualize a sustainability transition as a business ecosystem change. We then introduce the value network as the interceding level connecting the individual business to the wider ecosystem, which upon scaling, can change the ecosystem, leading to transition. CSBMing aims to redesign value networks and may thus be used as an actionable approach to accelerate transitions. Second, through the multi-level perspective, we explain how CSBMing can scale, influence other value networks, and change the ecosystem. Third, we recognize that scaling value networks might need more than just implementation of a CSBM and show how elements of CSBMing can complement executing transition management activities. We illustrate the potential role of CSBMing in accelerating transitions through two examples from the Dutch energy transition. In all, we show that CSBMing can be a fruitful approach to innovate and scale value networks, create collective action needed for sustainability transitions, and contribute to transition management activities.