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"Visala, Aku"
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Conversations on Human Nature
Recent empirical and philosophical research into the evolutionary history of Homo sapiens, the origins of the mind/brain, and the development of human culture has sparked heated debates about what it means to be human and how knowledge about humans from the sciences and humanities should be understood. Conversations on Human Nature, featuring 20 interviews with leading scholars in biology, psychology, anthropology, philosophy, and theology, brings these debates to life for teachers, students, and general readers. The book-outlines the basic scientific, philosophical and theological issues involved in understanding human nature;-organizes material from the various disciplines under four broad headings: (1) evolution, brains and human nature; (2) biocultural human nature; (3) persons, minds and human nature, (4) religion, theology and human nature; -concludes with Fuentes and Visala's discussion of what researchers into human nature agree on, what they disagree on, and what we need to learn to resolve those differences.
eBook
Between Religion and Science
Examining the relationship between religion and science has until recently been considered a philosophical exercise and, as a consequence, theories of how natural and supernatural explanations are related tend to be highly abstract and operate at the level of ideal rationality rather than in the psychological reality of actual believers. Although cognitive developmental psychologists have studied the topic of explanation quite extensively, until recently little has been known about how people interpret, accommodate, and reconcile natural and supernatural explanations in everyday life. We review psychological data from three core biological domains and provide an analysis of how philosophical and psychological accounts are complementary. We propose that emerging psychological accounts of the coexistence of natural and supernatural explanations may be developed further by adopting the conceptual resources provided by philosophers, especially with respect to the topics of explanation and possible relationships between science and religion. Furthermore, psychological data can inform philosophical accounts by providing information concerning how people reason about topics of fundamental concern to humans.
Journal Article
Review of The Mind and the Machine: What It Means to Be Human and Why It Matters
Review of Matthew Dickerson, The Mind and the Machine: What It Means to Be Human and Why It Matters (Grand Rapids, 2011). 230 pages. Kindle edition $9.99. ISBN: 978158743272-9.
Journal Article
Verbs, Bones, and Brains
The last few decades have seen an unprecedented surge of empirical and philosophical research into the evolutionary history of Homo sapiens, the origins of the mind/brain, and human culture. This research and its popular interpretations have sparked heated debates about the nature of human beings and how knowledge about humans from the sciences and humanities should be properly understood. The goal of Verbs, Bones, and Brains: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Human Nature is to engage these themes and present current debates, discussions, and discourse for a range of readers. The contributors bring the discussion to life with key experts outlining major concepts paired with cross-disciplinary commentaries in order to create a novel approach to thinking about, and with, human natures. The intent of the contributors to this volume is not to enter into or adjudicate complex philosophical issues of an epistemological or metaphysical nature. Instead, their common concern is to set aside the rigid distinctions between biology and culture that have made such discussions problematic. First, informing their approach is an acknowledgment of the widespread disagreement about such basic metaphysical and epistemological questions as the existence of God, the nature of scientific knowledge, and the existence of essences, among other topics. Second, they try to identify and explicate the assumptions that enter into their conceptualizations of human nature. Throughout, they emphasize the importance of seeking a convergence in our views on human nature, despite metaphysical disagreements. They caution that if convergence eludes us and a common ground cannot be found, this is itself a relevant result: it would reveal to us how deeply our questions about ourselves are connected to our basic metaphysical assumptions. Instead, their focus is on how the interdisciplinary and possibly transdisciplinary conversation can be enhanced in order to identify and develop a common ground on what constitutes human nature.
eBook
CONSCIOUSNESS AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY: SKEPTICAL CHALLENGES AND THEOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS
Some philosophers and scientists have argued that we humans cannot be held morally responsible for anything. Invoking results of the neurosciences and the cognitive sciences, they argue that humans lack the kind of conscious control and awareness required for moral responsibility. For theological ethics and Christian theology as a whole, moral responsibility is indispensable. I will begin by outlining some empirical results that are invoked in support of moral responsibility skepticism. I will, then, examine the subsequent discussion and the question why conscious awareness is central to moral responsibility. Consciousness contributes to morally relevant control over action in multiple ways. I will briefly examine some accounts of conscious control that are resistant to the skeptical challenge. Although the empirical results might lead us to revise the degree and range of conscious control, there seems to be enough of it to ground many everyday practices of responsibility. I will conclude the article with some theological reflections.
Journal Article
IMAGO DEI, DUALISM, AND EVOLUTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL DEFENSE OF THE STRUCTURAL IMAGE OF GOD
Most contemporary theologians have distanced themselves from views that identify the image of God with a capacity or a set of capacities that humans have. This article examines three arguments against the structural view and finds them wanting. The first argument is that the structural view entails mind/body dualism and dualism is no longer viable given neuroscience and contemporary philosophy. Against this, I argue that contemporary forms of dualism are able to circumvent such worries and are at least prima facie plausible. The second claim is that structural views end up disvaluing the human body and our relatedness. Here, I argue that neither the structural view nor dualism has such consequences. The third issue consists of various evolutionary worries that have to do with the lack of a clear‐cut boundary between human capacities and the capacities of nonhuman animals. As a response, the article argues that although there might not be a clear‐cut set of capacities that all humans share, we could still have a notion of human distinctiveness that is sufficient for the structural image of God.
Journal Article
Reflections on the Debate: What Does Philosophy Have to Do with the Cognitive Study of Religion?
Why should the study of religion in general and cognitive study of religion in particular be interested in philosophy in the first place, and vice versa? The paper offers some responses to the debate between John Shook and his respondents. It will suggest that such debates are useful, as it is a philosophical task to reflect upon the basic assumptions, inference patterns and theories of the study of religion. Furthermore, cognitive study of religion and other approaches in the study of religion should be of great interest to philosophers of religion. The paper puts the debate in a larger context of the dialogue of philosophy and cognitive science of religion and introduces two central themes: debates about psychological explanations and debunking arguments.
Journal Article
Evolutionary debunking arguments against theism, reconsidered
Evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs) against religious beliefs move from the claim that religious beliefs are caused by off-track processes to the conclusion that said religious beliefs are unjustified and/or false. Prima facie, EDAs commit the genetic fallacy, unduly conflating the context of discovery and the context of justification. In this paper, we first consider whether EDAs necessarily commit the genetic fallacy, and if not, whether modified EDAs (e.g., those that posit falsehood-tracking or perniciously deceptive belief-forming mechanisms) provide successful arguments against theism. Then, we critically evaluate more recent attempts to argue that a more promiscuous evolutionary scepticism renders religious belief unjustified because, unlike commonsense and scientific beliefs, religious beliefs have no way out of such scepticism.
Journal Article